February 2026 Longshore Maritime Update No. 321
Notes from your Updater:
The IRS announced an increase in the rate for business mileage, beginning on January 1, 2026, up from 70 cents per mile to 72.5 cents per mile. The rate for medical mileage dropped from 21 cents per mile to 20.5 cents per mile.
In the January 2026 Update we reported that Judge Saris of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts declared President Trump’s executive memorandum titled “Temporary Withdrawal of All Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf From Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government’s Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects” (directing federal agencies “to suspend issuing all new permits, leases, and other authorizations needed to develop and operate wind energy projects, both onshore and offshore, pending a wide-ranging assessment of federal wind leasing and permitting practices”) to be “unlawful” and vacated the order in its entirety. See State of New York v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-11221, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252857 (D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2025). We also reported in the September 2025 Update that Judge Gallagher of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed several counts in the suit by the Mayor and City Council of Ocean City Maryland against the United States Department of the Interior, seeking to set aside the approval of the construction and operations plan for the Maryland Offshore Wind Project to be located off the coast of Ocean City, Maryland and Fenwick Island, Delaware (based on violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and a number of federal environmental statutes). See Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, Maryland v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 1:24-cv-3111, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125644 (D. Md. July 2, 2025). After the revocation of the approval, US Wind asserted that the revocation violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. US Wind sought a preliminary injunction, but Judge Gallagher declined to grant the injunction on December 15, 2025, stating that US Wind had failed to identify any action constituting a final agency action that was ripe for review. The denial was without prejudice to renewal of the request at a later date. See 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258274 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2025). Judges in additional cases issued orders allowing construction to continue on offshore wind projects. On January 12, 2026, Judge Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a stay and preliminary injunction of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s order of December 22, 2025 that Revolution Wind, LLC suspend all ongoing activities on the Revolution Wind Project off the coast of Rhode Island for 90 days “for reasons of national security.” See Revolution Wind, LLC v. Burgum, No. 1:25-cv-2999 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2026). On January 15, 2025, Judge Nichols of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a stay and preliminary injunction to Empire Leaseholder with respect to the order of December 22, 2025 for the Empire Wind 1 Project offshore Brooklyn, New York. See Empire Leaseholder LLC v. Burgum, No. 1:26-cv-4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2026). On January 16, 2026, Judge Walker of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted a preliminary injunction staying the December 22, 2025 order with respect to the Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind Project. See Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. United States Department of the Interior, No. 2:25-cv-830 (E.D. Va. Jan. 16, 2026). And, on January 27, 2026, Judge Murphy of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts stayed the December 22, 2025 order with respect to the Vineyard Wind 1 Project off the coast of Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts. See Vineyard Wind 1 LLC v. United States Department of the Interior, No. 1:26-cv-10156 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2026).
We previously reported that Judge Aiken of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued an injunction ordering the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security to restore and maintain the helicopter rescue capacity of the Newport Air Facility in Oregon that was to be closed on the eve of Dungeness crab fishing season (posing a grave risk to the fishermen in Newport and surrounding communities). See Newport Fishermen’s Wives, Inc. v. United States Coast Guard, No. 6:25-cv-2165, No. 6:25-cv-2172, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230689 (D. Ore. Nov. 24, 2025). Judge Aiken then held an evidentiary hearing and considered the argument of the United States that the plaintiffs were seeking a mandatory injunction, which is subject to a higher standard than a prohibitory injunction. According to the United States, the plaintiffs were seeking to restore the outdated HH-52 helicopters that were used in 1987, and the United States has no operational HH-52 helicopters. Calling the United States’ framing of the injunction as “palpably ridiculous,” Judge Aiken stated in her opinion on December 22, 2025 that the plaintiffs were only seeking to restore the status quo that the United States would deploy a rescue helicopter, a prohibitory injunction. Accordingly, Judge Aiken ordered the United States “to preserve the status quo ante by restoring and maintaining the deployment of a Coast Guard MH-65 rescue helicopter to AIRFAC Newport, together with full operational capabilities, infrastructure, and personnel support” during the pendency of the suits. Judge Aiken also held that no bond would be required. 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26813 (D. Ore. Dec. 22, 2025).
On December 22, 2025, Judge Boardman of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, declined to transfer the suit brought in federal court in Maryland to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, in which the Sierra Club and other groups challenged the biological opinion of the National Marine Fisheries Service with respect to the impact of oil and gas activities in the Gulf of America on protected species under the Endangered Species Act. See Sierra Club v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 8:22-cv-1627, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264605 (D. Md. Dec. 22, 2025).
Many state and local governments impose an accommodation tax on hotels, and some have extended the tax to vacation rentals (such as Airbnb) that provide short-term accommodations. The state of Hawaii enacted a statute that extended its tax, registration, and notification requirements to cruise ships that dock at ports in Hawaii. The Cruise Line International Association and local business interests brought suit in federal court in Hawaii, challenging the law as violating the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution, conflicting with the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1884, and infringing on the cruise lines’ First Amendment right against compelled speech. The parties each sought injunctive relief. Although Judge Otake believed that there were serious questions on the Tonnage Clause claims, she declined to grant an injunction on the ground that there was no showing of irreparable harm. Both sides filed notices for an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See Cruise Lines International Association, Inc. v. Suganuma, No. 1:25-cv-367, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 269925 (D. Haw. Dec. 23, 2025).
On January 9, 2026, the First Circuit affirmed the decision of Judge Stearns of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, declining to grant an injunction to employees who sought exemptions from the COVID-19 vaccination policy of the Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, which provides ferry service between the mainland of Cape Cod and the Islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket. See Brox v. Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, No. 24-1063, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 573 (1st Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (Howard).
On January 14, 2025, the Fifth Circuit denied the challenge of the South Texas Environmental Justice Network to the third extension granted by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality for Texas LNG to begin construction of an LNG terminal on a site bordering the Brownsville Ship Channel. See South Texas Environmental Justice Network v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, No. 24-60580, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 977 (5th Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) (Higginbotham).
We reported in our September 2025 Update that the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of Judge Rodgers of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, dismissing the LHWCA claim of shipyard worker Albert Jackson as a sanction for failing to provide authorizations and to attend a medical examination. Horizon Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 24-12858, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 19230 (11th Cir. July 31, 2025) (per curiam). Jackson filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and, on January 27, 2026, the Supreme Court declined to grant the writ. See Jackson v. Horizon Shipbuilding, Inc., No. 25-6184, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 619 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2026).
On the LHWCA Front . . .
From the federal appellate courts
Second Circuit rejected argument of security worker who claimed PTSD for service in Iraq that the ALJ improperly denied his claim on the basis of his lack of credibility and not giving sufficient weight to the opinions of his treating psychiatrists compared the opinions of the employer/carrier’s choice of psychiatrist; Gabriel v. United States Department of Labor (SOC-SMG, Inc.), No. 24-2254, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 32904 (2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) (per curiam).
Rogers Avendano Gabriel, a resident of Lima Peru, worked as a security guard in Iraq for SOC from July 2011 until January 8, 2012, primarily at the U.S. Embassy and nearby checkpoints. His employment with SOC followed similar employment with Triple Canopy. Gabriel claimed that rockets, mortars, and car bombs exploded close to where he was on duty from 2007 to January 2012, and that he was left “a little bit deaf,” had trouble seeing well, had trouble sleeping, experienced headaches, and developed blisters after taking refuge in a location where there were “flies—flying worms.” Gabriel went on medical leave on January 8, 2012 (he was “feeling bad”) and returned to Peru where he worked as a security guard. Gabriel claimed that he worked at some points and his brother supported him when he was not working. He met with a lawyer about a claim at some point between 2012 and 2014, and his symptoms returned or intensified in 2019 (nightmares about explosions and hitting the enemy). Gabriel had a medical evaluation in March 2020 with Dr. Eduardo Avila Suarez, a psychologist who is the Director of the Psychological Counseling Center Villasol, who diagnosed Gabriel with post-traumatic stress disorder as a “sequel of war.” Gabriel was also examined by Dr. Jesus Angel Manrique Galvez, a psychiatrist, who diagnosed late onset PTSD due to war sequelae. Another psychiatrist, Dr. Gustavo R. Benejam, diagnosed Gabriel with PTSD, Major Depressive Disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder caused “by the traumatic experiences as part of his work overseas.” Dr. Benejam opined that Gabriel’s symptomatology limited him from war-related jobs or work that involves stress and interaction with others. Benjamin filed his claim for compensation under the LHWCA (as extended by the Defense Base Act) on June 9, 2020, and SOC and its carrier, Continental Insurance Co., controverted the claim. Their choice of psychiatrist, Dr. Yuri Velazco Lorenzo, evaluated Gabriel and reported that the results of the psychometric tests and inconsistencies in the symptoms he related demonstrated that Gabriel was “exaggerating and simulating symptoms to validate the PTSD diagnosis.” He concluded that Gabriel did not have PTSD but had Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood. He stated that the disorder was likely triggered by Gabriel’s “economic and work situation and his mother’s health problems,” noting that Gabriel had returned to Peru and worked without issue “until he was fired due to his constant leaves to take care of his mother’s health.” The dispute was tried to Administrative Law Judge Calianos on a paper record (with a formal hearing), and ALJ Calianos found that Gabriel established a prima facie case of psychological harm that could have been caused by his working conditions in Iraq and that the employer/carrier rebutted the prima facie case with the unequivocal opinion of Dr. Lorenzo that Gabriel’s “current depression, anxiety, and other psychological symptoms are part of an adjustment disorder triggered in 2019, by his termination from his employment, with subsequent financial issues, and his mother’s ill health.” Weighing the evidence, ALJ Calianos held that Gabriel did not meet his burden on causation for his alleged psychological injury, finding that Gabriel lacked credibility, the diagnoses that were based on his self-reporting of symptoms were not reliable, and that the “well-reasoned” opinions of Dr. Lorenzo outweighed the opinions of Gabriel’s psychiatrists. Therefore, he denied the claim for benefits under the LHWCA/DBA. Gabriel appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which concluded in a per curiam opinion, that ALJ Calianos’ credibility determinations were rational and supported by the evidence in the record. Therefore, the BRB affirmed the denial of disability and medical benefits based on the finding that Gabriel’s psychological condition was not work-related. Gabriel filed a petition for review with the Second Circuit, arguing that ALJ Calianos should not have concluded that his credibility was “questionable” based on “minor inconsistencies” in his testimony that should be attributed to his “cognitive difficulties” and not a lack of credibility. The Second Circuit rejected Gabriel’s argument, reasoning that the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not “patently unreasonable.” Gabriel also argued that ALJ Calianos gave too little weight to the opinions of the treating psychiatrists and accorded too much weight to Dr. Lorenzo’s opinions. The Second Circuit held that the ALJ properly relied on the opinions of Dr. Lorenzo, stating: “Dr. Lorenzo deployed ‘multiple objective psychological tests,’ ‘discussed in detail [Gabriel’s] experiences in Iraq, personal history and education, and occupational history,’ and conducted an analysis of [Gabriel’s] symptoms against the DSM-V criteria for PTSD and adjustment disorder.” As it was “for the ALJ, and not this Court, to weigh conflicting evidence,” The Second Circuit denied the petition for review.
From the federal district courts
Longshore worker’s spoliation argument that his expert would not be able to opine about the defective condition of the pin on the gangway that disengaged (causing his injury) was used to exclude the opinion of the expert who could not inspect the pin; absence of evidence of a defect in the pin was fatal to the worker’s claim for breach of the turnover duty, and access of third parties to the gangway was fatal to the worker’s claims of res ipsa loquitur and breach of the active control duty; Mondella v. Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Oltmann mbH & Co., No. 1:20-cv-1059, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258966 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025) (Gonzalez).
