August 2026 Longshore Maritime Update No. 327
Notes from your Updater:
The IRS announced a mid-year increase in the rate for business mileage, beginning on July 1, 2026, to 76 cents per mile. The rate for business mileage from January 1 to June 30, 2026 is 72.5 cents per mile. The rate for medical mileage, beginning on July 1, 2026, increased to 23.5 cents per mile. The rate for medical mileage from January 1, 2026 to June 30, 2026 is 20.5 cents per mile.
On July 1, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint of Shannon Bazemore, a member of the clerks and checkers Local 1475 of the International Longshoremen’s Association in Savannah, Georgia, alleging that the Local discriminated against her and 21 additional African American members of Local 1475 with disparate and unlawful employment practices based on race (“including a segregated work list, disadvantageously changing seniority rules, and implementing waivers to assure the white members of Local 1475’s bargaining unit that Bazemore and her fellow African American members would not take on ‘AA’ seniority status”). See Bazemore v. International Longshoremen’s Association, ILA Local 1475, No. 25-12774, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19312 (11th Cir. July 1, 2026) (per curiam).
On July 7, 2026, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the challenge of environmental groups to the approval of the Maritime Administration to Delfin LNG’s deepwater port in the Gulf of America (“a cluster of floating vessels, moored miles offshore, that would liquefy natural gas and load it onto tankers bound overseas”) based on lack of standing, concluding that the petitioners failed to show an injury in fact fairly traceable to MarAd’s licensing decision. See Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Department of Transportation, No. 25-60282, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19815 (5th Cir. July 7, 2026) (Willett).
On July 7, 2026, Alaska Governor Mike Dunleavy, Associate United States Attorney General Stanley Edmund Woodward, Jr., and Anchorage Mayor Suzanne LaFrance announced a settlement of the 12-year lawsuit by Anchorage against the United States (for the Maritime Administration) in the Court of Federal Claims, accusing MarAd of breaching duties in failing to provide expertise in the design, construction, and overseeing of the design and construction of the Port of Anchorage Intermodal Expansion Project (with the United States paying Anchorage $180 million). See Anchorage v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-166 (Ct. Fed. Cl.).
On July 13, 2026, Magistrate Judge Beeler of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed two of the claims brought by environmental groups against the Coast Guard, challenging the Coast Guard’s process for designating vessel-routing measures off the California coast in which endangered species feed and migrate for lack of ripeness. She dismissed the claims because the measures were non-binding recommendations and not a final agency action. See Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Coast Guard, No. 3:25-cv-9109, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154833 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2026).
In our March 2026 Update, we reported the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Fiedler v. United States, affirming the dismissal of the suit against the United States on behalf of the victims of the CONCEPTION fire based on the discretionary function exception applied by the courts in cases brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act. On July 20, 2026, the Ninth Circuit declined to grant rehearing en banc, despite amicus curiae briefs from maritime law professors and California consumer attorneys. See Fiedler v. United States, No. 24-5064, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 21629 (9th Cir. July 20, 2026). We will report when the petition for certiorari is filed.
On July 22, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom upheld an arbitral award for the seller’s negligent failure to timely deliver the M/V LILA LISBON under a Norwegian Saleform contract, entitling the buyer to recover loss of bargain damages, concluding: “If a Memorandum of Agreement on the SALEFORM 2012 form is lawfully cancelled by a buyer under Clause 14 because the vessel is not delivered by the cancelling date as a result of the seller’s ‘proven negligence’, the buyer is entitled to recover loss of bargain damages even though there has been no accepted repudiatory breach of contract.” See Great Asia Maritime Ltd v. Orion Shipping & Trading LLC, [2026] UKSC 23.
On July 27, 2026, Judge Nichols of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part Empire Offshore Wind’s motion to dismiss the suit brought by Save Long Beach Island, Dr. Robert Stern, and others against the United States (Empire Offshore Wind intervened as a defendant), challenging the approval to build a wind farm off the coast of New York and New Jersey. Judge Nichols declined to dismiss the claim for violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act with respect to the “take” of Northern Migratory Coastal Bottlenose Dolphins (a claim that was not involved in the dismissal of a related challenge in a suit in New Jersey). See Save Long Beach Island, Inc. v. United States Department of Commerce, No. 1:25-cv-2214, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166104 (D.D.C. July 27, 2026).
On the longshore front . . .
From the federal appellate courts
Fifth Circuit affirmed use of Section 10(c) and not Sections 10(a) or 10(b) to calculate the average weekly wage of a terminal worker who had worked for the employer for 10 weeks and had a sporadic employment history in the year before his injury; Brady v. Director, OWCP (Texas Terminals, L.P.), No. 25-60003, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 20798 (5th Cir. July 15, 2026) (per curiam).
Kevin Brady asserts that a loading beam fell on him on May 15, 2017 while he was working for Texas Terminals. He sought treatment the next day and was diagnosed with a contusion and released to return to work. A different provider confirmed that he had a contusion and could return to work without restrictions. Brady retained an attorney who sent him to a chiropractor and then his designated doctor before Brady requested a change to Dr. Shahid Syed, who released Brady to work with restrictions. The carrier’s choice, Dr. David Vanderweide, released Brady without restrictions. Texas Terminals offered regular work within the restrictions but eventually terminated Brady on November 15, 2017 for failing to show up for scheduled shifts. He subsequently obtained work as a cook for James Coney Island. Brady argued that he was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his accident, and the dispute was tried before Administrative Law Judge Daly, who found that Brady reached MMI with no residual impairment or restriction on May 1, 2018. The only issue remaining after the case was appealed twice to the Benefits Review Board was Brady’s average weekly wage. Texas Terminals argued that his AWW was $112.86 based on the fact that Brady was hired on March 6, 2017 and earned $5,869.50 in the 10 weeks before his accident. Texas Terminals argued that the earnings should be divided by 52 because Brady had not worked a full 52 weeks in at least the three years preceding the accident. ALJ Daly decided that the appropriate AWW should consider the total amount Brady earned in the 52 weeks prior to his injury ($20,745.64), resulting in an AWW of $398.95 (the Board calculated the AWW at $402.19). As either amount was less than the post-injury wage earning capacity of $480, Texas Terminals did not dispute the calculations of the ALJ or BRB. ALJ Daly calculated the AWW based on Section 10(c), finding that Brady’s gross earnings in the 10 weeks did not reasonably reflect his AWW. Instead, he blended Brady’s earnings from multiple employers (including Texas Terminals) for the 52 weeks prior to the injury. He found no evidence to support application of Sections 10(a) or 10(b). The BRB found ALJ Daly’s reasoning to be reasonable, except the BRB corrected the wages in the prior 52 weeks to $20,913.64, resulting in the increase in the AWW to $402.19. Brady, pro se, filed a petition for review with the Fifth Circuit and summarized his argument as follows: “Defendant’s must have paid oalj daly or owcp case workers to overlook my exhibits, and purposely deny me Longshoreman Act Benefits, which is a crime”. The Fifth Circuit deduced that Brady was claiming that his average weekly wage should be what he made in the week before his injury ($651) or what he insisted he was making per week before his accident ($1000). However, the court noted that ALJ Daly had not found Brady to be credible and had based his decision on a lack of evidence supporting his asserted earnings. Brady also argued that application of Section 10(c) was error and that his AWW should be calculated under Section 10(a) or 10(b) (although his assertion of his wages sounded more like a 10(c) argument). The Fifth Circuit did not find either section applicable to Brady who was not employed for substantially the whole of the year, had periods of unemployment, and who did not establish an average daily wage or salary. As there was substantial evidence for the BRB’s calculation of $402.19, the Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review.
From the federal district courts
Barge owner and operator were not responsible under LHWCA Section 5(b) when a subcontractor employee during ship repair/maintenance fell through an open area in a guardrail that was left when the barge was decoupled from its articulated tug for drydocking, and state law and federal admiralty law did not supplement the Scindia duties; owner’s consultant who was hired to ensure the work was performed correctly did not breach any duty to the worker; claims of the defendants against the employer for indemnity, allocation of fault, and breach of the WWLP were dismissed; Lopez-Mulvaney v. Fraser Shipyards, No. 3:23-cv-789, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86936 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2026) (Peterson).
This decision arises from the maintenance and repair of the barge INTEGRITY, owned by Holcim, Inc. and operated by Andrie, LLC at Fraser Shipyards in Superior Wisconsin. Andrie contracted with Anchor Consulting to oversee the repairs. Fraser hired C&L Contracting to perform sandblasting and painting work as part of the project. Randall Mulvaney was employed by C&L Contracting as a painter. He was covering the rail on the vessel with a tarp to prepare the hull for painting when he fell through a gap in the guardrail, resulting in his death. C&L Contracting’s LHWCA carrier, American Interstate Insurance, paid LHWCA benefits to Mulvaney’s family, and Mulvaney’s beneficiaries brought this suit in Wisconsin federal court against Fraser Shipyards, Andrie, Holcim, and Anchor Consulting. The claims were brought under Section 5(b) of the LHWCA, the general maritime law, and Wisconsin law. The beneficiaries were joined in the suit by C&L Contracting and American Interstate. Fraser, Andrie, and Holcim filed counterclaims against employer C&L Contracting, seeking indemnity and apportionment of responsibility. The parties presented three motions for summary judgment to Judge Peterson. The barge owner and operator (Andrie and Holcim), moved for summary judgment that the only remedy against them was under the Scindia duties of LHWCA Section 5(b) and that they did not violate the Scindia duties. The INTEGRITY is the barge component of the articulated tug-barge G.L. OSTRANDER-INTEGRITY. The barge was decoupled from the tug in order to be drydocked, leaving a gap in the guardrail. The plaintiffs argued that Andrie and Holcim violated the turnover duty by turning over the vessel in a dangerous condition and by failing to warn of the gap and misled Fraser by providing an inaccurate diagram that did not show the gap. Andrie and Holcim responded that they did not have to warn about the gap because it was an open and obvious danger. Fraser was aware of the gap before the accident and had placed red caution tape over the gap. Therefore, Judge Peterson held that Fraser’s undisputed knowledge of the gap precluded any finding that Andrie and Holcim breached a duty to warn. The plaintiffs argued that Andrie and Holcim violated the turnover duty by failing to barricade the gap in the guardrail, and the defendants answered that the Fraser’s knowledge likewise precluded liability on this theory. Judge Peterson reasoned that the duty to take precautions rested with Fraser or its subcontractor, C&L Contracting (the party best able to prevent injury to its employee). Therefore, Judge Peterson held that the vessel defendants did not breach the turnover duty. Judge Peterson then considered the argument that the vessel defendants breached the active control duty because they contractually agreed to retain “meaningful control” over safety conditions during the work (including the right to participate in joint safety audits upon request and the stop-work authority). Judge Peterson rejected the argument, explaining that reservation of authority was not the same as actively controlling an area or directing the contractor’s activities. Therefore, he granted summary judgment on the active control duty. With respect to the claims under the general maritime law and state law, the plaintiffs agreed that the claims would be preempted if the plaintiffs recovered on the Section 5(b) claims. However, they argued that the claims were not preempted when there was no remedy under Section 5(b). The plaintiffs cited the caveat from Scindia, “absent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary” and argued that there was positive law in Wisconsin in its safe-place statute, concluding that the vessel defendants had an affirmative duty to inspect their vessels for hazards. Judge Peterson disagreed that the “positive law” language could impose a general safe-place duty on vessel owners that was inconsistent with the purpose of the LHWCA, “which was to make vessels liable only for their own negligence, and to place the primary responsibility for maintaining safe conditions on maritime contractors, not on vessel owners.” Judge Peterson next considered the motion for summary judgment of Anchor Consulting, which was hired by Andrie to serve as its onsite representative during the maintenance/repair work to ensure that the barge was repaired correctly and to provide quality control guidance to Andrie about the repairs. The contract with Anchor Consulting contained no explicit reference to worker safety, which was reserved to Fraser under its contract with Andrie/Holcim. Although the plaintiffs cited the general supervisory authority over the project, the attendance of Anchor Consulting’s principal employee at safety meetings, and its stop-work authority, Judge Peterson responded that the evidence did not establish that Anchor Consulting acted negligently, and he granted summary judgment to Anchor Consulting. Finally, Judge Peterson considered C&L Contracting’s motion for summary judgment on the claims of Andrie, Holcim, and Fraser for breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance, apportionment of responsibility, and common-law and contractual indemnity. Judge Peterson agreed that Andrie and Holcim were barred by the LHWCA from seeking indemnity or apportionment. Fraser argued, however, that it was entitled to common-law indemnity under an active-passive theory. Judge Peterson pointed out that the active-passive case cited by Fraser did not involve the LHWCA, and he held that the common-law indemnity claim was barred by Section 5(a). With respect to the claims for contractual indemnity and breach of the WWLP, C&L Contracting argued that there was no express agreement and that no reasonable fact finder could find an implied indemnity agreement. Fraser did not respond, and Judge Peterson granted summary judgment to C&L Contracting.
