January 2026 Longshore Maritime Update No. 320
Notes from your Updater:
On November 14, 2025, Judge McFadden of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the suit brought by charter fishing boat companies who want recreational fishermen to keep more striped bass than allowed by the limitations developed by the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, an interstate compact entity formed by 15 states to coordinate fishery management (striped bass fishing has been prohibited in federal waters for decades, but it is allowed in state waters). Judge McFadden held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that sovereign immunity independently prevented the court from considering the claims against the state defendants. See Cape Cod Charter Boat Association v. Burgum, No. 1:25-cv-1457, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224881 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2025).
On November 17, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order of Magistrate Judge Cassady of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, declining the motion to compel arbitration of the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, Local Union 1410, in the suit brought by APM Terminals Mobile, LLC, following a disruption in operations at the Port of Mobile, Alabama, asserting that the Union breached the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement. See APM Terminals Mobile, LLC v. International Longshoremen’s Association, No. 24-11100, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30045 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025) (Pryor).
On November 17, 2025, Judge Damian of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas awarded attorney fees in the amount of $15,840.50 in connection with the default judgment entered in the suit brought by Centennial Bank against the M/Y MODERN DAY DRIFTER, III and its owner with respect to the unpaid balance owed on a note secured by a First Preferred Ship Mortgage. The award was based on hourly rates of $475/$385/$325 for attorneys (as a “straightforward vessel foreclosure action), and $175 for paralegals. Judge Damian also awarded the costs requested by the attorneys, $4,341.75. See Centennial Bank v. M/Y MODERN DAY DRIFTER, III, No. 0:25-cv-60705, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233802 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2025).
The December 2025 Update discussed the decision in Sun Terminals, Inc. v. Polo, No. 24-14016, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 26826 (11th Cir. Oct. 15, 2025), in which the Eleventh Circuit held that an ALJ lacks authority to grant a change of physicians but has authority to decide who the employee’s physician is. Sun Terminals moved for rehearing with the panel of the Eleventh Circuit, and the panel denied the request on November 18, 2025. See 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30440.
On November 24, 2025, Judge Aiken of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued an injunction ordering the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security to restore and maintain the helicopter rescue capacity of the Newport Air Facility in Newport, Oregon, that was to be closed on the eve of Dungeness crab fishing season (posing a grave risk to the fishermen in Newport and surrounding communities). See Newport Fishermen’s Wives, Inc. v. United States Coast Guard, No. 6:25-cv-2165, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230689 (D. Ore. Nov. 24, 2025).
We reported in the June 2024 Update that Judge Trenga of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the antitrust suit filed on behalf of a class of naval architects and marine engineers against Navy shipbuilders (asserting an “unwritten gentlemen’s agreement” not to “affirmatively recruit one another’s naval engineers” or naval architects), holding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient facts to toll the statute of limitations. See Scharpf v. General Dynamics Corp., No. 1:23-cv-1372, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72184 (E.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2024). The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On May 9, 2025, a majority of a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the putative class action brought against the nation’s largest shipbuilders and naval-engineering consultancies alleging a wide-ranging “no-poach” conspiracy in which the companies formed a “gentlemen’s agreement” not to recruit each other’s employees in order to drive down wages. The panel disagreed with the analysis of Judge Trenga, who concluded that a “non-ink-to-paper” agreement could not constitute an affirmative act of fraudulent concealment that would toll the four-year statute of limitations in the Sherman Act. Writing for the panel of the Fourth Circuit, Judge Wynn stated: “We hold that neither logic nor our precedent supports distinguishing between defendants who destroy evidence of their conspiracy and defendants who carefully avoid creating evidence in the first place.” See Scharpf v. General Dynamics Corp., No. 24-1465, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11258 (4th Cir. May 9, 2025). See June 2025 Update. The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing on June 13, 2025, and the shipbuilders and consultants, including Bath Iron Works, Electric Boat Corp., General Dynamics, Huntington Ingalls, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Newport News Shipbuilding, Bollinger Shipyards, Gibbs & Cox, Serco, CACI International, The Columbia Group, Thor Solutions, and Tridentis asked the Fourth Circuit to stay its decision while the defendants file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, on July 8, 2025, the appellate court declined to stay the issuance of its mandate. See Scharpf v. General Dynamics Corp., No. 24-1465 (4th Cir. July 8, 2025) (per curiam). On September 11, 2025, General Dynamics and other shipbuilders and consultants filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, presenting this question:
Congress has provided a four-year statute of limitations for antitrust claims alleging a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. 1 (Sherman Act), 15b (Clayton Act statute of limitations). Like other federal limitations periods, the Section 15b statute of limitations may be tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit parted ways with the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that plaintiffs who allege an unwritten conspiratorial agreement sufficiently plead an affirmative act of fraudulent concealment—even though nearly all plaintiffs claiming an unlawful conspiracy will be able to make such an allegation, and even though the bare assertion of an unwritten agreement does not reflect any active attempt to mislead third parties in order to conceal the conspiracy. The question presented is:
Whether plaintiffs adequately plead that defendants engaged in fraudulent concealment, for purposes of tolling the Section 15b statute of limitations, by alleging that defendants maintained an unwritten agreement.