Robert Mondella, an employee of Global Container Terminal, was assigned to unlash containers on the JPO CAPRICORNUS, which was docked at the Howland Hook Marine Terminal in Staten Island. Mondella boarded the ship using the gangway that was assembled by the vessel’s crew (he and other longshore workers continued to use the gangway throughout the day). In the early afternoon, Mondella was disembarking the vessel when part of the handrail he was using became loose after a pin disengaged, and Mondella fell down several of the gangway’s steps. Mondella brought suit against the owner and operator of the vessel in federal court in New York under Section 5(b) of the LHWCA. The defendants moved to exclude the opinions of Mondella’s liability expert, Captain Joseph Ahlstrom, and for summary judgment. Judge Gonzalez began with the comment: “With no hint of irony, Defendants ask the Court to find that the metaphorical guardrails of Rule 702 apply such that they preclude the expert testimony of Capt. Ahlstrom, which concerns the literal guardrails on the gangway of the Capricornus.” The defendants challenged Captain Ahlstrom’s “defective pin theory” (that the accident occurred because the pin used in the handrail was dangerous) because of its rusted and deteriorated condition. The defendants acknowledged Captain Ahlstrom’s experience with hundreds (if not thousands) of gangways, but they argued that he is not a metallurgist and his expertise does not extend to the integrity of the pin, noting that he did not inspect in person the pin or the gangway. Judge Gonzalez recognized that the failure to inspect the pin or gangway was not sufficient, by itself, to render the opinions unreliable, Mondella previously stated in a spoliation motion that without the pin, their expert would not have sufficient facts to determine the condition of the pin. Judge Rodriguez considered that concession to be fatal, concluding that the opinion about the defective pin was too speculative and conjectural. As Captain Ahlstrom’s other conclusions failed to consider reasonable alternative causes and were legal conclusions “dressed up as expert testimony,” Judge Gonzalez excluded the opinions of Captain Ahlstrom. Turning to the motion for summary judgment, Judge Gonzalez addressed the defendants’ arguments that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in this case and that the defendants did not breach any Scindia duties. Judge Gonzalez agreed that res ipsa loquitur did not apply because third parties had access to the gangway and the defendants did not have exclusive control over it. After excluding the opinions of Captain Ahlstrom with respect to a defect in the pin, there was no evidence that the gangway was turned over in a defective condition. The active control duty failed for the same reason as the res ipsa loquitur claim—control of the gangway was ceded to stevedoring operations. Moreover, the defendants continued to monitor and inspect the gangway during the day to prevent unreasonable hazards. Judge Gonzalez stated: “Defendants’ access to the gangway and their ability to inspect the gangway are not enough to trigger the active control duty.” Accordingly, Judge Gonzalez granted summary judgment to the defendants.
Offshore platform worker was entitled to a jury trial in his maritime suit brought in state court that was removed to federal court based on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; the worker was not a seaman, and his claims under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness were dismissed, but he presented sufficient facts to support his claims under Section 5(b) of the LHWCA and general maritime negligence against the boat for the slippery condition of a step on which he fell and for lack of a guardrail; Lopez v. Quality Construction & Production, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-250, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260157, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7117 (M.D. La. Dec. 15, 2025, Jan. 14, 2026) (Jackson).
Rolando Lopez was employed by Quality Construction as a rigger to perform work on a Talos Energy platform that was located on the outer Continental Shelf of the Gulf of America, offshore Louisiana. He ate and slept on the M/V ISABELLA ROSE, and he slipped and fell on the vessel while walking to the mess hall. Lopez brought this suit in Louisiana state court against his employer, Quality Construction, and the charterer of the ISABELLA ROSE, C&G Boats, asserting that he was a Jones Act seaman. Quality Construction removed the case to federal court in Louisiana, arguing that Lopez was covered under the LHWCA, as extended by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (and was not a seaman) and asserting that there was federal jurisdiction under the OCSLA. Lopez argued that the court did not have jurisdiction under the OCSLA because he was off duty at the time of the incident. Magistrate Judge Wilder-Doomes rejected the argument, and Judge Jackson agreed with Magistrate Judge Wilder-Doomes. He cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Valladolid in which the Court held that the OCSLA applied when the employee’s land-based injury occurred as the result of extractive operations conducted on the OCS. In this case, Lopez “was engaged in offshore operations that qualify for OCSLA jurisdiction, and his injury on a vessel attached to an offshore platform occurred ‘as a result’ of those operations.” As Lopez would not have been injured but for his employment to work on the platform to which his vessel was moored, Judge Jackson agreed that the case fell within the scope of the OCSLA, and removal was proper. Judge Jackson then addressed the motion of the owner of the M/V ISABELLA ROSE for summary judgment on Lopez’s Jones Act claim against the vessel owner based on the evidence that Lopez performed his work almost exclusively on fixed platforms. Lopez responded that the court should remand the case instead of ruling on the merits, but Judge Jackson granted summary judgment, dismissing the Jones Act claim, as Lopez failed to contest the substance of the argument presented by the owner. See May 2024 Update.
The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal of the unseaworthiness claims. Lopez opposed the motion, explaining that he would not pursue the unseaworthiness claims so long as the court’s ruling on his seaman status under the Jones Act “remains binding on the parties.” As the unseaworthiness claims were left “untethered to any legal authority to which he could be afforded relief,” Judge Jackson dismissed the unseaworthiness claims. See April 2025 Update.
The defendants moved to strike Lopez’s jury demand, arguing that the remaining claims were only cognizable under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction. Judge Jackson noted that the case was removed based on jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and Lopez filed an amended complaint in which he asserted jurisdiction under the OCSLA and sought a jury trial. In the amended complaint he alleged maritime claims but removed all references to admiralty jurisdiction. Concluding that Lopez “was clear enough” that he was not invoking admiralty jurisdiction, Judge Jackson held that Lopez had retained the right to a jury trial.
As Lopez was not a seaman, the vessel defendants moved for summary judgment that they did not breach any duty to Lopez under Section 5(b) of the LHWCA or under the general maritime law, arguing that Lopez had no claim for negligence arising from wet surfaces and other conditions inherent in work at sea. Judge Jackson did not have to decide whether the duty should be determined under Scindia (Section 5(b)) or under the general maritime law as he found fact issues that precluded summary judgment. With respect to the turnover duty, Lopez’s expert, Dr. Robert Andres opined that the diamond plating was not adequately slip resistant and that the lack of a handrail compounded the hazard because Lopez did not have an adequate means to arrest his fall. The issue of whether the defendants were in active control of the area where the injury occurred was also highly contested. The defendants argued that they did not issue any orders or directions to Lopez to engage in any specific work practices; did not provide any personnel, tools, or equipment for his work; and did not exercise supervision or control over Lopez during his work. Lopez responded that only the back deck, not the galley where the incident occurred, was included in his area of assigned work and that his employer’s contract with the defendants indicated that the whole of the vessel was under the owner’s sole control and that the owner remained responsible to maintain the vessel. Therefore, Judge Jackson denied the motion for summary judgment.
And on the maritime front . . .
From the federal appellate courts
Montreal Convention (limits on liability) and admiralty law (joint and several liability) applied to passenger injury on round-trip flight from Florida to The Bahamas; Murphy v. Airway Air Charter, Inc., No. 24-13811, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1220 (11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (per curiam).
Richard C. Murphy, III, chartered a Cessna 402B from Airway Air Charter for a flight from Opa-Locka, Florida to Chub Cay in The Bahamas. The aircraft was owned by Venture Air Solutions and was operated by Airway Air Charter. Atlantic Aviation provided supplies and fuel. Murphy was the sole passenger, and the plane was piloted by Alex Gutierrez. The plane ran out of fuel during the flight, causing it to crash into the ocean. Murphy and his wife brought this suit in state court in Miami-Dade County, Florida, against Airway Air Charter, Venture Air Solutions, and Gutierrez, asserting claims under Florida law. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the claims were governed by the Warsaw Convention (as updated by the Montreal Convention), not Florida law, and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint based on the Warsaw Convention. The plaintiffs added Atlantic Aviation in their third amended complaint, and Atlantic Aviation removed the case based on federal question jurisdiction (from the Warsaw Convention) and admiralty jurisdiction. In federal court, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint, attaching the Charter Agreement. Airway Air Charter and Gutierrez moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint, citing the liability waiver for injuries in the Charter Agreement. The plaintiffs responded that Airway Air Charter and Gutierrez had waived their right to raise the waiver as a defense by repeatedly failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in their answers to the previous complaints filed by the plaintiffs. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the waiver was unenforceable under the Warsaw Convention. Airway Air Charter and Gutierrez argued that they did timely raise the waiver defense in their response to the fourth amended complaint, which was the operative pleading at the time. Judge Bloom rejected that argument as the Eleventh Circuit has held that an amended complaint does not automatically revive all defenses or objections that the defendant may have waived in response to a prior complaint. She held that Airway Air Charter and Gutierrez waived reliance on the waiver by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense when answering the complaint in state court. Judge Bloom also addressed the argument that the waiver was unenforceable and the defendants’ argument that the Warsaw Convention does not prevent the parties from entering into a different agreement limiting liability. Judge Bloom agreed that the parties can enter into agreements for different limitations on liability, but the agreements may only provide a limitation in excess of the cap on liability of $75,000. As the waiver in this case provided for a release of all liability, Judge Bloom held that the defendants had not shown that Murphy failed to state a claim based on the waiver provision. See May 2024 Update.
The parties filed several motions that were addressed by Judge Bloom. The defendants challenged the testimony of Murphy’s accident reconstruction expert, Mark Pottinger, that the aircraft most likely experienced dual engine failure as the result of fuel starvation when the pilot mismanaged available fuel by operating on the main fuel tanks until the fuel in those tanks was depleted. Although the defendants argued that Pottinger only held a single-engine private pilot’s license, not the multi-engine license required to fly the Cessna 402B, Judge Bloom noted that Pottinger had extensive qualifications from his education, training, and experience. The defendants next argued that Pottinger’s testimony should be excluded because the overwhelming evidence indicated the main tanks were fueled (but Pottinger opined the auxiliary tanks were fueled) and because his opinions were based on an unreliable Report of the Aircraft Investigation Authority of The Bahamas. However, Judge Bloom found sufficient support for Pottinger’s opinions, and the fact that the Report is inadmissible did not mean that his testimony was unreliable. Judge Bloom held that Pottinger could not testify that there was a violation of aviation regulations; however, he could testify as to the requirements of the regulations and about the evidence that may indicate those regulations were not followed. Judge Bloom also held that Pottinger’s opinion that Atlantic should have taken steps to preserve all video of the aircraft fueling, which deprived the accident investigators of valuable information, should be excluded because Pottinger’s experience and training did not demonstrate reliability of his opinions with respect to video footage and because his opinion was not probative of whether the defendant acted negligently in fueling the aircraft. Murphy sought to exclude the opinion of the defendants’ rebuttal expert, Keith O. Major, that the Report of the Bahamian Authority was inadmissible under Bahamian law. Judge Bloom agreed to strike that opinion because Murphy’s expert could rely on an inadmissible report in formulating his opinion and because Bahamian law was not applicable in this case. Judge Bloom next considered Murphy’s motion for summary judgment that the limitation of liability was unenforceable under the Warsaw Convention. The parties provided confusing briefing on whether the original Warsaw Convention or its subsequent protocols (the Hague Protocol or the Montreal Convention) applied. Murphy argued that the Hague Protocol applied because The Bahamas is not a party to the Montreal Convention, but the United States is a party to all three. As the flight was part of a round trip to/from the United States, Judge Bloom held that the Montreal Convention applied with its prohibition on agreements absolving a carrier from liability and its prohibition on limitation of liability of damages of $75,000 or less. Consequently, Judge Bloom held that the defendants could not rely on the limitation. Finally, Atlantic moved for summary judgment, arguing that any breach of duty in fueling the aircraft was not the proximate cause of the accident because the pilot bears the ultimate responsibility for the operation of the plane, including ensuring there is sufficient fuel. Judge Bloom believed, however, that the issue of proximate causation was properly left to the jury. See October 2024 Update.
In preparation for trial, Judge Bloom considered the parties’ motions in limine and held that the Bahamian Aircraft Accident Investigation Authority Report was admissible, once authenticated under the public records exception. She rejected the argument that the report was inadmissible under Bahamian law (as the claims are governed by Florida law) and the argument that the court should analogize the report to the inadmissibility of NTSB reports (answering that the report “is not a NTSB report”). Airway argued that evidence of Murphy’s emotional damages should be excluded based on the limitation in the Montreal Convention that a plaintiff cannot recover emotional damages unless they are “sufficiently connected to a physical injury.” Judge Bloom answered that to the extent Murphy can establish that he suffered emotional harm as a direct result of the physical injuries he suffered, the damages are recoverable.
Venture Air Solutions, owner of the plane, was sued for vicarious liability of the pilot and under a dangerous instrumentality theory. Venture sent Murphy a proposal for settlement that was unanswered, and Judge Bloom eventually granted summary judgment in favor of Venture. Venture then sought attorney fees and costs (pursuant to Florida’s statute providing for recovery of attorney fees), and Magistrate Judge Torres recommended an award of attorney fees because Venture prevailed on state as well as federal claims. Magistrate Judge Torres recommended an award of fees in the amount of $28,359.75, based on rates of $225 (partner) and $175 (associate).
The case was tried to a jury, and, on October 16, 2024, the jury found that Alex Gutierez and Airway were negligent, but that Atlantic was not negligent. The jury apportioned fault to Murphy (20%), Airway (40%), and Gutierrez (40%). The jury found damages in the total amount of $2,912,888--for past medical expenses ($12,888), past and future pain and suffering, disability, impairment, and disfigurement ($1,160,000), and mental anguish, inconvenience, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life as a result of the bodily injury ($1,740,000). Judge Bloom accordingly issued a final judgment against both Airway and Gutierrez. Airway and Gutierrez filed a motion for new trial and a notice of appeal. See December 2024 Update.