From the state courts
Longshore worker (and his spouse) adequately alleged breach of the turnover duty and duty to intervene with respect to asbestos exposure on vessels, and they were entitled to seek recovery of loss of consortium; allegations of negligence were insufficient to permit recovery of punitive damages; Torres v. American President Lines, LLC, No. 25STCV36127, 2026 Cal. Super. LEXIS 33173 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles, Apr. 9, 2026) (Iwasaki).
Lorenzo Torres claims that he developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while employed as a longshore worker (and through exposure during automotive repair). He and his wife, Anita, brought this suit in state court in Los Angeles County, California, against several shipping companies (including Matson Navigation Co., American President Lines, and Residual Enterprises) for third-party negligence under the LHWCA. The shipping defendants moved to strike the negligence allegations for inaccurately stating the turnover duty and failing to state sufficient facts to support the existence of a duty to intervene (based on the Scindia duties for a claim under Section 5(b) of the LHWCA). They also moved to strike the claims for punitive damages and loss of consortium on the ground that the LHWCA does not permit the plaintiffs to seek non-pecuniary damages. Judge Iwasaki held that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated claims under Scindia. The allegations that the defendants failed to exercise ordinary care in transferring a reasonably safe vessel (including equipment, cargo, and work space) so that Torres could perform operations in a safe manner and that the defendants failed to warn of hazardous asbestos-containing materials of which the defendants should have known were sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements for the turnover duty. The allegations that the defendants failed to intervene to prevent Torres from being exposed to asbestos-containing materials that the defendants knew were hazardous was sufficient to plead a failure to intervene. With respect to the claim for loss of consortium, Judge Iwasaki held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvez (allowing recovery of consortium for longshore injury claims) was still controlling after the decisions of the Supreme Court in Miles and Batterton. Therefore, Judge Iwasaki declined to dismiss the claim for loss of consortium. Finally, Judge Iwasaki addressed the issue of whether punitive damages are available in a claim for maritime negligence. He considered that punitive damages were available as a remedy for gross neglect and willful and malicious conduct, but not for ordinary negligence. Therefore, he dismissed the claim for punitive damages for the negligence of the defendants.
And on the maritime front . . .
From the federal appellate courts
Passenger’s pleading of res ipsa loquitur did not obviate the requirement that he establish that the cruise line had notice of the piece of glass in the quesadilla served to him in a restaurant on the ship, resulting in affirmance of the summary judgment in favor of the cruise line that it did not owe him a duty of reasonable care; Cunningham v. Carnival Cruise Line, No. 25-13025, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19624 (11th Cir. July 6, 2026) (per curiam).
Maurice D. Cunningham, a passenger on the CARNIVAL VENEZIA, claims that he swallowed glass in his chicken quesadilla while eating in the Canal Grande restaurant on the vessel. Cunningham brought this suit against the cruise line in federal court in Florida, and the cruise line moved for summary judgment for failure to establish notice of the dangerous condition or causation. Cunningham had no evidence that any crewmembers knew of the glass in his food before the incident, and there was no evidence that others found glass in their food at the Canal Grande restaurant or any other restaurant on of the cruise line’s vessels. Cunningham responded that he was entitled to an inference of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur, but the cruise line argued that application of res ipsa loquitur did not obviate the obligation to provide notice (and that the doctrine was inapplicable in this case). Judge Bloom agreed that Cunningham had not established notice, and she then addressed whether res ipsa loquitur applied and obviated the need to establish notice. She noted that the Eleventh Circuit had considered whether a passenger could survive summary judgment without evidence of notice by invoking res ipsa loquitur. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the doctrine only allows an inference that the defendant breached its duty but did not establish that the defendant owed a duty in the first place. To establish there was a duty, the passenger had to prove that the cruise line was on notice of a dangerous condition. Thus, the assertion of res ipsa loquitur did not eliminate the need to prove that the cruise line had notice that glass could be in Cunningham’s quesadilla. The absence of notice was fatal to the suit, and Judge Bloom granted summary judgment to the cruise line. See October 2025 Update.
Cunningham filed a notice of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. He acknowledged that there was no evidence of actual or constructive notice—that the crew was aware of the glass in his food or that anyone had ever had glass or a foreign object at the Canal Grande or any other restaurant on one of the cruise line’s vessels. As the absence of notice was fatal to the duty of reasonable care, Cunningham argued that res ipsa loquitur created an inference of negligence for the fact finder. The Eleventh Circuit reiterated that res ipsa loquitur can allow a jury to infer from circumstantial evidence that the defendant must have breached its duty, “but it cannot show that a defendant must have had that duty in the first place.” As the prerequisite to the duty of care is actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition, and as Cunningham failed to establish notice in this case, he could not rely on res ipsa loquitur to establish that the cruise line owed him a duty. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the summary judgment.
From the federal district courts
Maritime lien continued after release of the cargo when the release was procured by fraud, and the lien could be enforced in an in personam proceeding; maritime law may apply to fraud claim, without regard to the Grubart test, if the fraud is asserted as an equitable claim and not as a tort; Weida Freight System, Inc. v. Jetson Electric Bikes LLC, No. 1:24-cv-7180, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71600, 85902 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 17, 2026) (Matsumoto).
Weida Freight System is a Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier, freight forwarder, and logistics provider. Jetson Electric Bikes sells e-mobility products, including electric scooters, electric bikes, and hoverboards. Josh Sultan was the CEO of Jetson, and Benjy Goldstein was a Jetson shareholder who was primarily responsible for financial decisions and for negotiations with Weida with respect to Jetson’s debt. Jetson engaged Weida to provide freight forwarding and logistics services for the ocean shipment of Jetson electric bikes, but Jetson fell behind in its payments. The bills of lading issued by Weida (as well as the general maritime law) afforded a maritime lien to Weida on Jetson’s electric bikes. After the debt reached $3.5 million, Weida expressed its intent to assert its lien. Goldstein and Sultan set in motion a scheme to induce Weida to release possession of the liened cargo in exchange for payments. Goldstein and Sultan did not reveal to Weida that Jetson could never sell the liened cargo to make the payments because the liened cargo was already encumbered to another creditor. Weida released the cargo, but the other creditor took possession of the cargo and sold it to TruRide, a company that thereafter owned and operated Jetson and in which Goldstein has an ownership interest. Weida then brought this suit against Goldstein, Sultan, and Jetson (TruRide was added in an amended complaint) in federal court in the Southern District of New York, asserting claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, account stated, fraud, and successor liability. The action was transferred to the Eastern District of New York, and Goldstein, Sultan, and TruRide filed motions to dismiss. Before turning to the merits, Judge Matsumoto addressed the objection of TruRide, a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business in Delaware, to personal jurisdiction. As the law of the forum (New York) governs personal jurisdiction in admiralty cases, as New York state law recognizes imputation of personal jurisdiction on successor entities, and as Weida plausibly alleged TruRide’s successor liability, Judge Matsumoto denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Applying maritime law to Weida’s claims, Judge Matsumoto rejected the argument of Goldstein and Sultan that they are not personally liable for the claims against Jetson, answering that they perpetrated an elaborate fraudulent scheme in Jetson’s name to induce Weida to release possession of the liened bikes. She also held that Weida had sufficiently alleged successor liability because TruRide and Jetson engaged in a merger in which TruRide owned Jetson and Jetson ceased operating as an independent entity and by which TruRide purchased the liened cargo to operate the same business that Jetson did. Judge Matsumoto then addressed whether Weida had a maritime lien despite the release and transfer of the liened cargo. She noted that, traditionally, plaintiffs seeking to enforce a maritime lien were only permitted to proceed in rem and in the district where the property was located. But she added: “Under modern admiralty law, however, plaintiffs enjoy significantly more flexibility in enforcing maritime liens.” Judge Matsumoto explained that Weida could enforce its maritime lien by adding an in rem proceeding to this in personam action, or it could adjudicate its maritime lien rights within the in personam action. The maritime lien was still valid because it is not released unless there is an unconditional delivery of the cargo. The conditional delivery of the cargo pursuant to the payment plan did not, as a matter of law, release the lien on the bikes. As Weida stated a viable claim for fraud in the inducement, Judge Matsumoto stated that punitive damage were potentially available.