General Dynamics Corp. v. Scharpf, No. 25-293 (U.S.). Meanwhile, after being reversed by the Fourth Circuit, Judge Trenga addressed the issues that he did not have to reach when he dismissed the case as untimely, and he rejected the arguments that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege the existence of a conspiracy, that plaintiff did not allege a plausible antitrust injury, and that individual defendants did not participate in the conspiracy (citing “the alleged ‘incestuous’ nature of the ‘small, close-knit, geographically concentrated industry,’ the alleged frequent interactions among executives, and the ‘education, specialized training, security clearance, and citizenship requirements’ that ‘made the pool of naval engineers small and the cost of replacement significant’ such that Defendants would have ‘every incentive to recruit each other’s employees.’” Scharpf v. General Dynamics Corp., No. 1:23-cv-1372 (E.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2025) (record citations omitted).
The Update has noted that the difficulties in salvaging “the only identified pirate shipwreck ever discovered,” the WHYDAH GALLEY under the command of Sam Bellamy, which sank off the coast of Cape Cod in 1717 (rumored to have chests of treasure from at least 53 other vessels that were robbed by the crew of the WHYDAH GALLEY), pale in comparison to the land-based disputes over ownership that have arisen from the salvage of the pirate treasure. See Buddenhagen v. Clifford, No. 2019-0258, 2024 Del. Ch. LEXIS 183 (Del. Ch. May 10, 2024) (Cook). See June 2024 Update. On December 2, 2025, more than 40 years after Barry L. Clifford discovered the WHYDAH GALLEY in 1982, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the decision of the court of chancery. See Buddenhagen v. Clifford, No. 228, 2025, 2025 Del. LEXIS 446 (Del. Dec. 2, 2025).
On December 5, 2025, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide an important issue of federal jurisdiction in cases involving arbitration (although in a non-maritime case). The question presented to the Court is:
Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may apply to confirm or vacate an arbitration award. But federal courts have limited jurisdiction over Section 9 and 19 applications. In Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 4, 9-11 (2022), this Court held that a federal court may exercise jurisdiction only if the application establishes diversity or federal-question jurisdiction on its face. A federal court may not exercise jurisdiction merely on the basis that the underlying dispute, save for the arbitration agreement, would have been justiciable in federal court. See id.
But what happens when a court initially exercises jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, stays the case pending arbitration, and is later faced with an application to confirm or vacate an arbitration award in the same case? The courts of appeals have sharply divided on the appropriate jurisdictional analysis. Several courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit below, have held that the initial exercise of jurisdiction creates a “jurisdictional anchor” that confers jurisdiction over a subsequent Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or vacate, even if jurisdiction would otherwise be absent. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that a court must establish an independent basis for jurisdiction over a Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or vacate.
The question presented is:
Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.
Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 25-83 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2025).
On December 8, 2025, Judge Saris of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts declared President Trump’s executive memorandum titled “Temporary Withdrawal of All Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf From Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government’s Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects” (directing federal agencies “to suspend issuing all new permits, leases, and other authorizations needed to develop and operate wind energy projects, both onshore and offshore, pending a wide-ranging assessment of federal wind leasing and permitting practices”) to be “unlawful” and vacated the order in its entirety. See State of New York v. Trump, No. 25-cv-11221, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252857 (D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2025).