Murphy filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Torres’ recommendation with respect to attorney fees, arguing that federal law applied (adopting the American Rule for attorney fees) rather than Florida law (offer of judgment statute). Judge Bloom noted that Magistrate Judge Torres had concluded that Venture prevailed on claims under Florida law, but Murphy argued that the case was removed, in part, based on admiralty jurisdiction and that substantive admiralty law applied regardless of how Murphy pleaded the case: “Once a court enjoys admiralty jurisdiction, the substantive law of admiralty comes with it. That includes the American Rule.” Venture responded that there was supplemental jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Murphy and that Murphy had not contended that maritime law applied to the claims until it responded to the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Torres. Judge Bloom agreed that the argument based on application of admiralty law, which had not been presented to the Magistrate Judge, was untimely, stating that although Murphy “may indeed be correct that Venture is not entitled to attorneys’ fees because the claims are governed by federal admiralty law,” she did not have reach the merits given the “failure to properly preserve the issue for the Court’s review.” Accordingly, as the argument was untimely, Judge Bloom adopted the recommendation with respect to attorney fees. See April 2025 Update.
Airway and Gutierrez moved for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. Airway and Gutierrez argued that they were entitled to assert a Fabre defense under Florida law by which the jury would be able to assess fault against non-party Cessna Aircraft Corp. Judge Bloom rejected that argument as the claims were brought under maritime law (and treaty), not state law. As maritime law does not recognize the state rule on apportionment of fault, it would be error to allocate fault to a nonparty. The defendant also objected to the introduction of “enhanced videos of the fueling” that had not previously been produced. Judge Bloom easily rejected the argument as the enhancement was merely zooming in on the fueling, stating: “There is nothing inherently prejudicial about making it easier for the jury to review a video.” The defendants argued that the judgment improperly held Gutierrez jointly and severally liable, contrary to Florida law. Judge Bloom disagreed as the claims arose under the Montreal Convention and, more importantly, general maritime law, which provides for joint and several liability of defendants. Finally, the defendants argued that the sole cause of action asserted by Murphy was under the Warsaw Convention, which is different from the Montreal Convention. Judge Bloom agreed that Murphy pleaded the case under the Warsaw Convention, but she noted that a Warsaw Convention claim involves the same elements as a Montreal Convention claim. Accordingly, the defendants were on sufficient notice of the nature and grounds of the plaintiff’s claims. And, although there is a difference in the defenses available under the conventions, the case was tried based on the Montreal Convention so there was no prejudice to the defendant. See May 2025 Update.
Gutierrez appealed, arguing that Judge Bloom erred in applying the Montreal Convention (as the operative version of the Warsaw Convention in force in the United States). The Eleventh Circuit explained that the Montreal Convention provides the exclusive remedy for an injury to an international air passenger, including flights within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State (even if that State is not a party to the Convention). Thus, the Montreal Convention was the exclusive remedy for Murphy’s injury on the round-trip flight to The Bahamas even though The Bahamas is not a signatory to the Montreal Convention. The appellate court noted that Murphy’s complaint referred to the Warsaw Convention, but the court responded that the question is not whether the complaint properly identified the governing law but whether it pleaded facts sufficient to establish that the claim was plausible, stating: “[T]he fact that a plaintiff pleads an improper legal theory does not preclude recovery under the proper legal theory.” Gutierrez argued that he was prejudiced because the recoverable damages under the Montreal Convention are different than the damages recoverable under the Warsaw Convention, but the Eleventh Circuit answered that the defenses available under the two versions are essentially the same and that Gutierrez did not show that his strategy or preparation would have been different had the complaint pleaded the claims under the Montreal Convention. Gutierrez next argued that Judge Bloom erred in finding that Airway and Gutierrez were jointly and severally liable under the general maritime law. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, explaining that when the Montreal Convention speaks to an issue, such as the limit of liability, that is the end of the inquiry and its provision is applicable. However, when the Montreal Convention does not speak to an issue, the court applies the substantive provisions of the law that would apply in absence of the Convention. As the crash in the ocean satisfied the locality and nexus requirements for the application of maritime law, and as the Montreal Convention is silent on the allocation of responsibility between co-defendants, the Eleventh Circuit applied the maritime rule of joint and several liability. Gutierrez also objected to joint and several liability, arguing that after the judgment was entered, Murphy entered into a joint stipulation with Airway and the plane’s owner, Venture, to vacate the judgment against Murphy for Venture’s attorney fees. However, that stipulation did not release Airway from the judgment against it, and Judge Bloom entered an amended final judgment in which she awarded Murphy the same amount as before against Airway and Gutierrez. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision that Gutierrez was jointly and severally liable for the judgment, despite being found 40% at fault. Gutierrez also argued that Judge Bloom failed to instruct the jury with respect to the fault of Cessna for the design of the airplane. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Montreal Convention provides a defense when the injury was solely due to the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a third party. Judge Bloom instructed the jury that it must decide whether there was sole fault of a third party, but she did not list Cessna for a finding of its percentage of fault. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the submission accurately presented the sole-fault defense and was not erroneous. Finally, the appellate court held that Judge Bloom did not abuse her discretion by admitting the “enhanced” videos of the fueling (zooming in). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment against Gutierrez.
Fifth Circuit agreed that limitation action was untimely because there was a reasonable possibility that the value of the claim exceeded the value of the vessel ($12.5 million) more than six months before the injured worker submitted a demand in excess of $20 million; In re Genesis Marine, LLC, No. 25-30205, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1310 (5th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (Stewart).
On December 23, 2020, Brandon Darrow, a tankerman on the tug ANACONDA was injured while handling mooring lines at the Apex Oil Co. docking facility in Mt. Airy, Louisiana. Darrow brought suit in Louisiana state court against the owner of the tug, Genesis Marine, on December 23, 2021 (served on January 19, 2022). He filed a supplemental and amended petition on July 12, 2022 (served on July 18, 2022). Darrow did not include a specific statement of the amount of damages he was seeking in either petition, but Genesis stated in its answer: “[T]he amount of damages sued for in the Petition herein greatly exceeds the amount or value of Genesis’s interest in the M/V ANACONDA, and her freight then pending, if any; Genesis accordingly invokes the benefits of the provisions of the Revised Statutes of the United States of America and the acts amendatory thereof and supplementing thereto in limitation of the liability of shipowners.” On August 21, 2024, Darrow demanded that Genesis pay more than $20 million to settle the case, and Genesis filed this complaint for limitation of liability in federal court in Louisiana within six months thereafter (December 13, 2024), asserting that the value of the vessel was $12.5 million. Darrow filed an answer and claim in the limitation action and moved for summary judgment that the limitation action was not timely filed within six months of written notice of the claim. Chief Judge Brown reasoned that the six-month period is triggered by a notice that demonstrates a “reasonable possibility” that a claim will exceed the value of the interest of the petitioner in the vessel. Once a reasonable possibility is raised, the burden falls on the shipowner to conduct an investigation and file a limitation action, if necessary, within six months. Darrow argued that the statement in the answer filed in state court that the amount sought greatly exceeded the value Genesis’s interest in the vessel was a judicial admission. Genesis responded that it was a “boilerplate” affirmative defense and simply an allegation, not an admission. Chief Judge Brown did not have to decide whether there was a judicial admission, finding that there was a reasonable possibility the claim would result in damages in excess of $12.5 million (value of the vessel). More than six months before the limitation action was filed, medical evidence indicated that Darrow was permanently disabled after failed back surgeries that rendered him unable to be able to return to work. He had permanent spinal cord stimulators implanted, his lost wages were approximately $3.5 million, and his future medical expenses were in a range of $1.7 million. With the other elements of damages (past, present, and future mental and emotional pain and suffering and disability, as well as loss of enjoyment of life), there was a reasonable possibility of damages in excess of $12.5 million. Therefore, Chief Judge Bown granted summary judgment that the limitation action was not timely, and Genesis filed a notice of appeal. See June 2025 Update.
Chief Judge Brown did not enter a final judgment in the limitation action because Genesis also filed a third-party complaint against Petroleum Fuel and Terminal Co. As there was still a claim remaining against Petroleum Fuel, Genesis moved to stay all claims pending the appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Chief Judge Brown agreed that she should exercise her discretion to grant the stay, reasoning: “This Court has dismissed the limitation claim, and that ruling is currently on appeal. Therefore, it would be a waste of judicial resources to adjudicate the third-party claims at this point. If Genesis is successful on appeal, Darrow will be required to prosecute his own claim in this action, and all claims can then be adjudicated once without any repetitive discovery or other activity. Conversely, if Genesis’s appeal is not successful, all claims will be adjudicated in state court.” Genesis also asked the court to hold Darrow in contempt for violating the Monition for filing two motions in his state court action—seeking an expedited status conference to select a new trial date and requesting the resetting of a hearing for pre-trial motions. Darrow argued that there was no contempt because the court dismissed the limitation action; however, Chief Judge Brown noted that the order was not final, and no one had asked the court to enter a partial judgment under Rule 54(b). There was also a procedural conundrum. If the order granting summary judgment is an appealable order under Section 1292(a)(3), then “the appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction ‘over those aspects of the case on appeal.’” Chief Judge Brown declined to hold Darrow in contempt and stayed the limitation action pending appeal. See August 2025 Update.
Genesis’s appeal challenged Chief Judge Brown’s grant of summary judgment on the timeliness of the limitation action. Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Stewart explained that the district judges must conduct a “fact-intensive inquiry” to answer two questions: “(1) whether the writing communicates the reasonable possibility of a claim, and (2) whether it communicates the reasonable possibility of damages in excess of the vessel’s value.” The second question was at issue for the appeal. Genesis first argued that Chief Judge Brown misapplied the Fifth Circuit’s Bonvillian rule that the six-month deadline is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional rule. Although failure to comply with the deadline no longer divests the court of jurisdiction, Judge Stewart did not believe that district courts may now disregard the deadline. Accordingly, he agreed that Judge Brown properly addressed the deadline in response to the motion for summary judgment. On the merits, Genesis argued that there was a fact issue as to the date that there was a reasonable possibility that the claim would exceed the value of the vessel. Judge Stewart noted that in August 2022, when Genesis filed its answer to the petition, it acknowledged that Darrow was suing for damages that “greatly exceed[ed] the value of Genesis’s interests” in the vessel. The estimated future economic damages in excess of $3.5 million, together with non-economic damages, were sufficient for Judge Stewart to conclude that Genesis should have known of the reasonable possibility that the value of the claim would exceed $12.5 million well before the settlement demand. Finally, Genesis argued that its defense to the state petition was not a judicial admission that could be used as evidence to support the summary judgment. Judge Stewart agreed with Chief Judge Brown that it did not matter whether the statement was a judicial admission. The statement, coupled with Genesis’ knowledge of the serious and developing extent of Darrow’s injuries, demonstrated that there was a reasonable possibility that the claim could exceed the value of the vessel. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment that the limitation action was untimely.
From the federal district courts
Seaman’s suit against the United States for injury on MARAD vessel was dismissed, even though filed within the two-year statute of limitations under the Suits in Admiralty Act, because the seaman did not exhaust her administrative remedy under the Clarification Act before filing the suit; Hausner v. United States, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234357 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2025) (Bennett).
Patricia Hausner was employed as a utility deck and engineer seaman on the DENEBOLA, which she asserts was owned and operated by the United States (MARAD) and Tote Services. She claims that she injured her hand on April 14, 2023, while walking on a gangway across the ANTERES, which was tethered next to the DENEBOLA. She filed an administrative claim with MARAD and Tote on March 28, 2025, but before that claim was resolved she brough this suit in federal court in Maryland on April 3, 2025 against the United States, the Maritime Administration, and Tote Services based on the court’s admiralty jurisdiction. The United States moved to dismiss the claims against all defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States argued that Hausner’s exclusive remedy was against the United States and that her claim against the United States was time-barred because she failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedy under the Clarification Act before filing this suit (and the time to file the suit under the Suits in Admiralty Act has now expired). Judge Bennett applied the Clarification Act to the public vessel owned by the United States and operated by a private company under contract with MARAD, noting that the Clarification Act requires that the administrative claim be disallowed in writing or by failure to address it within 60 days of filing the claim. Reading the Clarification Act in conjunction with the Suits in Admiralty Act, Judge Bennett held that the “statutes require that a plaintiff both exhaust administrative remedies and file her properly exhausted claim within two years of the injury.” As the suit was filed within 60 days of the filing of the administrative claim, the administrative claim had not been exhausted. Hausner argued that the suit should be subject to equitable tolling because the 60-day period has passed, and she did file the suit before the running of the 2-year period. Judge Bennett disagreed, noting that Hausner had ample time and opportunity to bring the suit within the 2-year period, reasoning: “Diligent pursuit of claims typically includes filing administrative claims with sufficient time to allow a plaintiff to satisfy exhaustion requirements before the termination of the limitation period.” As Hausner’s sole remedy was against the United States, and as she did not exhaust her administrative remedy before the statute of limitations ran against the United States, Judge Bennett dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Passenger sufficiently pleaded notice of the slippery condition of the flooring surrounding the hot tub on the vessel from prior incidents on the same vessel that including specific names and cases with similar allegations; Roberts v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:25-cv-24450, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234738 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2025) (Moore).