Goldstein and TruRide sought reconsideration of Judge Matsumoto’s decision, arguing that the court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over the claims for fraud in the inducement and for successor liability. Although Judge Matsumoto noted that reconsideration is not the proper vehicle to present new arguments, she did advise Weida, which is preparing an amended complaint, to set forth with precision the specifics on whether its claims are based on state or federal law, whether they are based on equity or tort, and identifying the specific theory of fraud. Judge Matsumoto added that fraud-based maritime claims are not, by default, maritime torts that are analyzed under the tort standards set forth in Grubart (“the jurisdictional analysis turns on whether fraud in the inducement is pled as an equitable claim or a tort). She reasoned that “when the object of the fraud, as alleged in this action is the dispossession of maritime cargo subject to a maritime lien, the fraud-related claim may be derivative of claims related to the enforcement of the maritime lien” (“defendants cannot evade the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction simply by standing on land while fraudulently dispossessing the plaintiff of maritime cargo subject to a maritime lien”). Once the amended complaint is filed, the defendants can move to dismiss new claims on the merits and any claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge dismissed seaman’s complaint alleging a violation of state law for retaliatory discharge for lack of admiralty jurisdiction; McKerchie v. Kokosing Alberici Traylor, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-10903, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71629 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2026) (Parker).
Brandon McKerchie was employed as a captain on Kokosing Alberici Traylor’s vessel, M/V SHIRLY ANN. McKerchie was required to complete Subchapter M forms to be submitted by Kokosing to the Coast Guard (Safety, Health, and Environment forms). On November 5, 2024, McKerchie noted deficiencies on the forms. McKerchie asserts that Kokosing then performed a random drug test on McKerchie, which he passed, and then terminated his employment for violating the substance abuse policy. McKerchie brought this suit against Kokosing in Michigan federal court, based on admiralty jurisdiction, for breach of the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, and Kokosing moved to dismiss the suit as time barred, for failure to state a claim under the state statute, and for lack of admiralty jurisdiction over the state claim. McKerchie filed an amended complaint, and Kokosing filed another motion to dismiss. McKerchie then filed a second amended complaint to which Kokosing responded with a motion to dismiss. McKerchie argued that admiralty law and its three-year statute of limitations applied, causing Judge Parker to address whether the court had admiralty jurisdiction over the suit. Judge Parker noted the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Donovan v. Texaco that a seaman does not have a cause of action against his employer for termination of employment for reporting safety violations to the Coast Guard. Congress responded by enacting the Seaman’s Protection Act that prohibits retaliation against seamen who inform the Coast Guard of dangerous situations. However, McKerchie did not mention the federal statute in his pleadings or briefing and continued to invoke admiralty jurisdiction for violation of the state statute. As McKerchie only asserted a violation of state law, Judge Parker dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge declined to reconsider ruling that time charterer was not entitled to bring a Ryan WWLP action against the stevedore for injuries and property damage resulting from a fire and explosion on ship for failing to disconnect batteries on used cars that were loaded on the vessel; Grimaldi Deep Sea S.p.A. v. SSA Atlantic, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-562, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72219 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2026) (Howard).
Grimaldi Deep Sea, which time chartered the vessel M/V HOEGH XIAMEN, engaged stevedore SSA Atlantic to load approximately 1,500 used vehicles onto the vessel at the Blount Island Marine Terminal in Jacksonville, Florida for international transport. Grimaldi provided instructions to SSA on how to complete the loading that included disconnecting batteries in the vehicles (to reduce the risk of fires caused by used vehicles). Shortly after the loading was completed, a fire broke out on the vessel. A team of firefighters from the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department arrived, and several firefighters were injured in an explosion. Ultimately, many of the vehicles were damaged, and the vessel was a total loss. The injured firefighters settled their claims with Grimaldi and SSA Atlantic, and Grimaldi settled the claims for damage to the vehicles and vessel. Grimaldi then brought this action in federal court in Florida against SSA Atlantic for breach of contract, seeking to recover indemnity for the expenses incurred in defending and settling the claims arising from the fire and explosion (contending that the fire and explosion were caused by the stevedore’s failure to load the cargo in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with the contract instructions). SSA Atlantic moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Grimaldi, as time charterer, is not entitled to recover under the Ryan warranty of workmanlike performance. Judge Howard agreed that SSA Atlantic had a duty to perform stevedoring services with reasonable care, skill, and safety and that it would breach the implied warranty of workmanlike performance if it failed to do so. However, breach of the warranty “does not automatically entitle Grimaldi to indemnification.” Reasoning that the time charterer does not have an obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel, Judge Howard held that “a time charterer, like Grimaldi, does not have an implied right to indemnity against a stevedore under the Warranty.” Judge Howard noted that the claims involved property damage and personal injury. She added that even if the warranty extended to the time charterer, it would not extend to property damage claims and that the warranty should not apply for the injury claims because the time charterer was not liable for unseaworthiness. Judge Howard did not believe that Grimaldi was without remedy. She explained that “application of comparative fault in these circumstances best advances the goals underpinning the Ryan doctrine.” As Grimaldi only sought damages for breach of contract based on indemnity under the implied warranty of workmanlike performance, Judge Howard dismissed the complaint. See December 2025 Update.
Grimaldi filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal and also filed a motion for reconsideration with the district court. Grimaldi assert that reconsideration was necessary to correct a clear error and to prevent a manifest injustice because critical legal issues were not applied in determining whether Grimaldi is entitled to seek indemnity for breach of the WWLP. Grimaldi cited cases, that it had not previously cited (but were available) to support its argument that Ryan indemnity applies to time charterers. Judge Howard first noted that reconsideration was not an appropriate mechanism to supplement its original briefing and to rehash issues already presented to the court. Nonetheless, the additional cases were not persuasive for Judge Howard. Some of the cases involved bareboat charters and not time charters, and some involved express indemnity or failed to fully analyze the applicability of Ryan. Finally, the cases highlighted the split in the appellate courts on the breadth of Ryan indemnity and did not provide binding authority for the court to diverge from the Eleventh Circuit’s admonition to reject all-or-nothing allocation in favor of dividing damages based on fault. Accordingly, Judge Howard denied the motion for reconsideration, and Grimaldi filed an amended notice of appeal.
Recording a Notice of Claim of Lien for a first-priority maritime lien to secure payment of the purchase price of a vessel does not establish a first preferred ship mortgage or a maritime lien that will support arrest of the vessel; Caribbean Charter Corp. v. M/Y AUREELITO, No. 3:25-cv-1618, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73141 (D.P.R. Apr. 1, 2026) (Arias-Marxuach).
This case involves the sale of the M/Y AUREELITO by Caribbean Charter Corp. to The 3hird Fisherman LLC with a first-priority maritime lien to secure payment of the purchase price. Caribbean Charter executed a Notice of Claim of Lien and recorded the Notice with the Coast Guard National Vessel Documentation Center. After 3hird defaulted, Caribbean Charter brought this action against the AUREELITO, in rem, and 3hird (and the loan’s guarantor Elliot Eduardo Giraud Donate) in personam, in federal court in Puerto Rico to enforce its first-priority maritime lien on the vessel and to recover for the breach of contract. The vessel was arrested, and 3hird moved for a hearing to argue that Caribbean Charter did not have a maritime lien because the parties never executed a mortgage and no mortgage was ever recorded. Caribbean Charter responded that it was not claiming a preferred ship mortgage. Instead, it was asserting that it had properly given notice of its lien under Section 31343. It was clear that Caribbean Charter had not complied with the statutory requirements for a preferred ship mortgage, but Judge Arias-Marxuach noted that it was not sufficient that Caribbean Charter merely file a notice of a lien in order to be able to arrest the vessel. It was also necessary that Caribbean Charter establish that it had a valid maritime lien. Judge Arias-Marxuach cited the “unremarkable” proposition that vessel sales do not confer maritime jurisdiction and held that Caribbean Charter failed to establish admiralty jurisdiction for the in rem action. Accordingly, he vacated the arrest of the vessel.
Suit by worker who claimed that his mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos-containing mud on jack-up rigs on the OCS was removable under the federal question jurisdiction of the OCSLA, but his Jones Act claim was severed and remanded to state court; Patterson v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., No. 4:25-cv-5715, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86251 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2026) (Bray), recommendation adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84586 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2026) (Hanks).
Robert Lynn Patterson, Sr., asserts that he suffers from mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos while employed by Union Oil Co. of California from approximately 1961 to 1975. He claims that his exposure occurred while serving as a roustabout, trainee, and engineer on jack-up rigs on the outer Continental Shelf. Patterson was also employed by UNOCAL in land-based jobs. Patterson brought this suit in state court in Harris County, Texas against UNOCAL (as his Jones Act employer), against Baker Hughes, individually and as successor to Milchem, as supplier/manufacturer of asbestos-containing drilling mud, and against Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. as manufacturer of asbestos-containing drilling mud. Chevron Phillips removed the case to federal court based on the federal question jurisdiction from the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act with the consent of Baker Hughes. It did not obtain consent from UNOCAL, arguing that it was not necessary. Patterson moved to sever the Jones Act claim against UNOCAL and to remand it to state court. UNOCAL argued that the Jones Act claim was fraudulently pleaded and should be dismissed. Judge Bray agreed that the claims against Baker Hughes and Chevron Phillips arose under the OCSLA and were removable as they involved oil and gas operations on the OCS. Patterson argued that the court should remand the entire case because UNOCAL did not consent to removal, but Magistrate Judge Bray disagreed, answering that the Removal Statute only requires consent from the defendants against whom claims are asserted that arise under federal law, and the Jones Act claim does not arise under federal law for federal question jurisdiction. Magistrate Judge Bray also noted that the Jones Act claim is nonremovable by statute, and the Removal Statute provides that the claim should be severed and remanded to state court. However, UNOCAL argued that the court should pierce the pleadings to rule that the claim was fraudulently pleaded. Magistrate Judge Bray disagreed, stating that the procedure is necessary only when a fraudulently pleaded claim would frustrate federal jurisdiction. As the Removal Statute allows the court to retain jurisdiction over the non-Jones Act OCSLA claims, federal jurisdiction is not frustrated. Therefore, Magistrate Bray declined to pierce the pleadings in order to retain jurisdiction over the Jones Act claim. Accordingly, he recommended that the Jones Act claim be severed and remanded to state court. There was no objection to the recommendation, and Judge Hanks adopted it.
Injured passenger’s claims for breach of contract and violation of consumer protection laws were barred by the six-month limitation in the passage ticket; allegations were insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages; Anglade-Dorleans v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 1:25-cv-23217, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73537 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2026) (Louis).