The Update has reported that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the jurisdictional dispute between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) with respect to maintenance work at SSA Terminals’ Terminal 5 at the Port of Seattle, Washington. The National Labor Relations Board assigned the work to IAM-represented mechanics, and the ILWU filed a grievance against SSA Terminals under its collective bargaining agreement, seeking the value of the work assigned to IAM. An administrative law judge awarded the ILWU damages for the lost opportunity so that SSA Terminals would have to pay twice for the work, and SSA Terminals filed an unfair labor practice charge to which the ILWU claimed its conduct was immunized by the work-preservation defense. An administrative law judge rejected the defense, and the NLRB ordered the ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing the maintenance work at Terminal 5. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that its decision in Kinder Morgan allowed the ILWU to raise the work-preservation defense. Judge Miller, who wrote the decision for the Ninth Circuit, also concurred to suggest that the Ninth Circuit should reconsider Kinder Morgan en banc because it was wrongly decided. See International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 23-632, 23-658, 23-780, and 23-793, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 15101 (9th Cir. June 18, 2025) (petitions for rehearing en banc were filed by the National Labor Relations Board and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers). Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit applied the work-preservation doctrine as a complete defense to the claims brought by Samson Tug & Barge Co. against International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Alaska Longshore Division, and International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Unit 222, under the Labor Relations Management Act in connection with longshore work conducted at the Womens Bay terminal owned by Matson Navigation Co., which is a signatory to the All-Alaska Longshore Agreement. See Samson Tug & Barge Co. v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Nos. 24-5730, 24-6017, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21565 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025) (per curiam). Samson Tug filed a petition for rehearing en banc, and on September 30, 2025, the Ninth Circuit declined to hear the case en banc. See Samson Tug & Barge Co. v. International Longshore & Warehouse Union, Nos. 24-5730, 24-6017, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 25386 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2025). See November 2025 Update. On December 16, 2025, the Ninth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc in International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 23-632, 23-658, 23-780, and 23-793, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 15101 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025). The full Ninth Circuit will be presented with the validity of Kinder Morgan and the work-preservation defense.
On the LHWCA Front . . .
From the federal appellate courts
Vessel owner/operator did not violate any Scindia duties with respect to a longshore worker’s fall on a wet and poorly lit ladder in the hold of the vessel; stevedore whose longshore worker was provided by a labor supplier was a borrowing employer and was not subject to a negligence suit because of the exclusive remedy provision in the LHWCA; Alvarado v. Briese Schiffahrts GmbH & Co., No. 24-20476, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 32011 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025) (Wilson).
Alberto Alvarado, a nominal employee of Labor Finders, was sent to work at Jacintoport terminal in Houston, Texas to assist in loading cargo on the M/V BBC SAPPHIRE. While descending a wet and muddy ladder into the hold, he slipped and fell into the hold (he had to descend a first ladder, step off onto a transition platform, turn his body ninety degrees, and continue down a second ladder to the bottom of the chute). Alvarado brought this suit in state court in Harris County, Texas against Jacintoport and the owner and operator of the vessel, and the vessel defendants removed the case to federal court based on diversity. Jacintoport and the vessel defendants moved for summary judgment. Jacintoport argued that it was the borrowing employer of Alvarado, and its exclusive liability was LHWCA compensation. Judge Hoyt agreed, noting that Alvarado was supervised by one of Jacintoport’s gang foremen and was working at Jacintoport’s dock. Although Alvarado was paid by Labor Finders and received LHWCA compensation from Labor Finders’ insurance carrier, Judge Hoyt held that Jacintoport was entitled to summary judgment. Judge Hoyt then considered the Scindia turnover duty with respect to the vessel defendants. Alvarado argued that the condition of the ladder, lighting, and chute through which the ladder descended were hidden hazards that could not be anticipated by any stevedore. However, Judge Hoyt answered that the responsibility for lighting and for pointing out latent defects or unreasonably dangerous equipment lies with the stevedore, not the vessel. He added that mud, moisture, and dimly lit areas on a vessel are not, as a matter of law, unreasonable hazards. Accordingly, there was no violation of the turnover duty. Judge Hoyt also rejected the claim that there was a violation of the active control duty, concluding that the hold was under the control of the stevedore, and vessel crewmembers were not involved in the operations concerning the movement of the cargo. Finally, Alvarado argued that the vessel had a duty to intervene due to the poor lighting, foggy condition, and mud on the ladder and platform for which the vessel crew had actual knowledge. However, Judge Hoyt pointed out that it was only after the hold was inspected that Alvarado was permitted to descend into the hold, and that inspection eliminated any duty on the part of the ship’s crew to intervene. Therefore, Judge Hoyt granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the vessel defendants. See October 2024 Update.