Vontresa Roberts, a passenger on the CARNIVAL GLORY, slipped and fell on slippery flooring surrounding the hot tub at the Serenity adults only retreat area on Deck 14 of the vessel. Roberts brought this suit against the cruise line in federal court in Florida, alleging counts for negligent failure to warn, negligent failure to maintain, and general negligence. The cruise line moved to dismiss all of the counts for lack of notice and the general negligence count as improperly commingled. Roberts cited four prior incidents on the CARNIVAL GLORY as well as other incidents on similar vessels owned and operated by the cruise line. Judge Moore found the four incidents on the CARNIVAL GLORY to be substantially similar, as Roberts alleged that the passengers slipped and fell in the same or similar location, under similar conditions, and she provided the name and case associated with each incident. That was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The third count (general negligence) alleged that the cruise line failed to warn passengers of the dangerous condition, failed to maintain the area, failed to correct the condition, and negligently designed the area. Judge Moore noted that the failures raised distinct theories of liability, and the commingling of them into one count violated the rule against shotgun pleadings. Accordingly, he dismissed the third count without prejudice and allowed Roberts to replead it.
State claims arising from helicopter crash in the Gulf of America were preempted by federal law with respect to the pre-flight fitness of the pilot but not with respect to his in-flight conduct; claims with respect to failure of Emergency Locator Transmitter to activate were dismissed for lack of evidence because the wreckage was never recovered; Romero v. Westwind Helicopters Inc., Nos. 6:23-cv-442, 6:23-cv-484, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235242 (W.D. La. Dec. 2, 2025) (Hicks).
Robert Romero and Jeremy Hollier were passengers on a Bell 407 helicopter that was owned and operated by Westwind Helicopters and piloted by Westwind employee James Bullock. The helicopter was returning from a platform in the Ship Shoal 349 area of the Gulf of America (off the coast of Louisiana) to Abbeville, Louisiana, when it crashed into the Gulf of America. The cause of the crash was the incapacity of the pilot. The passengers and Westwind disputed whether the incapacity was sudden and unforeseeable or whether the pilot continued to fly after he indicated that he did not feel well. Romero and Hollier survived and brought this suit against Westwind (and its insurer) in state court in Iberia Parish, Louisiana, alleging claims under Louisiana law, and Westwind removed the case to federal court based on jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by federal law, and the plaintiffs argued that state law applied via the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Judge Hicks noted the decisions of the Fifth Circuit involving application of federal maritime law, explaining that state law can apply under the OCSLA only when the state law is applicable and not inconsistent with federal law. He added that the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “to the extent federal law applies to a particular issue, state law is inapplicable.” Turning to the allegations with respect to the pilot of the helicopter, it was undisputed that Bullock obtained a valid medical certificate two weeks before the accident in compliance with FAA requirements. Accordingly, Judge Hicks held that the allegations about the pre-flight fitness of the pilot were comprehensively governed by federal law and should be dismissed. As for the allegations regarding the in-flight conduct of the pilot, Judge Hicks noted that the Fifth Circuit has held that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts state regulation of aircraft “services” but not aircraft “operation.” Reasoning that Bullock’s conduct during the flight should be considered as aircraft operation, Judge Hicks held that the state-law claim arising out of the in-flight conduct of Bullock was not preempted. The plaintiffs also brought a claim for negligent maintenance of the helicopter’s Emergency Locator Transmitter, which failed to activate after the crash (delaying notification to the Coast Guard and prolonging the plaintiffs’ exposure). Judge Hicks did not believe that the claim was preempted by federal law, but the wreckage of the helicopter (and the ELT) remained lost at sea. Reasoning that the parties could not determine why the ELT failed to transmit a signal, Judge Hicks granted summary judgment that there was no evidence of negligent maintenance. Judge Hicks also granted summary judgment on the claim that Westwind acted negligently by failing to promptly notify the Coast Guard after losing contact with the helicopter. As there is no federal regulation specifying how soon the helicopter operator must notify rescue authorities, Judge Hicks applied Louisiana law under the OCSLA and granted summary judgment that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the 13-minute delay caused or aggravated the plaintiffs’ injuries. Finally, Judge Hicks granted summary judgment on the claim that Westwind failed to brief the passengers on how to manually activate the ELT, as there is no federal regulation requiring such briefing.
Limitation petitioner was granted leave to file third-party complaint under Rule 14(c) for contractual indemnity; In re Environmental, Safety & Health Consulting Services, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-1827, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168053 (E.D. La. Dec. 3, 2025) (Dossier).
This litigation arises from an allision between the vessel M/V MRS. PATSY and an obstruction on the lower Mississippi River in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, resulting in the sinking of the vessel and injury to passengers on the vessel employed by Jron Services. The passengers filed suits in Louisiana state court against the owner of the vessel, Environmental, Safety & Health Consulting Services, and the owner filed a limitation action in Louisiana federal court. Private Workforce Solutions, which employed the captain of the MRS. PATSY (Raymond Savant), was also named in the state suits. Private Workforce Solutions filed a claim in the limitation action, and petitioner ESHCS moved for leave to file a third-party complaint pursuant to Rule 14(c), seeking contractual indemnity and insurance protection from Private Workforce Solutions (as well as tort indemnity and contribution) and indemnity from Jron. Magistrate Judge Dossier noted that ESHCS was not technically a defendant, but she cited cases in which the limitation petitioner has been allowed to proceed with a third-party claim pursuant to Rule 14(c) in order to reduce the possibility of inconsistent results in separate actions and eliminate redundant litigation. Although the proposed third-party complaint did not cite admiralty jurisdiction and Rule 9(h) as a basis for jurisdiction, the Motion for Leave did refer to “subject matter jurisdiction under the general maritime law” and Rule 9(h). Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Dossier granted leave to file the third-party complaint.
Settlement with injured seaman precluded contribution and WWLP indemnity claim by company that supplied crane and crane operator against vessel charterer, but the Judge declined to dismiss an indemnity claim based on third-party beneficiary status to the charterer’s contract with the vessel owner; Keystone Terminal Holdings of Florida, LLC v. Hardie, No. 3:24-cv-175, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168536 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2025) (Pratt).
Salih Bebek, a bosun on the M/V MAPLE, was crushed to death by a 20,000-pound crane bucket. Bebek’s personal representative brought suit against several parties in federal court in Florida. Sims Crane contracted with Keystone Properties, charterer of the vessel, to assist with unloading cargo. Logistec Gulf Coast provided the crane. Fiber Marine Ship Management operated the vessel and employed Bebek. Maple Marine owned the vessel. Jeffery May was employed by Sims Crane as the crane signal man, and Patrick William Hardie was employed by Sims Crane as the crane operator. The plaintiff alleged that crane operator Hardie could not see the deck as he lowered the crane bucket and relied on signal man May to signal the appropriate direction. All of the parties settled with Bebek’s representative, and Sims Crane (and its employees) filed a cross-claim against Keystone for contractual indemnity. Keystone responded with a claim for tort-based indemnity, contribution, and breach of contract. The crane defendants moved to dismiss Keystone’s cross-claims, and Judge Berger explained that there are three theories for indemnity under maritime law, contractual indemnity, the Ryan warranty of workmanlike performance, and non-negligent or vicarious liability tortfeasor indemnity. Judge Berger reasoned that Ryan indemnity has been chipped away by the 1972 Amendments (LHWCA Section 5(b)) but is still viable in a limited fashion in the Eleventh Circuit. As the Amendments bar indemnity by the vessel against the worker’s employer, and as the crane defendants did not employ Bebek, the Amendments did not bar Keystone’s Ryan claim. Judge Berger then held that Keystone sufficiently pleaded a Ryan claim by asserting that Sims Crane agreed to provide stevedoring services with an implied warranty of workmanlike performance that it breached in this case. Judge Berger could not find any authority whether the warranty applied to employees May and Hardie and requested further briefing. Judge Berger declined to dismiss the Ryan claim, the breach of contract claim, and the contribution claim, but she dismissed the claim for deceptive and unfair trade practices under Florida law.
Sims Crane sought indemnity from Keystone based on an indemnity provision in Daily Job Tickets signed by a Keystone representative. On the day in which Bebek was killed, the signature was added after Bebek was struck and killed, and the Keystone representative denied that the signature was his. Additionally, the representative testified that he signed the tickets without looking at the terms and conditions, believing that he was simply approving the time sheet so they would be paid. Thus, there were fact questions that precluded granting indemnity to Sims Crane based on the job tickets. Sims Crane and its employees then sought summary judgment on the equitable indemnity and contribution claims against the crane defendants, arguing that the claims were based on the negligent acts of Hardie and May, but the workers were borrowed servants of Keystone (citing the job tickets that stated that Keystone had exclusive control over the workers). As control is only one of 9 factors to consider in the determination of borrowed servant status, Judge Berger declined to grant summary judgment. See October 2025 Update.
Keystone then moved to dismiss the claims filed against it by Sims Crane, and Judge Pratt agreed that the claims for contribution were barred under McDermott v. AmClyde based on the settlement reached by the parties. Keystone also sought dismissal of the indemnification claim based on breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike performance. To the extent Sims Crane sought contribution based on breach of the WWLP, Judge Pratt dismissed the claim based on AmClyde. To the extent the claim sought indemnity for breach of the WWLP, Judge Pratt responded that Sims Crane had not plausibly alleged any basis for indemnity because the indemnity runs to the benefit of shipowners. Sims Crane finally argued that it was entitled to indemnity for breach of an implied warranty, asserting that Keystone agreed to rent the crane from Sims Crane and supervise the unloading operations for the vessel, and that Sims Crane was a third-party beneficiary of the warranty owed by Keystone to the vessel. As neither party cited any caselaw addressing whether Sims Crane could be a third-party beneficiary of an implied warranty from Keystone to the vessel, Judge Pratt declined to dismiss that theory.
Magistrate Judge rejected motion for leave to file an amended complaint adding a claim for gross negligence (filed within the deadline in the scheduling order) based on unreasonable delay and the plaintiffs’ bad faith to avoid a potential defense; Kuntz v. Louisiana Marsh Adventures, L.L.C., No. 2:24-cv-1244, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 251128 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2025) (North).
Larry Kuntz and Richard Przybelski went to Louisiana Marsh Adventures’ dock for an alligator hunting excursion around the Lake Lery area of Delacroix, Louisiana. Kuntz and Przybelski signed a Passenger Release and Hold Harmless Agreement before boarding a vessel for the excursion. Both were injured when the captain, operating the vessel on navigable waters at a high rate of speed, struck land. Although injured, Kuntz and Przybelski advised the captain that they wanted to continue the hunt, and they successfully baited, trapped, killed, and assisted in pulling six alligators into the boat. The passengers brought this suit in federal court in Louisiana against Louisiana Marsh Adventures, based on negligence under the general maritime law. Before the deadline to amend pleadings, the passengers sought leave to amend their complaint to add as defendants, Desi Fulmer and Don Beshel, alleging that one of them was the operator of the boat. Additionally, the passengers sought to add a claim that Louisiana Marsh Adventures and the operators were guilty of gross negligence for which the passengers sought to recover punitive damages. Louisiana Marsh Adventures opposed the amendment with respect to gross negligence, arguing that the passengers had been dilatory (guilty of undue delay). Magistrate Judge North explained that amendments under Rule 15 are freely given but that undue delay is a basis to deny the amendment. Magistrate Judge North noted that the facts to support the gross negligence claim were the same as those pleaded for the negligence claim in the original complaint. “In short, nothing has changed and no new information has been discovered during the litigation that would explain or justify Plaintiffs’ decision to now assert a claim of gross negligence.” The only excuse given by the passengers was that the amendment was timely under the scheduling order, and Magistrate Judge North rejected that argument, concluding that the passengers unduly delayed in seeking to add the claim for gross negligence. Louisiana Marsh Adventures also argued that the passengers were guilty of bad faith because the defendant had contended from the outset that the release barred the claims. It was later, during settlement discussions, that the passengers’ counsel advised that the releases may be invalid because of gross negligence. When Louisiana Marsh Adventures pointed out that the complaint only alleged negligence, the passengers sought to amend the complaint without adding any new facts. Magistrate Judge North reasoned that the “so called ‘Amended Complaint’ – an unabashed attempt to avoid a dispositive motion based on the Passenger Releases – essentially pleaded a fundamentally different case with a new cause of action and two new parties” with “no new facts pleaded to support a wholly new alternative theory to avoid a potential defense.” This was “the very nature of bad faith” that weighed against granting leave to amend. As Magistrate Judge North believed that the amendment would fundamentally alter the nature of the case, he added that it would prejudice Louisiana Marsh Adventures. Finally, although Louisiana Marsh Adventures argued that the amendment was futile because it would not survive a motion to dismiss, Magistrate Judge North did not have to address that argument, concluding that the other factors were sufficient to reject the addition of a claim for punitive damages. As Louisiana Marsh Adventures clarified that the operator of the vessel was Fulmer, Magistrate Judge North allowed the passengers to add him to an amended complaint (but not Beshel).