Lesline Anglade-Dorleans, a passenger on the NORWEGIAN VIVA, slipped and fell on the ship’s gangway, allegedly from a slippery residue from the cleaning of areas adjacent to and above the gangway combined with the worn and uneven non-slip treading on the gangway. She brought suit against the cruise line in Florida federal court, asserting four counts for negligence, breach of contract, failure to warn of unsafe conditions, and violation of consumer protection laws. The cruise line moved to dismiss the complaint as improperly pleaded, time barred, and for an improper claim for punitive damages. Magistrate Judge Louis agreed that the complaint had to be dismissed. The negligence count combined multiple theories of negligence (failure to inspect, failure to warn, negligent training, and negligent design). Some of the negligence allegations duplicated the allegations in the count for failure to warn. Magistrate Judge Louis then considered the assertion that the claims for breach of contract and violation of consumer protection laws were time-barred by the provision of the ticket that requires all non-personal injury claims to be brought within 6 months (the suit was brought two days short of one year from the accident). Magistrate Judge Louis had to decide whether to consider the limitation period in the ticket for the motion to dismiss when the ticket was not attached to the complaint. Magistrate Judge Louis reasoned that the ticket was central to the claim for breach of contract and could be considered without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment as the authenticity of the ticket was not disputed. Magistrate Judge Louis then considered whether the passenger had notice of the limitation in the ticket. Anglade-Dorleans argued that the one-year limitation for injuries applied because her claim arose from the injury she suffered in the fall on the gangway. Magistrate Judge Louis disagreed, answering that the one-year period applied to the negligence counts, which were timely, but ticket reasonably communicated a six-month limitation period for the claims for breach of contract and violation of consumer protection provisions. Therefore, those counts were dismissed with prejudice. Finally, Magistrate Judge Louis noted the intra-district split on the issue of whether punitive damages are allowed in maritime cases but did not have to decide the issue because the pleading did not allege exceptional circumstances that are required under the most favorable standard.
Expert’s opinion on the slip resistance of the deck near the pool/jacuzzi of the cruise ship was permitted, but the Judge granted summary judgment in the absence of evidence of a slippery substance on the deck; Olenik ex rel. Olenik v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:25-cv-20901, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74603 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2026) (Bloom).
Helen and John Olenik were passengers on the CARNIVAL PRIDE. Helen fell on an exterior tile floor after walking through sliding glass doors leading from the interior of the ship to the Serenity pool deck (adjacent to the pool and jacuzzi). John was walking ahead of Helen and did not see her fall. Neither noticed a liquid or substance on the deck before or after the incident. There was a caution sign a couple of feet in front of the area where she fell. John brought this suit against the cruise line in Florida federal court as next friend of Helen, asserting counts for negligent failure to maintain, general negligence, and negligent failure to warn. The cruise line moved to strike and exclude the opinion of Olenik’s liability expert (Dr. Francisco De Caso) and for summary judgment. The cruise line objected that Dr. De Caso had opined on a range of topics in a “scattershot attempt to testify to a jury that many potential hazards could have caused [Helen] Olenik’s fall without any scientific method applied to explain whether these hazards existed at the time of the incident or how they contributed to the fall.” Judge Bloom noted that the cruise line did not contest the qualifications of Dr. De Caso, a Certified XL Tribometrist and licensed professional engineer with a Ph.D. in civil engineering, as a slip resistance expert, but did challenge his qualifications to opine about human factors and housekeeping standards. Judge Bloom agreed that Olenik had established that Dr. De Caso’s slip resistance testing was reliable, but she held that Olenik had not established that his opinions beyond slip index testing were based on reliable methodology. Turning to the motion for summary judgment, Judge Bloom dismissed all of the counts because Olenik failed to establish that the deck was contaminated or otherwise in a dangerous condition at the time of the incident. Although Dr. De Caso opined that water or grease can cause the deck to become dangerously slippery, he had no knowledge whether there was any substance on the deck, the Oleniks did not notice any substance, and the CCTV camera footage showed more than 25 people walking over the area without incident. The assertion of a dangerous condition was “entirely hypothetical,” and there was no presumption of a dangerous condition simply from the occurrence of the fall. Therefore, Judge Bloom dismissed the suit, and Olenik filed a notice of appeal.
Judge transferred limitation action from New Jersey to New York where the damage to the Queens Midtown Tunnel occurred and the location specified in the forum-selection clause in the subcontract with the limitation petitioner; In re Warren George, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-1539, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75887 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2026) (Almonte).
On September 4, 2024, the Queens Midtown Tunnel in the East River in New York City was allegedly damaged by drilling operations performed by Warren George, Inc. The New York City Economic Development Corp. (EDC) hired AECOM to provide engineering and landscape architectural design services for the construction of the East Midtown Greenway, which runs along the East River. AECOM subcontracted with Warren George to conduct drilling operations in the East River, and AECOM also contracted with GeoDesign to provide geotechnical engineering services. Warren George operated a tug and drilling barge, accompanied by an engineer from GeoDesign. The engineer confirmed the location and authorized the drilling, but the Warren George crew punctured the southern tube of the Tunnel. Warren George brought this action in New Jersey federal court, seeking to limit liability to the value of the tug ANNIE G II and the drill barge CT 511 (the vessels were located at Warren George’s dock in Jersey City, New Jersey at the time the limitation action was filed). Claims and third-party claims were filed, and AECOM and EDC moved to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York. They argued that New York was more convenient because of the location of the incident and most of the parties and because there is a forum-selection clause in the subcontract between Warren George and AECOM for the state in which the project is located. As the clause was mandatory and there was no allegation of fraud or overweening bargaining power, Magistrate Judge Almonte transferred the limitation action to the Southern District of New York.
Owner of catamaran that ran aground was denied recovery on the vessel’s insurance policy for violating the warranty that he would not operate the vessel single handedly and for violating the warranty of seaworthiness (incompetent crew), and the insurer was granted recovery of the salvage costs from the owner; Robert Jaffe MD, Inc. BO Robert Jaffe v Yachtinsure, Ltd., No. 4:24-cv-10062, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142389, 142685 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, June 25, 2026) (Martinez).
Robert Jaffe MD, Inc. BO Robert Jaffe owned a Royal Cape 53 sailing catamaran, the BELOVED, which was insured with Yachtinsure for $480,000 in hull coverage. Dr. Jaffe, who has roughly thirty years of sailing experience, took the vessel on a voyage from Tortola, BVI, to San Juan, Puerto Rico with his daughter Asiya. A storm approached, and Dr. Jaffe became confused while navigating the vessel in the dark. The vessel struck a coral reef off the coast of Puerto Rico, resulting in the sinking of the vessel. In his Claim Declaration, Dr. Jaffe stated that he must have fallen asleep as there was a period of time where he was absent. Yachtinsure declined to pay for the loss of the vessel, and Dr. Jaffe’s company brought this suit against Yachtinsure for breach of contract in Florida federal court. His amended complaint added counts for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and bad faith. Yachtinsure counterclaimed under a theory of unjust enrichment for the amounts it paid for salvage costs. As the policy contains a provision choosing New York law in the absence of federal admiralty law, Judge Martinez dismissed the extra-contractual claims based on New York law, and Yachtinsure then moved for summary judgment on the claim for breach of contract on the ground that Dr. Jaffe breached multiple warranties. Yachtinsure cited Exclusion 14, that excludes coverage for losses caused while the vessel is operated by one person only, i.e., single handed. It contended that Dr. Jaffe’s daughter was not aboard the vessel to operate it. Dr. Jaffe argued that there was more than one person aboard the vessel, resulting in a fact dispute whether Dr. Jaffe operated the vessel single handedly. Judge Martinez considered it a reasonable interpretation that the policy merely required another person present on the vessel. He found support from the fact that Dr. Jaffe is listed as the named operator and Exclusion 9 precludes coverage when anyone other than a named operator is operating the vessel. Yachtinsure also argued that Dr. Jaffe violated Exclusion 12 for failing to manage the vessel in a seaworthy condition (based on the crew being unfit/undermanned for the voyage). Judge Martinez declined to grant summary judgment on this exclusion, agreeing that the confusion and falling asleep were acts of negligence but did not demonstrate as a matter of law that the crew was unfit or incompetent, noting that the record did not establish that the acts were pervasive or repeated frequently (Dr. Jaffe later changed his story and claimed that he did not fall asleep). Accordingly, Judge Martinez declined summary judgment and set the case for a bench trial. Resolving the disputed facts, Judge Martinez held that the single-handed restriction meant that there must be more than one person who can assume the helm of the vessel, and Dr. Jaffe breached the provision because his daughter, who was aboard as the cook, was a non-operational crewmember. Judge Martinez also found that the vessel was not seaworthy because Dr. Jaffe and his daughter were not crew who were reasonably fit for the voyage from Tortola to San Juan (in view of the length of the journey, poor weather, his dislike of the waters in which he was sailing, the inexperience of his daughter, the lack of a lookout, the late departure, and the foreseeability he would be fatigued). Therefore, Judge Martinez denied recovery to Dr. Jaffe and held that Yachtinsure would prevail on its counterclaim for the $166,139.83 it paid for salvage.
Fact questions of notice and whether the danger was open and obvious, prevented summary judgment for the cruise line or passenger who claimed that he burned his foot on the hot deck of a cruise ship; Blanton v. Carnival Corp., No. 1-24-cv-23898, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76328 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2026) (Ruiz).
Donald Blanton, a passenger on the CARNIVAL HORIZON, was seated in a lounge chair on the deck of the vessel. He got up to put on his shoes, and he claims that in the time it took to put on his shoes, the bottom of his right foot was burned by the hot deck (API Syntheteak polyresin flooring). Blanton brought this action against the cruise line in Florida federal court, asserting counts for negligent failure to maintain (direct liability and vicarious liability), negligent failure to warn (direct liability and vicarious liability), negligent training (direct liability), and negligent approval, adoption, and selection of design, construction, and materials (direct liability). The cruise line moved for summary judgment on all counts (that Blanton produced no evidence proving any of his negligence claims), and Blanton moved for partial summary judgment that the cruise line produced no evidence that the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Blanton only contested the cruise line’s motion with respect to the direct liability claims for negligent failure to maintain and negligent failure to warn. The cruise line argued that it did not know the temperature of the deck, and there were no complaints to put it on notice. However, Judge Ruiz found sufficient constructive notice from 20 prior incidents involving passengers burning their feet on decks across the cruise line’s fleet of vessels. Although the incidents occurred on different vessels and locations, they all involved the same material—API Syntheteak. Therefore, there was sufficient notice. The cruise line argued that the temperature of a sun-exposed deck is open and obvious to a passenger using ordinary senses. Blanton countered that a reasonable person would not know the nature and extent of the danger. Judge Ruiz found a fact question that prevented summary judgment for either the cruise line or the passenger. Finally, the medical evidence was disputed as to whether the injury was caused by a burn or was a friction blister. Accordingly, Judge Ruiz held that there were fact questions with respect to the two contested counts.