Alvarado appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that there were fact disputes whether the vessel defendants breached the turnover duty and the active-control duty (he abandoned any argument on the duty to intervene as cargo operations had not yet begun). Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Wilson explained that the concession that cargo operations had not yet begun when Alvarado was injured also “dooms his claim under the active-control duty” as the duty is “applicable once stevedoring operations have begun.” Nonetheless, Judge Wilson discussed the viability of the turnover duty and the active-control duty. Alvarado argued that the ladder, chute, and lighting were not turned over in a condition that an experienced stevedore could perform the work with reasonable safety (and that the vessel defendants failed to warn of latent or hidden hazard that should have been known to the vessel defendants). Alvarado did not challenge the design of the ladder, only that the ladder, platform, and chute were wet and dimly lit. Judge Wilson began by answering the lighting argument with the rule that the obligation to ensure proper lighting in the area of stevedoring operations lies with the stevedore, not the shipowner (Judge Wilson also noted that Alvarado was aware that the area was dimly lit, so the lighting was not a hidden danger). Judge Wilson added that Alvarado’s expert conceded that foggy conditions and condensation are common aboard vessels. Therefore, there was no breach of the turnover duty. Alvarado argued that the vessel actively controlled cargo operations and the ladder chute, asserting that the chief mate of the vessel was responsible for overseeing cargo operations, including supervising the stevedore’s work to ensure that the cargo was properly loaded and unloaded. Judge Wilson responded that the argument conflated oversight with active control, explaining that “mere crew oversight is not evidence that a vessel exercised ‘active control over the actual methods and operative details’ of the longshoremen’s work.” Judge Wilson likewise rejected the assertion that there was active control because the vessel’s gangway watch directed Alvarado to the hatch cover to access the ladder because it did not show that the vessel’s crew controlled the timing or manner in which Alvarado was to descend the ladder to the hold. Accordingly, Judge Hoyt did not err in granting summary judgment to the vessel defendants. Alvarado also appealed the grant of summary judgment to Jacintoport based on the exclusive remedy of the LHWCA (as his borrowing employer), claiming that there were fact questions with respect to the 9 Ruiz factors that should have been decided before the court decided the issue. Judge Wilson explained that it is not necessary to resolve fact disputes on all of the Ruiz factors if the other factors clearly weigh in favor of borrowed-servant status. He agreed with Judge Hoyt that most of the factors were immaterial in this case, which turned on three factors—control of the employee/work, whose work was being performed, and whether there was an agreement between the original and borrowing employer. There was a formal agreement for Labor Finders to provide laborers to fulfill the obligations of Jacintoport, and Alvarado was assigned to work for a Jacintoport foreman for work performed by Jacintoport at Jacintoport’s dock. As Jacintoport secured LHWCA compensation for Alvarado, his exclusive remedy was LHWCA compensation and not a negligence cause of action. Therefore, Judge Wilson affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Jacintoport.
From the federal district courts
Court affirmed BRB’s reversal of ALJ’s denial of DBA claim because the employer rebutted the claimant’s original claim of exposure from burn pits but not his later claim of aggravation of his interstitial lung disease from exposure to dust; Northrop Grumman v. Hill, No. 3:23-cv-164, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226749 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2025) (Lambert), adopted (Dec. 9, 2025) (Berger).