Judge dismissed maritime claims in suit that was brought based on diversity jurisdiction and not admiralty jurisdiction; Estate of Adams v. Zenith Energy Terminals Holdings, LLC, No. 1:24-cv-52, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252472, 257270 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 8, 12, 2025) (Kleeh).
Shane Adams visited the Edith Barill Riverfront Park in Star City, West Virginia with his family. They were operating remote-controlled boats on the Monongahela River when one of the boats stopped responding. Adams decided to swim to recover the boat, but he drowned in the river near a marine fuel transfer facility owned and operated by Zenith Energy. Adams’ beneficiaries brought this suit against Zenith Energy in federal court in West Virginia, pleading jurisdiction under diversity. Zenith Energy sought leave to amend its answer to allege that Adams entered the river from the West Virginia Rail Authority Property that abutted the Zenith Energy Terminal, and that the West Virginia Economic Development Act of 1985 (Rails to Trails Program) affords defenses to owners of property that adjoins property owned by the Rail Authority. Chief Judge Kleeh permitted the amendment, finding good cause under Rule 16, and he then addressed the argument presented by the beneficiaries that their claims fall under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction. Zenith Energy moved to dismiss any maritime claims, and the parties briefed the issue whether the death satisfied the locality and nexus requirements of the test for maritime tort jurisdiction. Chief Judge Kleeh did not decide that question, reasoning that “prior to determining whether a case falls under federal admiralty jurisdiction, jurisdiction must be invoked.” He described the “predicate issue” as “whether Plaintiffs intended when filing suit to proceed under this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction or under federal diversity jurisdiction.” Reviewing the complaint, Chief Judge Kleeh found no mention or invocation of Rule 9(h) or admiralty law, only the pleading of diversity and claims under West Virginia statutory and common law. As the plaintiffs elected to proceed under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, he concluded: “The Court does not find that Plaintiffs elected to proceed with the trial of the Complaint in admiralty and, therefore, maritime law does not apply to this case.” Consequently, Chief Judge Kleeh granted Zenith Energy’s motion to dismiss the maritime claims. [Chief Judge Kleeh should compare the decisions applying the Reverse-Erie doctrine].
Judge declined to decide whether Dutch law or the Jones Act and U.S. maritime law applied to the injury claim of a Nicaraguan crewmember on a Dutch cruise ship based on a forum-selection clause in the worker’s employment agreement as the crewmember disputed the authenticity of the agreement in response to the motion to dismiss; Mendoza v. International Cruise Shops, Ltd., No. 1:25-cv-23286, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254724 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2025) (Bloom).
International Cruise Shops entered into a joint venture with Holland America Line to sell merchandise to passengers on Holland America’s vessel VOLENDAM. International Cruise Shops hired Modesto Alberto Bermudez Mendoza, a citizen of Nicaragua, to serve as a Sales Associate on the ship, and Mendoza claims that he was under the direction of either Holland America or Starboard Cruise Services. Mendoza injured his back when he tried to catch a falling box in a storage area on the ship, and he brought this suit in federal court in Florida against International Cruise Shops, Holland America, and Starboard Cruise, alleging claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the Dutch choice-of-law provision in Mendoza’s employment agreement and because the complaint was an impermissible shotgun pleading. The agreement stated that any claims arising under the agreement would be decided under the laws of Flag State of the vessel (the Netherlands). The parties disagreed whether the clause was applicable to all of the defendants and whether it clearly designated Dutch law to the exclusion of the Jones Act and U.S. maritime law. However, Judge Bloom did not have to decide that issue because Mendoza contested the authenticity of the agreement, preventing Judge Bloom from considering its terms for a motion to dismiss (she did caution that if the agreement was authenticated, Dutch law, and not the Jones Act or U.S. maritime law, was likely to apply). As the complaint failed to separate each cause of action or claim for relief into different counts, Judge Bloom dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
Rule 25 was not the proper vehicle to substitute the widow/estate of the owner of the vessel in a limitation action brought in the name of the owner who died in the sinking of the vessel, but the widow/estate could be substituted under Rule 17; In re Adames, No. 1:25-cv-4680, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254884 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2025) (Pollak).
Cecilio Javier Adames, owner of a 30-foot 1985 Grady White Runabout, and two passengers on the vessel, were killed when the vessel sank in bad weather off the coast of Breezy Point, Brooklyn, New York. A limitation action was filed in federal court in New York in the name of decedent Adames, seeking to limit liability to the value of the vessel (not exceeding $500). Magistrate Judge Pollak recommended approval of the ad interim stipulation and the stay of other proceedings, and counsel for the owner then filed a suggestion of death and motion for substitution of parties under Rule 25. The motion sought to amend the caption to substitute Francisca Adames, as the widow, lawful spouse, and representative of the Estate of Cecilio Javier Adames, in place of petitioner Cecilio Javier Adames. Magistrate Judge Pollak found the procedural posture to be “unique,” noting, “as of now, no complaint has been filed. Thus, the question before this Court is whether a party in interest may be substituted for a predeceased plaintiff in a matter where liability has been limited under the Limitation of Liability Act but a complaint has not yet been filed.” Magistrate Judge Pollak answered that Rule 25 requires service of the motion and notice in order to be effective (strict compliance with the requirement is necessary to prevent a situation in which a case is dismissed because a party never learned of the death of an opposing party). As no claim had yet been filed, there were no parties upon whom a noticed of death could be filed. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Pollak held that Rule 25 was not the proper vehicle to pursue the substitution. Magistrate Judge Pollak then considered whether the court could allow substitution under Rule 17 where “a pre-complaint petitioner was deceased ab initio.” Magistrate Judge Pollak reviewed cases holding that a case filed by a deceased plaintiff was void ab initio and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to substitute a real party in interest, even though the real party in interest would otherwise have standing to pursue the case. Magistrate Judge Pollak added that the nullity doctrine was an open question in the Second Circuit, and that substituting the real party in interest would not substitute a new cause of action over which the court had subject matter jurisdiction for one in which the court lacked jurisdiction. She explained that the substitution of Mrs. Adames as the petitioner “would alter the action in form only, and not in substance.” She concluded that the substitution “rectifies a mistake and neither prejudices any current or future party nor runs abreast of the very policies accomplished by Rule 17.” Therefore, Magistrate Judge Pollak permitted the substitution so that the protections of the Limitation Act would survive for the Estate.
Federal judge applied state law (agreed by the parties) to approve settlement of claim of minor injured on cruise ship, but the Judge applied federal procedure in holding that a guardian ad litem was not required; Twisler v. Magical Cruise Co., No. 6:24-cv-1776, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 255752 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2025) (Sneed).
This case involves an injury to an 8-year-old passenger on the DISNEY DREAM. The minor’s mother brought this suit in federal court in Florida against the cruise line, and the parties agreed to a settlement. The parties jointly moved for approval of the settlement based on Florida law, which requires court approval of a minor settlement after an action is commenced. Judge Sneed applied Florida law with respect to approval of the settlement, reasoning, “If the parties litigate the case under the assumption that a certain law applies, [the court] will assume that the law applies.” Judge Sneed noted, however, that the appointment of a guardian ad litem is a procedural issue controlled by Rule 17(c). As there was no indication of a conflict of interest or that the minor’s mother was incapable of adequately representing her daughter, Judge Sneed held that a guardian ad litem was unnecessary. Judge Sneed then reviewed the settlement agreement and discerned no provisions rendering the agreement fundamentally unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise contrary to the minor’s best interests. Absent any evidence of collusion, Judge Sneed approved the settlement agreement. [Compare this case to the decision in Pryor v. Carnival Corp., discussed in the December 2025 Update, in which the Magistrate Judge concluded that court approval was not necessary under maritime law for a mother to consummate a settlement with a cruise line on behalf of her minor son].
Judge has discretion to empanel an advisory jury in a limitation action, but a motion to strike is not the appropriate vehicle to assert that the Judge should not exercise her discretion to empanel an advisory jury; Magistrate Judge declined to strike “immaterial” or “scandalous” allegations about the operator of the vessel in claims in the limitation proceeding as the claimants proffered reasons for materiality of the allegations (noting that the court could later address whether evidence associated with the allegations should be excluded); Magistrate Judge bifurcated trial of liability and limitation from trial on damages, but she declined to bifurcate discovery; In re Mad Toyz III LLC, No. 8:25-cv-1914, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 255753, 256035, 258700 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 12, 2025) (Adams).
Opinion Scandalous Allegations
This litigation arises from a collision between a 380-foot Statement 380 Open Motorboat, owned by Mad Toyz III and operated by Jeffrey David Knight, and the Clearwater Ferry MADDIE’S CROSSING (carrying more than 40 passengers) near the Memorial Causeway Bridge in Clearwater, Florida. Mad Toyz and Knight brought this limitation action in Florida federal court. Some of the claimants in the limitation action requested an advisory jury for the trial of all issues, and Mad Toyz and Knight moved to strike the demand. Magistrate Judge Adams noted that there is no right to a jury trial in an admiralty case; however, she added that Rule 39(c) provides that in an action that is not triable of right to a jury, the court may try an issue with an advisory jury. As the court has the discretion to employ an advisory jury, Magistrate Judge Adams held that the motion to strike was not an appropriate vehicle to assert that the district judge should not exercise her discretion to employ an advisory jury. Therefore, she denied the motion to strike the request for an advisory jury.
Mad Toyz and Knight also moved to strike “immaterial” or “scandalous” allegations in some of the claims concerning Knight’s statements and actions following the collision and concerning Knight’s alleged prior malfeasance in operating vessels and vehicles. The claimants responded that Knight’s statements after the collision were evidence that he believed he was liable, and his history of operating vessels and vehicles demonstrated his lack of the requisite knowledge of proper operation of the vessel (and that Mad Toyz negligently entrusted the vessel to him). As the claimants proffered reasonable bases for the allegations, Magistrate Judge Adams declined to strike the allegations, but she cautioned that Mad Toyz and Knight could present the arguments in a motion in limine to exclude evidence associated with the allegations.
The claimants moved to bifurcate the limitation action into a liability phase and a damages phase. If, after a bench trial on liability and privity, the court declined to limit the liability of Mad Toyz and Knight, the court would dismiss the limitation action and dissolve the injunction against parallel proceedings to allow trial to proceed in state court in Pinellas County. Magistrate Judge Adams agreed with the bifurcation of trials, but she disagreed with bifurcation of discovery to exclude any investigation of damages. She reasoned that bifurcating discovery would prevent the parties from discovering information necessary to the determination of liability and would not economize litigation. Magistrate Judge Adams explained that “damages inform the liability and apportionment analyses,” reasoning that in order to prove negligence, the claimants must establish that they were damaged and that the limitation petitioners caused the damage. She explained that an order dividing discovery “seems likely to breed confusion and heavy motions practice.” Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Adams granted the motion to bifurcate the trials so that the Court will decide whether the petitioners are entitled to limit liability before the Court considers the issue of damages (or allows the claimants to pursue damages in another forum), but she declined to bifurcate discovery.
Judge declined to allow late claim for cargo damage in the DALI limitation action arising from the allision with the Francis Scott Key Bridge; manager of the DALI presented sufficient evidence of dominion and control over the vessel to create a fact question whether it had standing to pursue limitation of liability; In re Grace Ocean Private Ltd., No. 1:24-cv-941, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257889, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12246 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2025, Jan. 21, 2026) (Bredar).
This litigation arises from the allision between the DALI and the Francis Scott Key Bridge. The owner and manager of the DALI, Grace Ocean Private and Synergy Marine, brought this action seeking exoneration/limitation in federal court in Maryland, and Judge Bredar issued a Protective Order governing the use of confidential information in the litigation. The parties sought to amend the protective order to accommodate the concerns of the National Transportation Safety Board, which is conducting an investigation of the allision, that the Protective Order did not adequately cover its documents. Although Judge Bredar expressed his intent to accommodate the interests of the NTSB to the extent feasible, he balanced the interests of the parties and NTSB with the public’s presumptive right of access to the judicial process. He explained that the proposal would “permit parties to file documents wholly under seal, without any publicly viewable version, so long as the documents contain any confidential information.” Judge Bredar warned that “any request for a protective order that contemplates wholesale sealing of documents—as opposed to the application of carefully limited redactions—will likely be denied.” Therefore, he denied the request without prejudice. See February 2025 Update.