Fact questions whether cartons or pallets were the COGSA package and whether the cargo was palletized for the convenience of the merchant precluded summary judgment on the package limitation for spoiled beef on shipment from Uruguay to New York; Alle Processing Corp. v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co., No. 1:24-cv-5604, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84151 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2026) (Stanton).
This case involves the carriage of frozen boneless beef from the Port of Montevideo, Uruguay to the Port of New York on the M/V MSC DARDANELLES. The vessel lost power during the shipment, causing the cargo to spoil. MSC Mediterranean, which chartered the vessel, was unable to determine what caused the incident and conceded liability. The issue that was presented was the application of COGSA’s package limitation. The cargo was loaded into two containers. One container held 1080 cartons of beef palletized onto 29 pallets. The other had 894 cartons of beef palletized onto 34 pallets. The carrier argued that the pallets were the packages, and liability was limited to $31,500 for the 63 packages ($500 per pallet). Cargo argued that the cartons were the packages, so there were 1974 packages. Judge Stanton explained that the court should begin the analysis with the description of packages in the bill of lading. In this case, the face of the bills of lading listed the number of cartons under the heading, “Description of Packages and Goods.” However, the reverse side of the bills of lading contained boilerplate terms defining a COGSA package as “any palletised and/or unitized assemblage of cartons.” Judge Stanton added that the Court could consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties in view of the ambiguity in the provisions of the bills, but the extrinsic evidence did not clarify the ambiguity. Judge Stanton reasoned that even if he were to find that the pallet was the COGSA package, the carrier would have to demonstrate that the beef was palletized for the convenience of the merchant. Finally, cargo argued that the power failure constituted an unreasonable deviation, but Judge Stanton rejected the argument, answering that the Second Circuit only recognizes two types of unreasonable deviation: geographic deviation and unauthorized on-deck stowage (“mere negligence with regard to stowage or handling of the cargo has never constituted deviation”). Therefore, he denied the motion for summary judgment with issues to resolve on how to define the COGSA package and whether the beef was palletized for the convenience of the merchant.
Judge declined to order countersecurity in dispute over design services on vessel that led to arrest of the vessel and counterclaim for substandard and incomplete work; Yacht Dzign, LLC v. 2013 75’ Riva Motor Yacht, No. 0:25-cv-61276, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115972 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2026) (Leibowitz).
Nadhem Boudoukhane purchased the 2013 75’ Riva Motor Yacht that is the subject of this suit and contracted with Caroline Dunlap, owner of Yacht Dzign, to perform interior design services for the vessel. The interior design did not go as planned, and Yacht Dzign brought this action against the vessel in Florida federal court, asserting a lien for repairs in the amount of $159,248.16. The vessel was arrested, and Yacht Dzign added an in personam claim against Boudoukhane. The vessel was released on security in the amount of $183,427.94. Jab Holding, LLC (owner) and Boudoukhane counterclaimed against Yacht Dzign for breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, gross negligence, fraud in the inducement, and fraudulent misrepresentation, and sought damages in excess of $300,000 for incomplete and substandard work. They also brought a third-party action against Dunlap, which was dismissed. Boudoukhane and Jab Holding then requested countersecurity against Yacht Dzign in the amount of $164,464.57 as security for the counterclaim (or, alternatively, to reduce the security they posted by that amount). Judge Leibowitz reviewed the factors identified by the Eleventh Circuit with respect to countersecurity and held that the factors favored denial of the request. He reasoned that posting countersecurity would not trigger the release of Yacht Dzign’s property from the Boudoukhane’s custody; Boudoukhane could not have asserted its claim in rem and asserted standard contract and negligence claims in personam; Dunlap lacked the financial ability to pay the countersecurity and requiring her to pay (or reducing the security) would effectively deprive her of the ability to prosecute her claims; although the counterclaim may not be frivolous, the individual claims against Dunlap had been dismissed and there were questions about the reliability of the damage evidence submitted by Boudoukhane.
Judge declined to dismiss Rule 14(c) complaint by defendant against its subcontractor in connection with the alleged failure to properly secure equipment on a barge; Endurance American Insurance Co. v. Nordholm Cos., No. 2:25-cv-314, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78025 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 9, 2026) (Rothstein).
Orion Government Services contracted with Nordholm Cos. to prepare a sea fastening plan to secure a Static Pile Tester and other equipment for transit by tug and barge from Seattle, Washington to Honolulu, Hawaii. Orion contracted with Boyer Logistics to lash and secure the Static Pile Tester to the barge BAINBRIDGE, and Alexander Gow, Inc. inspected the lashings and other equipment used to secure the equipment to the deck of the barge. During the transit, the Static Pile Tester collapsed onto the deck of the barge and surrounding cargo, and Orion asserted that it sustained $1.8 million in losses. Endurance American Insurance, which issued the marine cargo policy for the equipment, paid $1,745,452.26 for the damage and brought this action in federal court in Washington against Nordholm in admiralty under Rule 9(h). Nordholm filed a third-party complaint against Glosten, Inc. (under Rule 14(c)), alleging that Nordholm contracted with Glosten to prepare a sea fastening and lashing plan, that Glosten failed to prepare a suitable plan, and that Glosten should be held liable directly to Endurance for its loss. Glosten moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, arguing that Nordholm, not Glosten, prepared the securing design and that the claims are barred by the maritime economic loss rule. Judge Rothstein rejected the argument on the responsibility of Glosten, finding a fact dispute as to which party prepared the operative plans, the scope of the parties’ responsibilities, and whether the alleged deficiencies were attributable to Glosten or another entity. Glosten’s argument that Endurance could not recover for purely economic loss where the product injures only itself also could not be resolved in a motion to dismiss as the doctrine depends on the definition of the relevant product, whether the damage is to other property, and the source of the duty breached. Therefore, she declined to dismiss the third-party action.
Dominant mind theory did not negate claim that barge’s unseaworthy fender system contributed to dock damage when the barge allided with a dock while the barge was in tow of a tug; Atalco Gramercy, LLC v. Gnots-Reserve, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-7195, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78485 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2026) (Crain).
This litigation involves an allision between the barge ALEX G, in tow of the tug M/V BURRWOOD WISE, and components of Atalco’s dock facility located at its Alumina refinery located in Gramercy, Louisiana along the Mississippi River. Atalco brought this suit in Louisiana federal court in admiralty pursuant to Rule 9(h) against the tug and its owner, Gnots-Reserve. Atalco alleged that the tug controlled the barge as the dominant mind towing vessel and pushed the barge into the dock structures. Gnots-Reserve and the tug brought a third-party action with a Rule 14(c) tender against Associated Marine Equipment and Associated Terminals Pangaea Logistics, as the owner and operator of the ALEX G, alleging that the damage was caused by the design and unseaworthy nature of the fendering system on the barge. The tug/owner sought contribution and indemnity and demanded judgment on behalf of Atalco against the owner/operator of the barge. The Associated third-party defendants moved for summary judgment and also settled with Atalco. That left the claim asserted by the tug/owner against the barge/owner for its claims of faulty design of the barge. The barge/owner argued that it had no responsibility under the dominant mind doctrine because it had no operational control over the barge, there was no faulty design, and Associated was not operating under a stevedoring agreement with Atalco at the time of the allision. Judge Crain noted that the dominant mind doctrine is a fault-allocation tool for navigational incidents and that it does not extinguish the duty of the barge owner to tender a seaworthy vessel. As Gnots was asserting a design defect that was independent of the navigational decisions, Judge Crain held that the dominant mind doctrine did not support summary judgment. The parties presented competing expert opinions with respect to the adequacy of the fender system, but Associated argued that the tug captain’s knowledge of the barge’s fender system eliminated the design defect claim. Judge Crain did not believe that his knowledge that the tires were fixed with a pipe was sufficient to negate all of the alleged fault in the claim of a design defect. Therefore, Judge Crain declined to grant summary judgment.
Judges denied summary judgment to vessel operator on claim that his testimony about his knowledge in a collision was controlling and could not be refuted by other evidence; In re Mackey, No. 8:24-cv-309, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78880 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2026) (Adams), recommendation adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97842 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2026) (Merryday).
This litigation arises from a collision between a vessel owned and operated by Peter J. Mackey and a vessel owned by Freedom Marine Sales and Freedom Boat Club and operated by John Cornell, the M/V TIMELESS. Mackey filed a suit in federal court in Florida, seeking exoneration/limitation of liability, and Freedom filed an answer and claims against Mackey (seeking damages, contribution, and indemnity). Mackey filed an answer to the claims. Mackey later amended his complaint, seeking only exoneration of liability, and Freedom again filed an answer with the same claims as previously asserted. Mackey responded with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Freedom’s allegations were insufficient to state a claim, that the indemnity claim was barred by Mackey’s allegation that Freedom was at fault, and that the contribution claim was premature. Freedom responded that Mackey waived his right to bring the motion by previously answering and not moving to dismiss the same claims, that the claims were sufficiently pleaded, and that the indemnity and contribution claims are permitted under admiralty law. Magistrate Judge Adams reasoned that an amended complaint does supersede the initial complaint; however, its filing does not automatically revive all defenses or objections that the defendant may have waived in response to the initial complaint. Magistrate Judge Adams concluded that because Mackey answered (instead of moving to dismiss) the identical claims, he could not now move to dismiss them under Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, she recommended denial of the motion to dismiss. See January 2025 Update. Judge Merryday agreed and rejected Mackey’s objection that the earlier answer should not waive the right to seek dismissal of Freedom’s “woefully deficient second set of claims.”
Meanwhile, John and Brunna Cornell filed a suit in the same Florida federal court, seeking exoneration/limitation as owners pro hac vice of the M/V TIMELESS. Mackey moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the Limitation Act did not apply to a “covered small passenger vessel” and that the complaint did not state a claim for limitation of liability. As to the first claim, Magistrate Judge Adams noted that the complaint asserted that the vessel carried guests, but it did not address its tonnage, the number of passengers, or whether it was a wing-in-ground craft. Therefore, the pleading did not allege sufficient facts to determine whether the recent amendment to the Limitation Act removed the vessel from the protection of the statute. Magistrate Judge Adams then addressed the issue of whether the complaint sufficiently alleged dominion and control over the vessel that the Cornells could be considered to be owners pro hac vice over the vessel owned by Freedom Marine. She concluded that the allegation that the Cornells had “rental and dominion and control over the vessel” and that others had filed claims against them based on their claimed dominion and control was sufficient to establish the standing of the Cornells to bring the limitation action. Magistrate Judge Adams did agree that the complaint did not sufficiently state facts required by Rule F with respect to the voyage, whether the vessel was damaged, lost, or abandoned (and, if so, when and where), the value of the vessel at the end of the voyage, or specific facts (and not conclusory allegations) to demonstrate that the Cornells lacked privity or knowledge. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Adams recommended that the complaint be dismissed with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies. See February 2025 Update. There was no objection to the recommendation, and Judge Merryday adopted the recommendation on January 10, 2025.