Daniel Hill was employed by Northrop Grumman as a maintenance liaison/flight ops manager at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2018, where he alleges he lived in “primitive conditions” and was exposed to burn pits, aviation fuels, and solvents. He lived in a tent with eight other men that contained plywood cubicles with just enough room for a bed and table (he had to be mindful of mice, rats, and snakes). Dust flew everywhere in the tent when the HVAC system was turned on. He spent half of his workday on the flight line, overseeing the aircraft maintenance contractor, and the remainder in a tent with a similar HVAC system. Hill began experiencing bronchitis, coughing, and a runny nose in 2014, and he spent 20% of his time from 2014 to 2018 at a nicer facility in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Hill began having trouble breathing in July 2018 and was diagnosed with idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis/interstitial lung disease. In 2019, his physician stated that he was suffering from a progressive fatal lung disease with inevitable continued loss of function. He has not worked since returning to the United States in 2018. Hill filed a claim for benefits under the LHWCA, as extended by the Defense Base Act, and a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Henderson, who held that Hill established a prima facie case for interstitial lung disease that could have been caused by his working conditions; that the prima facie case that his idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis was due to work exposures such as burn pits, dust, and other pulmonary irritants was rebutted by the opinion of Dr. Patricia Rosen; and that, weighing all of the evidence, Hill failed to meet his burden to establish that the interstitial lung disease was work-related. The Benefits Review Board reversed the decision, holding that ALJ Henderson did not adequately address whether Northrop Gruman rebutted the Section 20(a) presumption. On remand, the case was reassigned to ALJ Panagiotis after ALJ Henderson retired, and ALJ Panagiotis declined to hold a de novo hearing because credibility determinations were not at issue. Based on the record, ALJ Panagiotis issued a decision awarding benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the decision, and Northrop Grumman filed this suit in federal court in Florida, requesting the court reverse the two decisions of the BRB and affirm the denial of Judge Henderson. The first issue presented by Northrop Grumman was whether Hill raised the issue of aggravation caused by exposure to dust at the first hearing so that a de novo hearing was necessary on remand. Hill’s LS-203 listed exposure to burn pits, aviation fuels, and solvents, and Dr. Rosen rebutted that exposure. However, the BRB determined that the medical evidence sufficiently established working conditions that could have contributed to Hill’s lung disease so that the presumption was not rebutted. ALJ Panagiotis noted that the issue of exposure to environmental dust was addressed before the District Director and in the evidence at the hearing, and he concluded that notice had been afforded to Northrop Grumman of a claim for aggravation from exposure to environmental dust (Hill was asked about dust in his deposition and stated that “the dust itself” was “certainly a contributor.” As the issue was addressed in the initial hearing, Magistrate Judge Lambert held that a de novo hearing was not necessary on remand. Northrop Grumman objected to the initial reversal by the BRB, complaining that the BRB was engaged in fact finding. Magistrate Judge Lambert disagreed, explaining that the BRB held that ALJ Henderson had addressed exposure from burn pits but had not addressed the exposure from dust. Accordingly, Judge Lambert recommended that the BRB’s decision be affirmed because it adhered to the statutory standard of review, and the BRB did not substitute its views for those of the ALJ. On remand, Northrop Grumman was given the opportunity to have Dr. Rosen review records addressing dust exposure, and Dr. Rosen advised that the records did not alter her initial opinion. Reasoning that the opinion failed to address the dust exposure aggravation claim, Magistrate Judge Lambert ruled that Northrop Grumman failed to rebut the presumption. Finally, Magistrate Judge Lambert rejected Northrop Grumman’s argument that the finding of disability was not supported by substantial evidence, agreeing that the evidence established that Hill could not return to his usual overseas work due to his disease, which was aggravated by exposure to dust. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Lambert recommended affirmance of the BRB. Neither party objected to the recommendation, and Judge Berger adopted the recommendation.
FrederickBarge worker supplied by staffing company to barge owner was a borrowed servant of the barge owner, and the tort claims against the barge owner and staffing company were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the LHWCA; Frederick v. GLO Resources LLC, No. 2:24-cv-1171, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228300 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2025) (Milazzo).