After the limitation action was filed, Judge Bredar accepted security of $43,671,000 and issued a stay of litigation against the petitioners and the vessel arising from the allision (except in the limitation action). Claims were brought on behalf of individuals and putative classes. The United States brought a claim but subsequently reached a settlement with the petitioners. Motions were then filed by the State of Maryland, Maryland Transportation Authority, Maryland Port Administration, Maryland Department of the Environment, and ACE American Insurance Co., requesting that the stay be lifted to permit the State claimants and ACE (asserting subrogation for payments to the State claimants) to pursue contractual and statutory claims outside of the limitation action as their claims fell outside of the scope of the limitation statute. The claimants argued that they were asserting claims for breach of contract and pursuant to state environmental statutes that are not subject to limitation, and the vessel interests responded that policy considerations favored maintaining the concursus of claims. Judge Bredar assumed arguendo that the claims fell outside the scope of the limitation statute, but he decided to exercise his discretion to decline to lift the stay. First, he believed that it was important to maintain the concursus because it protects both the vessel interests and claimants--to “ensure that all claimants, not just a favored few, will come in on an equal footing to obtain a pro rata share of their damages.” Judge Bredar was also concerned about the risk of inconsistent judgments, reasoning that findings in separate litigation could have issue-preclusive effect in the limitation proceeding, which would undermine the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. He added that the claimants had not presented any stipulations that would adequately protect the vessel interests’ right to seek limitation. He added that he did not “consider it equitable to set certain Claimants loose to pursue the merits of their claims—and, perhaps, obtain favorable judgments—while all other Claimants are required to wait and abide by the schedule set by this Court,” particularly when it was conceivable that there could be insufficient insurance to satisfy all losses. Finally, Judge Bredar explained that he was pursuing a practical, pragmatic procedure directed to determination of the critical limitation issue. He did not want parallel proceedings to interfere with this endeavor. If limitation is denied, he expected that he would then “set Claimants free to pursue any remaining claims in any court of competent jurisdiction.” See April 2025 Update.
The limitation action was brought by the owner and manager of the DALI, Grace Ocean Private and Synergy Marine, on April 1, 2024, and notice was provided for the filing of claims with a deadline of September 24, 2024. A group of cargo interests moved for an extension of the deadline, and Judge Bredar agreed to the extension but added: “In no event shall any late filed cargo claim be accepted after November 22, 2024.” Almost a year after the deadline (on November 5, 2025), United Source One sought leave to file a claim for loss of cargo carried on the DALI, arguing that it did not receive notice of the deadline for filing claims. United Source One asserted that it notified its cargo insurer, Tokio Marine America Insurance Co., of its claim on April 1, 2024, but the insurer did not notify it of the deadline to file a claim in the limitation action. Tokio Marine denied the claim on December 5 or 6, 2024, and United Source One engaged counsel to negotiate with Tokio Marine. In the meantime, a group of cargo interests insured by the Tokio Marine family of companies filed claims in the limitation action within the extended deadline. When United Source One’s negotiations with Tokio Marine failed, United Source One sought leave to bring its claim for $370,363 in the DALI limitation action. Judge Bredar accepted that United Source One was unaware of the deadline, but he also held that it had adequate notice of the deadline and had not identified a sufficient reason for the delay in filing the claim. Judge Bredar also found that allowing the late claim may prejudice the petitioners’ rights with trial set to begin in less than six months, even though its interests were essentially identical to those of other cargo claimants who timely filed claims. He noted that United Source retained counsel to negotiate rather than litigate in order to avoid incurring expense, and he explained that the fact that its “risk/benefit assessment failed to pan out does not obligate the Court to permit further complication of an already very complex case.” Judge Bredar added that he concurred with the petitioners that “it would set a bad precedent—particularly in a case that received such extensive media attention—to allow a Maryland corporation, which is based in the geographical area where notice of the deadline was published, to permit the filing of an extremely late claim.” Accordingly, Judge Bredar denied leave to file the late claim.
With trial scheduled to begin with respect to the entitlement to limitation of liability on June 1, 2026, the claimants moved for summary judgment on the standing of Synergy Marine, as manager, to seek limitation of liability. Judge Bredar noted that the party seeking limitation must have the equivalent of the interest of the owner or owner pro hac vice, displaying “a high degree of ‘dominion and control’ over the vessel.” He added that few of the cases have held one factor to be dispositive and that they have not clearly specified how the various factors should be weighed against each other—suggesting a “totality-of-the circumstances type test, in which the Court takes a holistic view of the ship manager’s relationship to the vessel in determining whether there was a transfer of ‘possession, command, and navigation’ sufficient to generate owner pro hac vice status on the part of the manager.” The claimants’ primary argument was that Grace Ocean had the financial responsibility for the operation of the DALI, reimbursing it for its costs and indemnifying and insuring it. Without a financial risk, Synergy lacked the key attribute of ownership and “the raison d’etre for the Limitation Act.” Synergy answered that the documents for compliance with the International Safety Management Code reflected that Synergy assumed responsibility for the operation of the ship with the duties and responsibilities imposed by the ISM Code. Agreeing that the insurance and reimbursement provisions were necessary because Synergy’s control over the vessel was sufficiently substantial to expose it to an owner’s risk of liability, Judge Bredar did not consider the financial arrangements to be dispositive. Turning to the actual management, Synergy recruited and trained the crew and supported the crew in navigating the vessel, but Grace Ocean paid them and executed crew employment contracts. The Ship Management Agreement also provided that Synergy would supervise the maintenance and coordinate daily operations with the shipboard management team. Although it was the time charterer, Maersk, that determined where the vessel would call to load and discharge cargo, the master of the DALI relied on Synergy for guidance if the vessel needed to divert for weather or other issues. Weighing all of the factors, Judge Bredar held that Synergy presented sufficient evidence of dominion and control to defeat the motion for summary judgment on its standing to bring the limitation action.
Dam on the Spokane River prevented Lake Coeur d’Alene from being navigable, and the federal court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over the suit brought under the Jones Act and general maritime law seeking to recover for injuries suffered by a deckhand on a vessel on the lake; Schnatter v. Lake Coeur D’Alene Cruises Inc., No. 2:24-cv-635, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257947 (D. Idaho Dec. 12, 2025) (Nye).
Daniel Schnatter was injured while serving as a senior deckhand on the M/V COEUR D’ALENE, a 100-foot passenger vessel that provided pleasure cruises around Lake Coeur d’Alene in Idaho. He brought this suit in federal court in Idaho against the vessel and its owner and operator, asserting claims as a seaman under the Jones Act and general maritime law. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Lake Coeur d’Alene does not qualify as navigable waters. Although the lake lies wholly within the state of Idaho, Schnatter argued that the lake flows into the Spokane River, which flows into the state of Washington. Chief Judge Nye answered that before the Spokane River reaches the state line, it is impeded by the Post Falls Dam, which is entirely in Idaho so that “it is impossible to travel by boat from Lake Coeur d’Alene into Washington.” As “[e]very Circuit to have addressed the issue has held that a dam ends the question of navigability, and, as a result, jurisdiction,” Chief Judge Nye held that the lake was not navigable for purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction. Although Schnatter argued that it may be possible to navigate from the lake to another state by canoe, the evidence to support the argument from the blog “NaughtyHiker” did not include any map, graphic or other evidence to support the claim (Schnatter also argued that removal of the dam would make the lake navigable again). Concluding that the court lacked admiralty jurisdiction, Chief Judge Nye dismissed the complaint.
Stipulation of two claimants in limitation action was sufficient to lift the stay without the necessity of the joinder in the stipulation from a potential indemnity/contribution claimant who had not filed a claim; In re Oceanside Watersports, LLC, No. 1:25-cv-512, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258277 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2025) (Rubin).
This litigation arose from a collision between two Sea-Doo vessels, owned by Oceanside Watersports, in Sinepuxent Bay, Maryland. Alicia Valerie, who chartered one of the vessels, and Lori D’Amico, a passenger on that vessel, claimed to have suffered injuries. The other vessel was chartered (and operated) by Tammi Bittner. Oceanside Watersports filed a limitation action in federal court in Maryland, seeking to limit its liability for the two vessels. Valerie and D’Amico filed claims in the limitation action that included assertions describing the fault of Bittner. In view of the allegations, Oceanside Watersports filed a third-party complaint against Bittner in the limitation action based on equitable indemnity, contractual indemnity, and contribution. Bittner did not answer the third-party complaint or file a claim in the limitation action, and Valerie and D’Amico moved to lift the stay. Oceanside Watersports responded that the stipulations signed by Valerie and D’Amico were insufficient to protect its rights in the limitation proceeding because Bittner, who had a potential claim, had not joined the stipulation. Judge Rubin agreed with the majority view that a party seeking indemnification or contribution from a limitation pleading “is properly treated as a separate claimant under the Limitation Act, because such a (reasonably) potential third-party claim (like Bittner’s) portends a ‘set of circumstances in which a shipowner could be held liable in excess of the limitation fund.’” However, Judge Rubin held that when a potential claimant (like Bittner) has not joined the stipulation, the present and stipulating claimants (like D’Amico and Valerie) may pursue their claims “under conditions that reserve the court’s right to stay any potential claims for contribution or indemnification until and unless that claimant executes Limitation Act compliant stipulations.” Finding that the stipulation of D’Amico and Valerie (that if any other court “renders a judgment or recovery in excess of Limitation Plaintiff’s stipulation of value, whether against Limitation Plaintiff or any other liable party or parties who may make a cross-claim over and against Limitation Plaintiff, in no event will claimants seek to enforce such judgment or recovery in excess of Limitation Plaintiff’s stipulation of value until such time as this Court has adjudicated Limitation Plaintiff’s Complaint for limitation of liability”) was sufficient to protect the interests of Oceanside Watersports in the limitation action, Judge Rubin dissolved the limitation injunction and stayed the limitation proceeding.
Count in passenger’s complaint arising from a slip and fall on a slippery surface that combined multiple theories and a claim for negligent mode of operation was dismissed, but the passenger sufficiently alleged notice from a slip and fall on a different vessel to defeat a motion to dismiss with respect to the claims for negligent failure to maintain and negligent failure to warn; Judge declined passenger’s request for an advisory jury in straightforward injury case brought under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction; Levari v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:25-cv-22777, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258584 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2025) (Bloom).
Adam Levari, a passenger on the CARNIVAL MARDI GRAS, slipped and fell on a slippery surface while walking down the vessel’s indoor glass-like winding staircase in a high-traffic area near the restaurants and pizzeria. Levari brought this suit against the cruise line in federal court in Florida, asserting in his Second Amended Complaint (Judge Bloom dismissed an earlier complaint) that the cruise line failed to maintain and operate the vessel in a reasonably safe condition in seven ways, failed to maintain the flooring surface and stairway in a reasonably safe condition in seven ways, and failed to warn the passengers in three ways. Levari brought the suit under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, but he sought an advisory jury. The cruise line moved to dismiss the complaint for commingling multiple causes of action within the counts, advancing a negligent mode of operation claim that is not cognizable under the general maritime law, failing to sufficient allege notice, and offering insufficient reasoning for an advisory jury. As the first count combined theories of negligent selection and design, negligent failure to inspect, and negligent mode of operation (that the cruise line failed to promulgate and/or enforce adequate policies and procedures to ensure that the flooring and stairway are adequately and regularly inspected, monitored, cleaned, and maintained free of hazardous conditions), Judge Bloom dismissed the count with prejudice. Judge Bloom did not believe that the allegations in the second and third counts improperly alleged a claim for negligent mode of operation as the assertions were specific to the incident in which Levari was injured. Therefore, she considered whether Levari had adequately pleaded notice. Levari cited an incident in which a passenger slipped and fell while descending a glass staircase in a highly trafficked area of another vessel. The cruise line argued that the incident was not sufficiently similar because it occurred on a different vessel that was not in a sister class, on a different deck, on a different staircase. Judge Bloom answered that the objection went to the weight of the evidence that need not be resolved at the stage of a motion to dismiss. Therefore, she declined to dismiss the second and third counts. Finally, Judge Bloom found no reason why an advisory jury was necessary for the straightforward allegations from Levari’s slip and fall on an interior staircase.
Judge agreed with denial of motions for summary judgment in collision case and with the decision not to grant bifurcation in limitation action when the injured claimants allowed their state action to be dismissed and there was no lawfully filed state action to which they could return; In re M/V AET EXCELLENCE, No. 3:23-cv-167, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260541 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2025) (Brown).