Back in Mackey’s limitation action, Mackey filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the factual allegations for Freedom’s contribution and indemnity claims were insufficient and that the claims were premature (as no judgment had been entered against Freedom, and Freedom had not entered into any settlement). Freedom’s contribution claim simply alleged that Mackey’s vessel struck Freedom’s vessel (injuring its occupants), that the injuries were proximately caused by Mackey’s acts or omissions, and that, should Freedom be held liable for the injuries, Freedom was entitled to contribution. Magistrate Judge Adams noted that Freedom did not plead facts (or even assert conclusions) establishing that Mackey owed a duty to the injured parties so that he could be found jointly liable. Therefore, she recommended that the contribution claim be dismissed with leave to plead sufficient allegations. Turning to the indemnity claim, Magistrate Judge Adams noted the three bases for indemnity and answered that there was no contract for indemnity and no entrustment of the vessel for work that would invoke a warranty of workmanlike performance. That left the theory of vicarious liability by which a party may be held liable for the negligent acts of another (even though the actor did not commit a negligent act) because of a special relationship or law. As Freedom did not plead facts to support that special relationship, Magistrate Judge Adams recommended dismissal of the indemnity claim with leave to plead sufficient allegations. Finally, Magistrate Judge Adams addressed Mackey’s motion to dismiss the contribution and indemnity claims on the ground that they were not ripe before judgment. Freedom argued that it is allowed to bring contribution and indemnity claims before being found liable, pursuant to Rule 14(c), but Magistrate Judge Adams rejected Freedom’s argument that the claims were allowed by Rule 14(c), answering that the impleader rule is designed to bring all relevant parties into a lawsuit so that the court can adjudicate all rights in a single proceeding. That purpose is not applicable in a limitation action in which a claimant is asserting a claim against the petitioner, who is not a new party. However, as Rule F provides for the filing of all claims in the limitation action, Magistrate Judge Adams held that the contribution and indemnity claims should be allowed to stand at this phase of the limitation proceeding. See July 2025 Update.
Mackey then moved for summary judgment for exoneration of liability. He asserted that he was properly navigating on the right side of the intracoastal channel and never saw the TIMELESS. He claims that he was following two large vessels and did not see the TIMELESS cut across the channel in front of him before the collision. To the extent the testimony of Mackey and his wife was disputed by the witnesses on the TIMELESS, Mackey argued that that the Mackeys’ testimony was controlling because the Mackeys were the only witnesses on his vessel and others could not refute what he said about his own conduct. Freedom responded that Mackey had denied that his view was obstructed and that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission had issued a criminal citation to Mackey for violating navigational rules and found that he failed to maintain a proper lookout. Magistrate Judge Adams believed that there was sufficient evidence to create a triable issue whether Mackey acted negligently and recommended denial of the motion. Mackey did not object, and Judge Merryday adopted the recommendation and denied the motion for summary judgment.
Allision recovery does not include damages for diminution in value (based on a lost purchase offer) or attorney fees; White Pearl Investments LLC v. M/Y MR LOUI TBR LUCIA, No. 1: 25-cv-20943, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103763 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2026) (D’Angelo), recommendation adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102626 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2026) (Damian).
On December 1, 2025, the M/Y MR LOUI TBR LUCIA was navigating in the Turnberry Marina in Aventura, Florida when it allided with the M/Y WHITE PEARL, which was moored in its slip at the marina. White Pearl Investments, owner of the WHITE PEARL, brought this suit against the MR LOUI TBR LUCIA in Florida federal court. The LUCIA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that White Pearl could not recover damages for a lost offer to purchase the WHITE PEARL prior to the allision. It argued that the general maritime law only allows recovery to return the vessel to its pre-casualty condition (restitutio in integrum), together with lost profits during the detention necessary to make the repair and does not permit recovery of diminution of value in a negligence claim where the vessel can be repaired for less than its pre-casualty value. Magistrate Judge D’Angelo recommended granting the motion with respect to damages for the lost sales offer, noting that the cases do not support the recovery and explaining that an award could put the plaintiff in a better position than before the allision as the plaintiff could recover the market value of the vessel and retain ownership of the vessel. The LUCIA also objected to White Pearl’s request for attorney fees as damages under an equitable assessment of damages. As White Pearl did not allege any statutory or contractual right to attorney fees or bad faith conduct on the part of the LUCIA, Magistrate Judge D’Angelo recommended granting of summary judgment on this element of damages. White Pearl did not object to the recommendation, and Judge Damian adopted the recommendation.
Yacht buyer sufficiently pleaded claims against seller for fraudulent inducement/concealment and violations of the state deceptive trade practices act, but the judge dismissed the claims for revocation of acceptance, unjust enrichment, and breach of implied warranty; Huguenard v. Cantiere del Pardo S.p.A., No. 2:25-cv-871, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82232 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2026) (Chappell).
John and Kelly Huguenard purchased a 2021 Pardo 38-81 yacht in January 2022 after meeting representatives of Cantiere del Pardo, Pardo Yachts Miami, and Germain Yachts (exclusive seller of Pardo yachts in Southwest Florida) at a boat show in Naples, Florida. Three years later, the Huguenards discovered that the yacht suffered from significant structural defects. They provided a long list of defects that they assert existed at the time of delivery but were not capable of discovery and revoked acceptance of the yacht. They brought this suit against Cantiere, Pardo Yachts, and Germain in Florida federal court, including counts against Germain for fraudulent inducement/concealment, violation of Florida’s deceptive trade practices act, revocation of acceptance, unjust enrichment, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act). Germain moved to dismiss all of the counts for failure to state a claim, and Judge Chappell began by holding that the Huguenards sufficiently pleaded the fraud claim under Rule 9, unambiguously delineating the omissions—what should have been disclosed and when during the sales process. Judge Chappell also held that the Huguenards sufficiently pleaded omissions that constituted deceptive practices under the Florida state. Judge Chappell agreed with Germain that the Huguenards could not assert the claim for revocation of acceptance because it is not acceptable where the seller disclaims all warranties (the purchase agreement disclaimed warranties and stated that all warranties were those of the manufacturer/supplier). As there was an express contract, Judge Chappell dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment. Finally, Judge Chappell dismissed the implied warranty claim as the warranties came from the manufacturer and were disclaimed by the seller.
Injured passenger could not voluntarily dismiss her suit brought in federal court under diversity (alternatively in admiralty) after learning that there was no diversity, so that she could refile the suit in state court with a jury as it would prejudice the shipowner who had raised limitation of liability as a defense and could no longer assert the defense in a contested state suit as it was past six months from notice; Hodnett v. Entertainment and Harbor Cruises LLC, No. 1:25-cv-12403, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83600 (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2026) (Gorton).
Kadie Hodnett was injured while disembarking from a vessel owned and operated by Entertainment and Harbor Cruises. A year later Hodnett brought this suit in federal court in Massachusetts against Entertainment based on diversity jurisdiction and, alternatively, admiralty jurisdiction. Entertainment asserted limitation of liability as a defense. Hodnett later discovered that there was no diversity jurisdiction, and she moved to dismiss her complaint, without prejudice, so that she could bring suit in state court with a jury. Entertainment objected on the ground that it would be prejudiced as it would no longer be allowed to assert the limitation defense that would be time-barred by the six-month limitation. Hodnett argued that Entertainment’s limitation was already untimely as the suit was filed more than six months after notice had been given, but Judge Gorton rejected the argument, noting that limitation can be raised as a defense in federal court without regard to the six-month limitation. As the case was properly pleaded in federal court in admiralty, as Hodnett did not have an inviolable right to a jury trial, and as Entertainment would be prejudiced by the loss of its limitation defense if the federal case were dismissed, Judge Gorton declined to dismiss the federal case.
Passenger did not sufficiently allege that the cruise line had notice of the hazard of the metal threshold for a tile-to-carpet transition that was uneven and worn; Cabrera v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 1:25-cv-25783, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83737 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2026) (Dimitrouleas).
Israel Cabrera, a passenger on the NORWEGIAN PEARL, tripped on an uneven and “lifted” metal threshold separating a tile-to-carpet transition. He attached a picture to support his contention that the condition of the threshold had existed for months (claiming that the trim was lifted in more than one area and the cruise line should have been aware of the condition by its regular maintenance). Judge Dimitrouleas noted that the Eleventh Circuit had rejected a similar argument in its Patton case (see June 2024 Update), as the photograph does not establish when or how the condition arose. As there were insufficient allegations to establish that the cruise line should have known about the uneven, lifted threshold, Judge Dimitrouleas dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
Magistrate Judge compelled arbitration (based on the arbitration clause in the vessel charter) in the vessel owner’s suit against the charterer and the charterer’s subcontracted captain in connection with damage to the vessel when it struck a seawall after the captain allegedly fell asleep; K2K Yacht Charters, LLC v. Burgess, No. 1:25-cv-3189, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85583 (D. Md. Apr. 20, 2026) (Crawford).
Four Seasons, which operates a luxury hotel in Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, entered into two contracts to provide maritime charter passages to its hotel guests. K2K Yacht Charters chartered a catamaran to Four Seasons under which Four Seasons agreed to maintain the catamaran, to hire a licensed captain for all charter activities, and to be responsible for damage to the vessel. Four Season contracted with Paul Burgess to operate the catamaran for the hotel guests. Both contracts contain arbitration clauses. On July 29, 2024, Burgess allegedly fell asleep while piloting the catamaran with passengers on board, and the catamaran allided with a seawall, causing damage to the vessel. K2K brought this suit against Burgess and Four Seasons in federal court in Maryland, alleging negligence of both parties and respondeat superior liability of Four Seasons for the negligence of Burgess. Four Seasons and Burgess both filed motions to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation. Magistrate Judge Crawford began by analyzing whether the claims against Four Seasons were encompassed by the language in the yacht charter covering “a dispute arising from this agreement.” She reasoned that the respondeat superior claim arose from the yacht charter because the yacht charter required Four Seasons to hire the captain to operate the catamaran and because Four Season agreed to be responsible for caring for the vessel and for any damage incurred on the vessel. Magistrate Judge Crawford also held that K2K’s claim against Burgess fell within the arbitration clause in the yacht charter. Although K2K argued that K2K had no contract with Burgess, Magistrate Judge Crawford answered that a non-signatory can be bound by an arbitration provision if the claims against the non-signatory are based on the same facts as the signatory-plaintiff’s claims against the other signatory. Magistrate Judge Crawford believed the clause was broad enough to encompass the claims against the non-signatory because the yacht charter stated that “if a dispute arises between the Parties hereto” and “in the event of a dispute arising from this agreement.” Therefore, she compelled arbitration with respect to K2K’s claims against both Four Seasons and Burgess.