Travis C. Frederick was employed by a staffing agency, GLO Resources, on a job as a barge manager for Cooper Consolidated at Cooper Consolidated’s facility in LaPlace, Louisiana. He was traversing docked barges to perform fiberglass repair work on a damaged barge cover when he fell into the Mississippi River and drowned. His beneficiaries brought this suit in federal court in Louisiana against GLO Resources, Cooper Consolidated, and GLO Resources’ insurer, basing jurisdiction on the LHWCA. The defendants moved for summary judgment that the LHWCA provided the exclusive remedy for Frederick’s death and precluded claims for negligence (failure to train employees, failure to supervise employees, and failing to provide proper safety equipment to employees), asserting that he was an employee of GLO Resources and a borrowed servant of Cooper Consolidated. The beneficiaries did not respond, and Judge Milazzo evaluated the nine Ruiz factors, concluding that Cooper Consolidated had control over Frederick and the work he performed; the work performed was Cooper Consolidated’s work; the General Staffing Agreement between GLO Resources and Cooper Consolidated provided that GLO Resources would recruit, hire, and assign employees for Cooper Consolidated and would provide the payroll and human resources services as well as personal protective equipment, but the employees would take their direction from Cooper Consolidated, which would supervise the performance of its work; Frederick was assigned to work for Cooper Consolidated just six days before his death, so there was not time to acquiesce to the employment (but he did not ask for reassignment during that period); GLO Resources did not exert any control over Frederick while assigned to work for Cooper Consolidated; all tools for the work, except personal protective equipment, were provided by Cooper Consolidated; Cooper Consolidated had the right to request that Frederick be reassigned, and the source of funds for Frederick’s employment came from Cooper Consolidated. As the factors “overwhelmingly” supported the conclusion that Frederick was a borrowed servant, Judge Milazzo held that Frederick was a borrowed servant of Cooper Consolidated and that the exclusive remedy provision in the LHWCA barred the tort actions against Cooper Consolidated (as well as GLO Resources).
Judge dismissed claims of longshore worker against the ILA Local when the worker was struck by a car crossing the road on his way to the hiring hall; Pyatt v. International Longshoremen’s Association Local 1422, No. 2:23-cv-5772, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228642 (D.S.C. Nov. 20, 2025) (Norton).
Christopher Pyatt, a member of ILA Local 1422, received work assignments from the Local’s hiring hall in Charleston, South Carolina. There were more workers seeking assignments than the available work, and the early morning hours were busy with workers seeking assignments and then trying to get to the work location. On September 24, 2020, Pyatt drove to the hiring hall and had to park across the street. As he walked across the street, he was struck by a vehicle driven by Otis Whaley. Pyatt brought suit against Local 1422 in state court in Charleston County (alleging that the Local created an unreasonably dangerous traffic condition), Whatley, and Charleston Stevedoring Company, and the Local removed the case (arising under federal law). Pyatt settled with Whaley and moved for a voluntary dismissal of his claims against Whaley. Judge Norton denied the motion, reasoning that the dismissal would prohibit the defendants from seeking an allocation of liability to Whaley and his contribution as a joint tortfeasor under South Carolina law. The Local moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not owe Pyatt any legally cognizable duty of care, and Judge Norton agreed. He rejected the argument that the Local created an unreasonable risk that Pyatt would be injured in a vehicle-pedestrian accident on a public roadway by requiring the workers be physically present but providing inadequate parking, answering that it was Pyatt’s decision to park across the street. Judge Norton rejected the theory that the Local owed a duty of care because it voluntarily provided parking to its members, answering that the accident did not occur because Pyatt relied on parking provided by the Local. Finally, Judge Norton rejected the argument that the Local owed a duty for creating an artificial condition on the highway (abutting the hiring hall) that was dangerous to travelers, noting that traffic on the highway is a normal and natural condition. Therefore, Judge Norton granted summary judgment in favor of the Local.
After dismissal of the claimant’s DBA claim and dismissal of her pro se suit against her employer and carrier in federal court, the federal judge granted the claimant’s request to seal her medical records but declined to seal her name, contact details, or any other identifying information; Rashidiasl v. MEP (ESIS/Arch/Chubb), No. 3:23-cv-325, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228887 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (Curiel).
Fariba Rashidiasl claims that she was injured while deployed in Afghanistan by Mission Essential Personnel as a linguist. She brought this suit in federal court in California, alleging that she was denied medical benefits and compensation under the Defense Base Act by defendants, MEP (ESIS/Arch/Chubb) and Iqarus (International SOS). She attached a description of what happened as well as medical reports, emails, and a response to requests for admissions filed with the Office of Administrative Law Judges. Rashidiasl requested that she be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, and she moved for appointment of counsel. Finding the information provided about her assets to be insufficient, Judge Curiel denied Rashidiasl’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (advising that Rashidiasl could refile with an affidavit identifying all of her assets). Judge Curiel then reviewed the complaint, sua sponte, and held that the documents that Rashidiasl submitted for her complaint did not state a claim. Accordingly, Judge Curiel dismissed the complaint (with leave to amend). Judge Curiel also noted that the complaint may be barred by res judicata in light of litigation previously brought in the same federal court by Rashidiasl’s employer and carrier to enforce a discovery order by Administrative Law Judge Alford (resulting in dismissal of the DBA claim as a sanction). As the case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, Judge Curiel declined to appoint counsel for Rashidiasl. See July 2023 Update.