This litigation arises from three limitation actions filed in connection with the collision between the M/V HUNTER T. and the M/V NORTHERN MAGNUM in which two seamen assigned to the AET EXCELLENCE were injured while riding on the HUNTER T. and a separate action in which one of the seamen was also injured while transferring from the M/V EXCALIBUR to the AET INNOVATOR. Limitation actions were filed in federal court in Texas on behalf of the HUNTER T., the EXCALIBUR, and the AET vessels after suit was filed by seamen Gerald Arukwe and Jose Uresti against the owners/operators of the HUNTER T. and the AET vessels. T&T Offshore, owner of the HUNTER T., filed a third-party complaint and Rule 14(c) tender against the NORTHERN MAGNUM interests in the HUNTER T. limitation action. The pleading sought contribution and indemnity, but it also sought judgment for Arukwe and Uresti directly against the NORTHERN MAGNUM interests. The NORTHERN MAGNUM interests objected, arguing that Rule 14(c) is only applicable when the plaintiffs have asserted an admiralty claim under Rule 9(h), and Arukwe and Uresti brought their claims against T&T Offshore under the Jones Act, demanding a jury trial. Magistrate Judge Edison cited the language of Rule 14(c) that the scope of the Rule applies to a plaintiff who “asserts an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h).” Although Arukwe and Uresti brought a claim in the T&T limitation action for the HUNTER T. (the limitation action can only be brought pursuant to Rule 9(h)), Magistrate Judge Edison reasoned that the seamen/claimants had not designated their claims as brought pursuant to Rule 9(h), had brought Jones Act claims, and had demanded a jury. Therefore, he held that T&T Offshore could not avail itself of Rule 14(c) to make the NORTHERN MAGNUM interests directly liable to the seamen. The NORTHERN MAGNUM interests also asked that T&T Offshore’ s claims under Rule 14(a) for contribution and indemnity should be dismissed. Finding no support for dismissal of the third-party claims that were asserted under Rule 14(a), Magistrate Judge Edison declined to recommend dismissal of those claims. There was no objection to the recommendations, and Judge Brown adopted them. See July 2025 Update.
The AET interests sought to depose the seamen’s treating physicians, Dr. Victoria Do and Dr. Rubin Bashir, and a dispute arose over the compensation that AET must pay to the doctors for the time spent in their depositions. Dr. Do, a family medicine doctor who has been practicing since 2004, sought an hourly rate of $2,500. Dr. Bashir, an orthopedist who has been practicing since 2008, sought an hourly rate of $3,500. Both demanded deposits ($5,000 and $3,500). The AET interests argued that the requested rates were excessive and that a reasonable rate was $500 per hour. Magistrate Judge Edison noted that Rule 26 provides that the party seeking discovery must pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent responding to discovery, and he added that it is in the court’s discretion to set the amount that it deems reasonable. Although the doctors argued that the requested fees were a reasonable approximation of the revenue the doctors would forego if they were being deposed instead of seeing patients, Magistrate Judge Edison stated that he had “no intention of forcing these doctors to choose between seeing patients and attending a deposition.” He explained that the lawyers could “arrange their schedules to conduct the depositions early in the morning, late in the afternoon, or on the weekend.” Magistrate Judge Edison added that the depositions could be continued over multiple days in order to allow the doctors to treat their patients during normal business hours. [Counsel for the AET interests stated that he would be happy to schedule the depositions, if convenient to the doctors, “at midnight, on a full moon, in a graveyard,” but Magistrate Judge Edison thought that “might be a tad much”]. As for the reasonable hourly rate, Magistrate Judge Edison held that $750 was a reasonable rate for time spent in the depositions, using his experience as a practicing lawyer and judge. Magistrate Judge Edison declined to order the AET interests to pay a deposit, citing authorities stating that “requiring up-front payments without reference to time actually spent in responding to discovery is contrary to the law.” Thus, the amount owed under Rule 26 becomes due only after the expert sits for the deposition. See September 2025 Update.
Magistrate Judge Edison then considered three motions for summary judgment and a motion to bifurcate. Harbor Offshore Marine, petitioner for the EXCALIBUR, moved for summary judgment as to the claims of AET for contribution and indemnity, arguing that there was no evidence that it was negligent in the operation of the EXCALIBUR. AET also moved for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ and T&T, arguing that there was no evidence that AET was negligent. AET also sought judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims for unseaworthiness in connection with the collision. With respect to the contribution and indemnity claims, Magistrate Judge Edison answered: “if ever a case were not suitable for summary judgment, it is this case.” He explained that the liability claims of the plaintiffs were not currently before the court and added that “there is simply no need for the court to decide questions it may never need to reach.” Magistrate Judge Edison was particularly perplexed by the claim of AET for contribution and indemnity against T&T. AET argued that T&T owed AET for the maintenance and cure payments it has made to the plaintiffs. Yet, AET asserted that it intended to prove that Uresti was not a Jones Act seaman. Magistrate Judge Edison stated: “I struggle to understand why I should wade into whether T&T owes AET contribution and indemnity for maintenance and cure when AET says that Uresti is not even entitled to maintenance and cure because he is not a Jones Act seaman.” Magistrate Judge Edison also declined to grant summary judgment to AET on the seaman’s claims because it admitted that Uresti was a seaman in its answer to the plaintiffs’ counterclaim. Magistrate Judge Edison did agree with AET that there was no unseaworthiness of its vessel. The plaintiffs cited the negligence of the captain in not safely navigating and failing to intervene. However, Magistrate Judge Edison considered that to be insufficient, concluding: “Assuming Captain Han knew about an unsafe condition and had a duty to intervene, his failure to do so is nothing more than an ‘isolated, personal negligent act.’” Finally, Magistrate Judge Edison denied the plaintiffs’ motion to bifurcate the federal proceeding into two phases with the first phase limited to negligence/unseaworthiness, privity and knowledge, and apportionment of fault. In the first place, Magistrate Judge Edison noted that the suit brought by the plaintiffs in state court had been dismissed for want of prosecution, and the plaintiffs had brought a second suit after the limitation actions were filed. Thus, the plaintiffs had “no lawfully filed state court action to which they could return.” Moreover, as the consolidated limitation actions involved two injury plaintiffs and six defendants in connection with two separate incidents that are inextricably intertwined, Magistrate Judge Edison did not believe this is “the type of case in which bifurcation makes sense.” See December 2025 Update.
Harbor Offshore Marine and the EXCALIBUR objected to the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs objected to the order denying their motion for bifurcation. Judge Brown agreed with the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Edison, overruling the objection to the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for bifurcation and denying all of the motions for summary judgment except for the dismissal of the unseaworthiness claim against AET.
Hull insurer of vessel that sank (with the death of its owner) was permitted to pay the insurance proceeds to the IOLTA account of the insurer’s attorney, pending appointment of a personal representative for the estate of the owner, and to dispose of the wreck of the vessel in order to stop the storage charges for the wreck of the vessel; Western World Insurance Co. v. Estate of Arsenault, No. 1:25-cv-13413, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260705 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2025) (Levenson).
Western World Insurance Co. is the hull insurer for the F/V SEAHORSE, a 30-foot commercial dragger, which sank off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, causing the death of the ship’s owner and operator, Shawn Arsenault. Arsenault is the named insured on the hull policy. Western World paid for the removal and recovery of the wrecked vessel, which was deemed a constructive total loss. The vessel is in possession of a salvage company and is incurring storage fees. Western World wants to terminate the storage charges by paying the insurance proceeds and disposing of the vessel, and it brought this suit in federal court in Massachusetts against the owner’s estate for a declaratory judgment to determine how to pay the proceeds. However, no personal representative has been named for the Estate. The owner’s daughter, Melissa Arsenault, has represented that she intends to petition to be named personal representative, but she has not done so and has not appeared in the declaratory judgment action. Therefore, Western World filed an ex parte emergency motion seeking leave to pay the insurance proceeds to the IOLTA account of Western World’s attorney, in trust for the Estate, to allow Western World to apply an offset of $1,701 against the hull insurance proceeds for an unpaid premium, and to authorize Western World to dispose of the wreck of the vessel in order to curtail the ongoing storage charges. Magistrate Judge Levenson concluded that counsel for Western World could appropriately serve as temporary custodian of the funds until the court determines the correct payee for the proceeds. He also concluded that waiting for the appointment of the trustee would be a needless waste in delaying the insurer from taking ownership of the vessel and disposing of it to stop the storage costs. However, he did not believe that it was necessary, before the determination of the proper payee, to deduct the premium allegedly owed to Western World. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Levenson ordered Western World’s counsel to temporarily hold the insurance proceeds in trust for the benefit of the rightful recipient and for Western World to dispose of the vessel pursuant to the terms of the hull policy.
Judge declined to grant summary judgment to dock owner for not providing a sufficient cleat when the captain of a vessel navigated the vessel from the dock with a line attached to the cleat and the line yanked the cleat out of the dock, injuring the captain; In re Brown, 2:20-cv-4629, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261119 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (Merchant).
Robert D. Brown, owner of a 42-foot Bluegame yacht, hired Billy Salazar, a professional captain, to transport the yacht to Sag Harbor, New York and to operate the vessel on day trips/excursions. On September 20, 2020, Brown engaged Salazar to take him and two guests on an excursion to Peconic Bay from a slip at Malloy’s Waterfront Marina in Sag Harbor, New York. The slip has three port-side cleats, two port-side pilings, two stern dock cleats, and a starboard-side piling. Salazar untied all but one of the dock lines, leaving the port stern spring line attached to a dock cleat. As he maneuvered the vessel from the dock, the line yanked the cleat out of the dock with the effect of a sling shot to Salazar’s head. Brown filed this limitation action in federal court in New York, and claims were filed by Salazar and Malloy’s Waterfront Marina, along with counterclaims. Brown settled with Salazar, leaving the claims between Brown and Malloy’s Waterfront Marina. Malloy’s moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not negligent, and Judge Merchant first addressed the applicable law to the claim. She concluded that the tort occurred on navigable waters (where the negligence took effect) as the marina opens onto Gardiners Bay, which feeds into Long Island Sound. As for the nexus test, Malloy’s described the incident as an injury on a recreational vessel that was attempting to depart while still tied to the dock of a recreational marina. Judge Merchant believed that the description was “unnecessarily specific.” She characterized the tort as a captain injured while operating a vessel on navigable waters and held that admiralty law governed the dispute. On the merits, Judge Merchant cited evidence that it is a known risk that vessel operators occasionally forget or miss a dock line when departing a marina slip, that it is standard practice to design the cleat and fastening bolts accordingly, and that the cleat was insufficient in size and improperly installed. Thus, she held that there was sufficient evidence of both negligence and foreseeability and denied the motion for summary judgment.
Judge declined to dismiss vessel owner’s suit against charter broker for non-payment of charter hire (based on the provision that the broker was not responsible for the charterer’s non-payment of charter hire) because the broker agreed to undertake all reasonable efforts to collect charter hire and there were fact questions whether reasonable efforts were undertaken; R&R Boats, Inc. v. GOL, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-1875, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262400 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2025) (Fallon).
We reported in the November 2025 Update the differing results reached by Judge Guidry and Judge Vance of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in cases involving similar issues to this case brought before Judge Fallon of the same court.
In the case decided by Judge Guidry, Offshore Liftboats, which operates crewed vessels for marine transportation in support of oil and gas production, contracted with GOL to broker Offshore Liftboats’ vessels to charterers. The brokerage agreement provided for a fee based on a percentage of the charter hire. Charterers would pay the charter hire to GOL, which would remit the hire (minus the brokerage fee) to Offshore Liftboats. The agreement stated that GOL would not be responsible for the charterers’ non-payment of charter hire, but that GOL would undertake all reasonable efforts to collect the hire (although Offshore Liftboats retained the right to try to collect unpaid invoices directly from the charterer). GOL arranged for charters with Cox Operating, which stopped paying invoices that grew to $3,339,343.78 before Cox Operating sought bankruptcy. Offshore Liftboats then brought this action in federal court in Louisiana seeking to recover the unpaid invoices based on failure to undertake reasonable efforts to collect the charter hire. GOL moved for judgment on the pleadings, citing the contract provision that it would not be responsible for non-payment of charter hire. Offshore Liftboats responded that GOL breached the separate obligation to use reasonable efforts to collect the charter hire. Judge Guidry declined to resolve the dispute over the contract terms at the preliminary stage of the litigation. He agreed the brokerage agreement provided that GOL would not be responsible for non-payment of charter hire. However, the allegations went beyond non-payment. Judge Guidry explained that Offshore Liftboats “attributes its damages to [GOL’s] failure to use reasonable measures to collect the charter hire, not Cox’s non-payment.” That was sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract, and discovery was necessary to determine whether GOL took all reasonable efforts to collect the hire. See Offshore Liftboats, LLC v. GOL, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-1632, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178597 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2025) (Guidry).