Treatment for a large mass on the seaman’s hand did not establish a McCorpen defense when he represented that he had not been diagnosed with an abnormal growth; Donahue v. Gnots-Reserve, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-527, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85685 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2026) (Milazzo).
Adam Donahue, a seaman on the M/V WISE ONE, owned and operated by Gnots-Reserve, claims that was injured on August 24, 2024 while lifting a cable wire that became unraveled and pinned him between the wire and the vessel, injuring his right hand and wrist. Donahue brought this suit against Gnots-Reserve in federal court in Louisiana seeking to recover for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. Gnots-Reserve moved for summary judgment 1) that the maintenance and cure claim was barred under McCorpen for willful concealment of a preexisting condition and 2) for lack of causation on the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims because the injury predated the accident in this case. Gnots-Reserve also sought leave to file a counterclaim for recoupment of maintenance and cure in light of the intentional concealment of the prior condition. Donahue sought emergency care on April 7, 2023 for swelling in the same region of his right hand that he claims was injured on the vessel. He was treated for a complex abscess or phlegmon, with soft tissue infection and discharged with an antibiotic and reference to a hand surgeon. On June 3, 2024, Donahue underwent a pre-employment physical and answered “no” to the question whether he ever had a tumor or abnormal growth. Judge Milazzo rejected summary judgment on the McCorpen defense, reasoning that he undisputedly had a large mass on his hand, but he was not diagnosed with an abnormal growth. In support of the motion for summary judgment on causation, Gnots-Reserve argued that the accident was unwitnessed, a picture taken of Donahue’s hand the day before his alleged accident showed the swollen mass was already present, he denied that the mass was due to trauma when he sought treatment, and the same condition was present in April 2023. Donahue responded that there was no report of abnormality of his hand on his pre-employment physical and that pictures of his hand after the accident showed bruising that was not present on the photos taken the day before the accident. Judge Milazzo considered this to be sufficient to create a fact question whether Donahue suffered the injury on the vessel. Finally, Judge Milazzo denied Gnots-Reserve leave to file a counterclaim to recover maintenance and cure payments. She noted that the Fifth Circuit allows the employer to recover payments of maintenance and cure only as an offset against the seaman’s damage award and not by an independent suit seeking affirmative recovery.
Living on a boat, without a legal agreement does not give the resident standing to challenge liens asserted on the vessel; Tomasso v. Peddle, No. 3:24-cv-280, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85772 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2026) (Edison), recommendation adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123502 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2026) (Brown).
This litigation involves the assertion of liens on the SOUTHERN BELL. Ludovico Tomasso and Bonnie Peddle were married from 1999 to 2022. Tomasso purchased the SOUTHERN BELL in 2014 and sold it to Forza Yacht Sales, which transferred ownership to B.E.L.L. Marine (which lists Tomasso and Peddle as governing persons). Tomasso lived on the yacht and described it as the couple’s secondary residence. In 2018, Linda Lee Krantz filed a notice of claim of lien against the vessel for work performed as a project manager and consultant. During the marriage, Peddle became president of 9371893 Canada and Forza 5. After Tomasso filed for divorce in July 2020, Peddle, as president of 9371893 Canada, executed a notice of claim of lien against the vessel based on a loan for work on the vessel for ship repair. She also executed a notice of claim of lien against the vessel for a loan made by Forza 5 for work on the vessel. The liens gave notice to the mortgagee, listed as Ludovico Tomasso & B.E.L.L. Marine. In the divorce decree, Tomasso was ordered to pay Peddle for half of the appraised value of the SOUTHERN BELL. On September 24, 2024, Tomasso brought this suit in Texas federal court against Peddle, 9371893 Canada, Forza 5, and Krantz, seeking to invalidate the maritime liens on the vessel. Peddle and the corporate defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that Tomasso lacks capacity to challenge the validity of liens asserted against a vessel he does not own. Magistrate Judge Edison agreed, noting that B.E.L.L. Marine is the owner of the vessel, and Tomasso is a manager of the company. Tomasso responded that he has a right of possession of the SOUTHERN BELL, which has been his residence since January of 2020 (using the language of Supplemental Rule C that a person who asserts a right of possession in property may bring an in rem action. However, Magistrate Judge Edison noted that this suit was not brought in rem and does not name the vessel. Magistrate Judge Edison added that the claim of a right to possession because he has been living on the vessel was unsubstantiated, noting that Tomasso did not produce a charter or any other document to support a right to possession: “But simply occupying the vessel, in the absence of some legal agreement, does not give Tomasso a legal right of possession that would confer Article III standing to challenge the liens on the SOUTHERN BELL.” Magistrate Judge Edison recommended that the court dismiss Tomasso as the plaintiff and give the real party-in-interest 21 days to move for substitution as plaintiff and that the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if no substitution is filed. There was no objection, and Judge Brown adopted the recommendation. On June 25, 2026, B.E.L.L. Marine, individually, as owner of the vessel, and on behalf of the vessel in rem, moved to be substituted as plaintiff instead of Tomasso.
Judge declined to strike expert opinions on the sufficiency of mooring and storage of vessel before hurricane and on causation for damage to property after the vessel broke free, even though the expert did not examine the boat or the dock that it allegedly struck; fact questions on adequacy of hurricane preparation resulted in denial of the motions for summary judgment, and the Judge declined to skip the liability issue and proceed to the limitation issue of privity or knowledge; In re Bextermueller, No. 2:24-cv-688, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87538 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2026) (Chappell).
This litigation arises from damage to Alexander Eaton’s property near Fort Myers, Florida during Hurricane Ian, allegedly caused by a Sea Ray Bow Rider 280 owned by Kenneth and Debra Bextermueller. The Bextermuellers, who reside in Arkansas, purchased a unit at the Paradise Pointe Condominiums in Cape Coral Florida and then purchased the vessel. When they returned to Arkansas in the spring of 2022 after visiting their condo, they raised the vessel on a lift at the Paradise Pointe marina with a clearance of six feet between the water and the keel. They did not ask anyone to secure the vessel. Kenneth stated that he looped an electrical extension cord from the vessel’s railing around a marina piling as the only thing keeping the boat on the lift. When Hurricane Ian made landfall as a category 4 hurricane on September 23, 2022, all of the boats at the marina floated away or were damaged to the point that the insurers paid total losses. The Bextermuellers’ boat drifted across the Caloosahatchee River and became stranded on Eaton’s property, allegedly causing damage to his dock, boat lift, and other property. Eaton filed a suit against the Bextermuellers in Florida state court, and the Bextermuellers filed this limitation action in federal court in Florida. The Bextermuellers stated that the value of their vessel was $21,392.50, and they identified Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance, the vessel’s insurer, as surety. They promised that Florida Farm would pay the vessel’s value as the court orders. Magistrate Judge Mizell declined to approve the security and issue the stay, reasoning that the promise of the petitioners did not satisfy the requirements of Rule F. The Magistrate Judge denied the request to approve the ad interim stipulation without prejudice. See September 2024 Update.
After the Bextermuellers satisfied the requirements of Rule F with a letter of undertaking from Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., they filed a motion for sanctions and to strike the request for relief asserted by Eaton in his answer and affirmative defenses in which he sought attorney fees from the Bextermuellers. The Bextermuellers argued that the litigation involved a tort claim subject to the American Rule and that Eaton had not cited any basis for recovery of attorney fees. Eaton responded that the act of bringing the limitation action was bad faith that entitled him to attorney fees. Although Judge Chappell stated that she “doubts that the mere act of bringing this limitation action constitutes bad faith,” she added that it was “far too early” to make such a determination (she noted that the discovery deadline did not expire for nearly six months). Judge Chappell then addressed Eaton’s motion for sanctions, arguing that the limitation action was brought in bad faith because the Bextermuellers were “presumptively negligent for unreasonably leaving their boat at his dock during Hurricane Ian.” The Bextermuellers responded that Eaton’s motion was akin to a premature motion for summary judgment to resolve material issues of law and fact. Judge Chappell stated that she “could not agree with Petitioners more. It is almost unfathomable how Claimant thinks the Court could grant his motion at this early state of the litigation, particularly when the negligence presumption is rebuttable.” Therefore, she denied Eaton’s motion as premature. See July 2025 Update.
Eaton and the Bextermuellers filed motions for summary judgment, and Eaton moved to exclude the opinions of Thomas Danti, the Bextermuellers’ maritime and seamanship expert. Eaton objected to the opinion that the vessel would have broken free regardless of whether additional mooring lines were used as speculative and based on hearsay about what other boat owners did. Judge Chappell disagreed, reasoning that the opinion was reliably based on deposition testimony and photographs and videos depicting the condition of the marina and vessels. It was a “closer call” with Danti’s “feeble statements” about the availability of storage options, which did “not inspire great confidence in his conclusions;” however, Judge Chappell declined to strike his opinions, noting that his opinions were based on his firsthand experience as an owner and operator of a vessel storage facility in Naples, Florida. Eaton also objected to Danti’s opinion that the damage to the vessel was inconsistent with the damage to the dock, arguing that Danti never examined the dock or vessel. Judge Chappell answered that the dock was repaired and the vessel was salvaged before Danti prepared his report, and Danti’s reliance on photos and his experience was sufficient to provide the opinion. Judge Chappell then addressed the motions for summary judgment, noting the presumption of fault when a moving or drifting vessel allides with a stationary object. The Bextermuellers asserted that the allision was the result of an act of God and that Eaton failed to show that the vessel caused Eaton’s damage, supported by Danti’s opinions. However, Eaton submitted the opinion of his expert, Craig Starns, that there was inadequate/unreasonable preparation for the hurricane, and Eaton testified about the contact with the dock. That was sufficient for Judge Chappell to find a fact dispute and to deny summary judgment to the Bextermuellers. Citing the Eleventh Circuit’s Skanska decision (see September 2023 Update) (holding that the court can forgo a decision on liability if the owner cannot establish a lack of privity with the alleged fault), Eaton argued that the knowledge of the Bextermuellers of the alleged negligent acts constituted privity that defeated their right to bring the limitation action. As this case is “replete with factual disputes,” Judge Chappell answered that she would not “skip a step” and “make findings as a matter of law on this record.” Accordingly, she declined Eaton’s motion.