In the case decided by Judge Vance, Seacor, which provides crewed vessels for marine transportation in support of oil and gas production, similarly contracted with GOL to broker Seacor’s vessels to charterers, and the contract provided that Seacor appointed GOL as its agent “solely for the purpose of obtaining charters” for Seacor vessels. The agreement contained the same provisions as in the previous case that charterers would pay the charter hire to GOL, which would remit the hire (minus the brokerage fee) to Seacor. The agreement stated that GOL would not be responsible for the charterers’ non-payment of charter hire, but that GOL would undertake all reasonable efforts to collect the hire (although Seacor retained the right to try to collect unpaid invoices directly from the charterer). Seacor provided vessels to Cox Operating that were brokered by GOL, but Cox Operating stopped paying for the charters and sought bankruptcy. GOL filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding that included approximately $2.7 million in unpaid invoices for Seacor’s charters (Seacor also filed a claim), and Seacor brought this suit in federal court in Louisiana against GOL, seeking the full amount of the outstanding invoices and an accounting with respect to payments GOL received from Cox Operating in the bankruptcy action ($13 million). Seacor and GOL filed motions for summary judgment, and Judge Vance began by finding that the brokerage agreement was unambiguous, concluding that whether GOL owed Seacor payments depended on whether GOL received payment on Seacor’s invoices. The Trade Agreement in the bankruptcy proceeding did not specify the invoices it was paying. However, the purpose of the agreement was to pay companies that continued to provide services to support Cox Operating in reorganization. As Seacor stopped providing services to Cox Operating months before the bankruptcy and did not commit to providing post-petition services, Judge Vance held that GOL did not have the discretion to pay Seacor from the $13 million disbursed in the Trade Agreement. Therefore, she held that GOL did not breach its duty to remit funds to Seacor. Judge Vance also rejected Seacor’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty, answering that GOL’s fiduciary duties were limited as it was Seacor’s agent only for obtaining charter hire and remitting payments actually received (GOL did not have a fiduciary duty over money to which Seacor was not entitled). Finally, Judge Vance addressed Seacor’s claim that GOL did not use reasonable efforts to collect the charter hire. GOL argued that it sought payment of unpaid invoices before the bankruptcy action and even filed liens on Seacor’s behalf. It continued collection efforts after the bankruptcy, including preserving the liens in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, Seacor argued that there were “significant other” steps that GOL could have taken, pre-petition, but it did not specify that those steps were. As Seacor did not identify additional actions or provide an industry standard that GOL failed to meet, Judge Vance found that Seacor failed to raise an issue of material fact that GOL did not use all reasonable efforts. Therefore, she dismissed Seacor’s claims with prejudice. See Seacor Marine, LLC v. GOL, LLC, No. 2:24-cv-2409, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180892 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2025) (Vance).
Before Judge Fallon addressed the merits in the suit brought against GOL by R&R Boats in federal court in Louisiana arising out of GOL’s brokering vessels that were chartered to Cox Operating, GOL sought to disqualify the law firm representing the plaintiff (R&R Boats), asserting that an attorney at the firm previously represented Cox Operating in its bankruptcy action. Judge Fallon denied the motion on September 22, 2025 and then considered the motion for summary judgment filed by GOL. Judge Fallon agreed with GOL that the Brokerage Agreement is a maritime contract and that maritime law, not Louisiana law applies. Therefore, R&R was not allowed to proceed on an open account claim under Louisiana law. In declining to grant summary judgment, Judge Fallon noted two distinctions between the contract with R&R Boats and the contract with Seacor. First, the agreement with R&R omitted the word “solely,” so the scope of the duty owed by GOL to R&R was potentially broader. Second, R&R presented evidence that created a fact dispute whether GOL undertook all reasonable efforts to obtain payment. Judge Fallon concluded: “Because the scope of GOL’s duty and the question of whether GOL’s actions undertaken to secure payment for R&R constitute ‘all reasonable efforts’ are issues pregnant with fact, the entry of summary judgment as to R&R’s breach of contract claim would be inappropriate. The claim must proceed to trial.” Judge Fallon held a bench trial on January 13 to 14, 2026.
Count in passenger’s complaint arising from fall from wheelchair on the gangway that combined multiple theories and a claim for negligent mode of operation was dismissed, but the passenger sufficiently alleged notice from prior claims for the counts alleging negligent inspection and maintenance and negligent failure to warn; passenger sufficiently identified the crewmembers responsible for supervision of the disembarkation process to be permitted to proceed under a vicarious liability theory as well as under direct liability; Smith v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 1:25-cv-21618, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263417 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2025) (Bloom).
Saundra Smith, a passenger on the cruise ship BREAKAWAY, was disembarking the ship in a wheelchair that was being pushed by her son on the carpeted gangway. When the wheelchair reached a connection to the carpeted transition ramp, the wheels became caught on the misleveled/excessively sloped ramp, and Smith fell from the wheelchair. Neither Smith, nor her son, could observe the condition because she was seated and he was pushing from behind. Smith brought this suit in federal court in Florida against the cruise line, asserting claims for negligent inspection and maintenance of the gangway (direct liability), negligent failure to warn (direct liability), negligent inspection and maintenance of the gangway (vicarious liability), negligent failure to warn (vicarious liability), and negligent failure to provide reasonably required assistance to passengers with special needs (vicarious liability). The cruise line moved to dismiss the counts alleging direct liability for lack of notice, and Smith presented four incidents involving passengers whose feet became trapped between the gangway and another object or where passengers lost their footing on misleveled or excessively sloped portions of a gangway, arguing that the incidents revealed a reasonable tendency for passengers to be unable to navigate excessively sloped or misleveled portions of a gangway, whether the passenger is proceeding on foot or in a wheelchair. The cruise line responded that Smith did not show that the incidents occurred on the same or similar gangways or under substantially similar circumstances, but Judge Bloom held that Smith had sufficiently alleged notice, answering that the argument addressed the strength of the evidence and not whether the allegations were sufficient. The cruise line also argued that the count alleging negligent inspection and maintenance was improper because it included the assertion of a claim for negligent mode of operation that is not permissible under the general maritime law. Judge Bloom agreed, stating: “Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant ‘fail[ed] to implement and enforce proper maintenance protocols and safety procedures designed to prevent misleveling or excessive sloping between the gangway and the transition ramp[,]’ . . . ‘describ[es]a failure to create or follow adequate policies and procedures’ which does not ‘relate to the specific circumstances of [Plaintiff’s] injury’ and is therefore based on an improper theory of negligent mode of operation.” The cruise line also moved to dismiss the vicarious liability claims on the ground that they “are nothing more than disguised claims sounding in direct liability seeking to circumvent the notice requirements for premises liability claims.” Judge Bloom disagreed, answering that in each of the vicarious liability counts Smith had identified the allegedly negligent crewmembers who were responsible for supervising the disembarkation process. Accordingly, as the plaintiff is the master of her complaint, Judge Bloom allowed her to choose to proceed under a theory of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both.
Judge enforced default provision in the $150,000 settlement agreement between an ocean carrier and NVOCC, requiring payment of $300,000 (minus payments made) if the NVOCC defaulted in paying installments under the settlement agreement (entering a judgment in the amount of $208,550); Mediterranean Shipping Co. (Canada) Inc. v. Beacon Logistics, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-5050, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264934 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2025) (Semper).
Mediterranean Shipping Co. brought this suit in 2022 in federal court in New Jersey against NVOCC Beacon Logistics seeking to recover more than $600,000 in charges resulting from the failure of Beacon Logistics to take possession of goods, transported by Mediterranean Shipping, at the ports of destination (port fees, detention charges, accessorial charges, and dunnage). Two years later, the parties reached a settlement, and Judge Semper signed the Stipulation of Settlement filed by the parties. Beacon Logistics agreed to pay $150,000 in installments, but the Stipulation contained a default provision that if Beacon Logistics failed to make any of the payments (after notice of default), Mediterranean Shipping “may enter judgment against Defendant in the amount of $300,000 US minus credit for any payments made pursuant to this Stipulation of Settlement, plus court costs.” Beacon Logistics made payments until January 1, 2025, and Mediterranean Shipping’s counsel sent emails requesting the defaults be cured. The defaults were not cured, and Mediterranean Shipping filed a motion seeking entry of judgment in the amount of $218,550 ($300,000 minus payments of $81,450). Beacon Logistics answered that payments had been delayed because of some serious family health issues and business liquidation issues, but that it “will be making a payment of $40,000 before the date of this motion which would make all outstanding payment up to date” (it did make an additional payment of $10,000). Judge Semper found the agreement was clear and unambiguous and that the default provision was enforceable as written. Citing the strong public policy favoring enforcement of settlement agreements, he ordered the entry of judgment in the amount of $208,550 (accounting for the additional payment of $10,000).
Passenger was required to plead notice in suit against cruise line for the injury she sustained when the lid on the cup of hot tea she was served (that was not properly secured) came loose and hot tea spilled on her; Aboubaker v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 0:25-cv-61975, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265223 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2025) (Dimitrouleas).
Yolette Aboubaker, a passenger on the EMERALD PRINCESS, requested a cup of hot tea while dining on the vessel. The server brought her a cup fitted with a lid, but the lid came loose when Aboubaker took a drink (she alleged it was improperly secured), and hot tea spilled onto her body. Aboubaker brought this suit against the cruise line in federal court in Florida with a count of negligence (containing several theories). The cruise line moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint contained no allegations that the cruise line knew of the hazardous condition, that the condition existed for a sufficient period to invite corrective measures, or that there were substantially similar prior incidents. Aboubaker argued that notice was not required because the cruise line created/maintained the unsafe condition. Judge Dimitrouleas noted that the Eleventh Circuit had rejected this argument, describing the cases espousing it as “wrongly decided.” As notice was required, Judge Dimitrouleas dismissed the complaint and gave Aboubaker one opportunity to cure the deficiency.
Maritime lien was necessary for Rule C arrest of vessel, and an action under the Federal Arbitration Act was insufficient; Fleetzero Inc. v. M/V ATLANTIC POWER, No. 6:25-cv-1686, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265587 (W.D. La. Dec. 23, 2025) (Ayo).
Fleetzero bareboat chartered the M/V PACIFIC JOULE to Atlantic Oceanic, and Atlantic Oceanic allegedly breached the charter by failing to pay charter hire, refusing to deliver the vessel to Fleetzero, and failing to pay a performance guaranty. Atlantic Oceanic initiated an arbitration proceeding, and the panel issued a partial final award in favor of Fleetzero and a final award in the amount of $4,157,724.59. Fleetzero then filed this suit in federal court in Louisiana to confirm the arbitration award and sought to arrest two vessels owned by Atlantic Ocean, the M/V ATLANTIC POWER and the M/V ATLANTIC WIND, pursuant to Supplemental Rule C. The court ordered the arrest of the vessels, and Atlantic Oceanic moved to vacate the arrests on the ground that Fleetzero did not plead that it had a maritime lien on the vessels that would permit their arrest under Rule C. Fleetzero argued that it was not proceeding under Rule C (1)(a), which provides that an in rem action may be brought to “enforce any maritime lien.” Instead, it asserted that it arrested the vessels pursuant to Rule C (1)(b), which permits an in rem action: “Whenever a statute of the United States provides for a maritime action in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto." Fleetzero argued that the United States statute is Section 8 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides: “If the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise justiciable in admiralty, then, notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the party claiming to be aggrieved may begin his proceeding hereunder by libel and seizure of the vessel or other property of the other party according to the usual course of admiralty proceedings, and the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award.” Magistrate Judge Ayo noted the Sembawang decision of the Fifth Circuit in which the appellate court rejected the argument that Rule C (1)(b) provides for an in rem action based on Section 8 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Section 8 “does not confer jurisdiction or a right against the vessel in rem,” concluding that Sembawang could not proceed in rem under Rule C (1)(b) (Sembawang was allowed to proceed under Rule B in that case). As Magistrate Judge Ayo was “unable to conclude here that the Fifth Circuit’s holding would not apply to the situation in the instant case,” Magistrate Judge Ayo vacated the arrests.
Passenger’s complaint against cruise line for slip and fall in a bar on the vessel did not sufficiently plead claims for vicarious liability; Francois v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:25-cv-23897, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265733 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 24, 2025) (Moore).
Kimberly Francois, a passenger on the CARNIVAL RELIANCE, slipped and fell on a wet, slippery liquid on the deck in a bar on the vessel. She brought this suit in federal court in Florida against the cruise line, asserting two counts of vicarious liability. The cruise line objected to the counts because they combined allegations of direct and vicarious liability (with references to the cruise line’s own duty and conduct). Judge Moore agreed and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The cruise line also argued that the vicarious liability claims were not properly pleaded because the allegations were premised on duties owed by the cruise line without allegations about the duty breached by a crewmember or the conduct of a crewmember that breached the duty. Therefore, Judge Moore held that the complaint failed to state a claim and dismissed it without prejudice for that reason as well.
Kenneth G. Engerrand
President, Brown Sims, P.C.
Houston 1990 Post Oak Blvd Suite 1800 Houston, TX 77056 O 713.629.1580
New Orleans 365 Canal Street Suite 2900 New Orleans, LA 70130 O 504.569.1007
Gulfport 1915 23rd Suite B Gulfport, MS 39501 O 228.867.8711
Miami 2801 SW 149th Ave Suite 120 Miramar, FL 33027 O 305.274.5507
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In the litigation that ensued with respect to the allision of the vessel DALI with the Francis Scott Key Bridge, Judge James K. Bredar stated:
A massive maritime disaster litigation such as this one is complex under the best of circumstances; without a firm hand on the tiller, it risks becoming unmanageable. The Court has structured this litigation with a singular focus on arriving at an answer to the question of limitation of liability as expeditiously as practicable.
In re Grace Ocean Private Ltd., 765 F. Supp. 3d 461 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2025).
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© Kenneth G. Engerrand, January 30, 2026; redistribution permitted with proper attribution.