Judge found fact question whether the vessel’s insurer could enforce a lay-up warranty in a policy renewal when the vessel owner requested coverage from January 1 to November 15 with no lay-up warranty and there was a loss of the vessel on December 10; Kuzmin v. Talisman Marine Insurance Protected Cell Inc., No. 2-25-cv-1395, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87652 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2026) (Coughenour).
Alexei Kuzman’s commercial fishing vessel, F/V MYSTERY, broke apart on December 10, 2024 about 30 miles west of Sand Point, Alaska. The vessel’s insurer, the Talisman Group, denied coverage based on violation of the policy’s lay-up warranty and port risk endorsement (that the vessel would be laid up in Homer between November 15 and January 1. Kuzman brought this suit in Washington federal court against Talisman, his broker, Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Management, and the wholesale broker, Pacific Marine, alleging that he had not requested the lay up warranty and no one gave him reasonable notice or advice with respect to the inclusion of the warranty. He asserted claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and negligence. Gallagher moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to rule that the lay-up warranty/port risk endorsement was invalid because Talisman failed to adhere to notice requirements when incorporating the provisions into the policy’s renewal in 2023 and then in 2024 for the policy at issue with the loss. Gallagher cited the Alaska statute that requires written notice of a material restriction or reduction in coverage when a policy is renewed and provides that the existing policy continues until the insurer provides the notice. Talisman argued that the renewal applications requested the lay-up period as they indicated that operations would be limited to the period between January 1 through November 15. However, the applications also stated that there would be no lay-up. Judge Coughenour considered the provisions to conflict, leaving a fact question whether the insured specifically requested the change in coverage
Judge declined to exclude opinions of seaman’s liability expert based on standards from inapplicable ISM Code, but the expert could not opine on whether the release signed by the seaman was consistent with the Jones Act; Conner v. REC Marine Logistics, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-458, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88329 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2026) (Fallon).
Jonathan Conner was employed as a deckhand by REC Marine on the GOL WARRIOR. His shoulder began hurting after he pulled some rope on January 27, 2024. He reported the pain to the captain who advised him to take Tylenol. Connor continued to work until the shoulder pain returned. Conner was eventually diagnosed as having suffered a heart attack. At the time he reported the symptoms, Connor was aware that he had suffered a heart attack in 2014, but the captain was unaware of Connor’s prior heart attack. Connor brought this suit against REC Marine in federal court in Louisiana, asserting claims for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to pay maintenance and cure. REC Marine moved for summary judgment on all of Conner’s claims, and Judge Fallon granted summary judgment on the claim for failure to pay maintenance and cure. After Conner’s first heart attack, he underwent cardiac catheterization and had a stent implanted. He was prescribed medication for hypertension, but he stopped taking it a few months later. Conner applied for employment with REC Marine in 2021. He circled “No” for heart disease, high blood pressure, surgical procedures, history of hospitalization, and history of heart surgery, although he initially circled “Yes” next to “Been a patient in a hospital” and then crossed it out and circled “No.” Conner explained that “the prior myocardial infarction was a one-off adverse reaction to synthetic marijuana” and had no bearing on whether he could do his job and on whether he was at risk for a future heart attack, but Judge Fallon found that Conner “objectively failed to answer these questions truthfully.” Judge Fallon concluded that REC Marine established the three elements of a McCorpen defense of intentional concealment of a prior medical condition—intentional misrepresentation, materiality, and a causal connection between the withheld information and the injury that was eventually sustained. Judge Fallon then addressed whether to dismiss Conner’s claim for punitive damages for willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligation. As REC Marine had no obligation to pay maintenance and cure because of the McCorpen defense, Judge Fallon held that Conner would not be allowed to recover punitive damages in connection with the dismissed maintenance and cure claim. See June 2026 Update.
REC Marine then moved to exclude the testimony of Conner’s marine liability expert, Captain Christine Hafen, because she based her opinions on REC Marine’s alleged lack of compliance with the International Safety Management Code, which arguably did not apply to the vessel on which Conner was working. REC Marine also objected to the opinions of Captain Hafen with respect to the validity of the Receipt and Release Agreement that Conner signed after the incident, arguing that the opinions are beyond the bounds of appropriate testimony for a marine liability expert. Judge Fallon did not believe that the inapplicability of the Code to the vessel was a basis to exclude the opinions, reasoning that the opinions, “reliant upon a seemingly widely accepted set of safety standards, provide[] the kind of specialized analysis that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence in this case.” Judge Fallon did agree that Captain Hafen would not be allowed to testify whether the release was consistent with the Jones Act. Finally, Judge Fallon addressed the testimony of Conner’s treating physician, Dr. Xianfeng Wen. He was designated as a non-retained expert, but Conner failed to disclose a summary of the facts on which Dr. Wen’s opinions are based, in violation of Rule 26(a)(2)(C). Judge Fallon agreed to limit Dr. Wen’s testimony but not based on the failure to comply with the rule because the defect was most likely harmless in light of the opinions of a properly designated expert who opined on causation and future treatment. However, he did rule that “if Dr. Wen begins to testify beyond what he personally saw and did and why he acted certain ways as a treating physician in opinion about causation or future medical treatment, that testimony is impermissible and Defendant may make an appropriate objection at trial.”
From the state courts
State claims against NVOCC for theft of cargo during inland transportation were preempted by federal law; Bolttech Insurance (HK) Co. v. Shine International Transportation (Hong King) Ltd., No. 25NWCV02238, 2026 Cal. Super. LEXIS 29142 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles, Apr. 14, 2026) (Park).
This is a cargo subrogation claim filed in state court in Los Angeles County, seeking to recover for the theft of 781 cartons of men’s woven jackets during a shipment from Haiphong Vietnam to Los Angeles and then on inland transit to Duluth Trading in Belleville, Wisconsin. “Bad actors” impersonated the brokered trucking company, cancelled the job, and showed up with a truck into which the cargo was loaded. The cargo insurer named the NVOCC, broker, and inland carrier, asserting causes of action under California law and the Carmack Amendment. The NVOCC moved for summary judgment on the claims asserted against it, first arguing that the claims under state law were preempted by federal law, as the contract of carriage is a maritime contract. Judge Park noted that the cargo insurer did not contest that argument and granted the demurrer (requiring repleading of the causes of action). The NVOCC also challenged the sufficiency of the pleading of the contract/deviation claims, and Judge Park explained that the claims referred to a contract but failed to give the terms as they relate to the incident. Accordingly, she granted the demurrer on that basis as well.
Kenneth G. Engerrand
Brown Sims, P.C.
Houston 1990 Post Oak Blvd Suite 1800 Houston, TX 77056 O 713.629.1580
New Orleans 365 Canal Street Suite 2900 New Orleans, LA 70130 O 504.569.1007
Gulfport 1915 23rd Suite B Gulfport, MS 39501 O 228.867.8711
Miami 2801 SW 149th Ave Suite 120 Miramar, FL 33027 O 305.274.5507
Quote
Two judges of the Florida Court of Appeal for the Fourth District commented on the apparent use of artificial intelligence in the pro se defendant’s appeal in Gouveia v. Meridian Financial Investments, 432 So. 3d 49 (Fla. App., 4th Dist., 2026).
Writing for the court, Judge May quoted this limerick that was generated with artificial intelligence:
There once was a litigant pro se,
Who let an AI lead the way.
It briefed every claim,
Cited cases—by name,
That vanished by morning’s next day.
Limerick on Pro Se Parties Using Artificial Intelligence (on file with the Fourth District Court of Appeal) (generated by ChatGPT 5.2).
Judge Lott wrote a concurring opinion “to highlight the need for prophylactic, rather than remedial solutions to the problem of improper use by pro se litigants of AI chatbots:”
That is not to minimize the well-recognized problems of improper use of AI by attorneys, particularly where AI generates hallucinated or fake authority that the attorney submits to the court without verification. But courts have been properly and adequately responding to this problem by using existing rules and tools to sanction attorneys who engage in this improper conduct. That toolbox works well enough for attorneys. Attorneys are repeat players in litigation. Sanction them, and they will learn from it. Monetary sanctions imposed on attorneys, who tend to be solvent, can make their adversaries whole for the time wasted by misconduct. If they repeatedly disregard sanctions orders, more severe discipline can be imposed by courts or state bars. Over time, I have no doubt that courts’ consistent response will lessen the problem of improper AI use by attorneys.
Pro se litigants, on the other hand, are usually not repeat players in the court system. The case at hand is their case. They have little experience or knowledge on how to litigate cases and how to, or not to, use tools like generative AI in that litigation.
All this creates a problem for the courts, for at least three reasons. First, remedial sanctions or warnings, like the one the Court rightly imposes on Appellant today, do nothing to prevent the problem of the continued use of AI by new pro se litigants who never received such warnings.
Second, there is a seemingly endless deluge of AI-generated drivel submitted by pro se litigants who have never received such warnings. I will not bother to collect authority sanctioning it; it is ample. Even more of it is dealt with in unpublished orders. Most commonly, the recalcitrant litigant simply loses without court comment on the AI problem, which is often the most economical way for a court to dispose of a given dispute. Any judge on any bench right now understands the pervasiveness of the problem.
Third, the AI-generated slop that pro se litigants serve up is a unique sort of gruel. Unlike real lawyers, AI Chatbots, at least in their current form, do not “think.” They make predictions about what words ought to come next in response to a prompt that the user provides it. This technology is very good at sounding right, but less adept at being right, especially where critical thought is required in creation of the content. Pro se litigants, reasonably, often do not appreciate the distinction and, lacking legal training, do not appreciate how or why a response might not be right. But it sounds right, so they put it in their brief to see what happens. And since the cost to generate the content is so low, they can put in a lot of it. The opposing party and the court are left in the position of breaking down why something that sounds right is not right, which tends to consume more resources than parsing through a traditional pro se appeal.
Pro se litigants of course cannot be faulted for using these tools. The lack of affordable legal services has been a perennial problem in the courts and legal professions. The problem is that AI Chatbots appear to the untrained eye to be a solution. But unless cautiously and thoughtfully wielded, they are no solution; they make the problem worse.
So in order to meaningfully solve the AI-slop problem, we need to get pro se litigants to understand, up front, that blind reliance on a Chatbot for legal assistance is not acceptable.
This is a much more difficult task than warning or sanctioning litigants on the back end. I have not seen a perfect solution.
Some courts have implemented rules or standing orders requiring all litigants, attorney and self-represented alike, to disclose the use of AI and certify its accuracy. This is probably the right starting point, and I would support adoption of such a requirement for this Court.
Chatbots are going to get better, and that’s going to make these problems worse. The question now must be how to address them on the front end.
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© Kenneth G. Engerrand, July 31, 2026; redistribution permitted with proper attribution.