Judge Curiel’s leave to amend expired on June 30, 2023. On June 29, Rashidiasl mailed a motion seeking an extension of time to file an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. As the Ninth Circuit would not have jurisdiction over an order granting leave to amend, Judge Curiel granted another extension for Rashidiasl to file an amended complaint and an amended motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (to August 4). Instead of filing the amended complaint or motion, she wrote two letters to the court around August 3, complaining about the court’s procedures in this case and presenting facts to support her grievance against the defendants in connection with her claim under the LHWCA/DBA. Despite Judge Curiel’s efforts to accommodate the pro se plaintiff, he could not construe the letters as an amended complaint, and he struck them from the docket. He did, however, grant Rashidiasl one final opportunity to file an amended complaint and an amended motion by September 15 (advising that he would dismiss the action if a complete amended complaint and motion (or filing fee) are not filed by that date. See September 2023 Update.
The deadline to file an amended complaint passed, and Rashidiasl did not file an amended complaint or seek an extension of time to file one. Therefore, on October 3, 2023, Judge Curiel dismissed the action without further leave to amend based on failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to prosecute. Just over two years later (November 13, 2025), Rashidiasl sent a message to Chief Judge Bashant stating: “I respectfully request that San Diego district Court immediately seal and restrict public access to all my personal information, including my name, contact details, court records, and any other identifying information, is [sic] being displayed on Gov.info or others from my case 3:23-cv-00325-GPC-D.” Judge Curiel responded that there is a “presumptive right of public access to court records based upon the common law and the first amendment.” Thus, the party seeking to seal a judicial record “bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting the ‘compelling reasons’ standard.’” Judge Curiel noted that district courts have concluded that “the need to protect medical privacy qualifies as a compelling reason to seal records.” Accordingly, Judge Curiel found that there were compelling reasons to seal Rashidiasl’s medical records that were attached to the original complaint. However, Judge Curiel found that Rashidiasl had “not shown any compelling reasons to seal documents that include her name, contact details or any other identifying information.” Consequently, Judge Curiel agreed to seal three attachments that included Rashidiasl’s medical history and records, but he denied the request to seal Rashidiasl’s name, contact details, or any other identifying information.
From the state courts
Electrical maintenance worker injured on docked vessel was not a seaman and could not bring a claim under the Jones Act; his state claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the LHWCA; Badloo v. City of New York, No. 2025-01110, 2025 NY Slip Op 06587, 2025 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6758 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. Nov. 26, 2025) (per curiam).
Deoraj Badloo was injured while performing electrical maintenance work on a vessel owned by the City of New York/NYC Ferry Fleet and operated by HNY Ferry. Badloo brought this suit in state court in Kings County, New York against the owners/operators of the vessel as a seaman under the Jones Act and based on common-law negligence, and the defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Badloo was not a seaman, and the common-law claim was barred by the exclusivity of the LHWCA (applicable to Badloo as a worker injured on navigable waters). The defendants argued that Badloo only worked on docked vessels and did not sail on the vessels after his work was done. Judge Swern held that Badloo was not a seaman and that his state claim was barred by the LHWCA. Badloo appealed, and the Appellate Division agreed that Judge Swern properly granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Papai and the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Sanchez, noting that “the inquiry into the nature of the employee’s connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether the employee’s duties take him to sea.” Badloo failed the nature element of the test for seaman status because he “worked only on docked vessels, he did not sail with the vessels after his work was done, his tasks were those of a general electrician, he had no maritime license, he did not sleep on board, and he reported to a land-based supervisor.” The court also agreed with Judge Swern that Badloo was a land-based maritime worker injured on navigable waters whose exclusive remedy is provided by Section 5(b) of the LHWCA. Therefore, his state-law cause of action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision in Section 5(a) of the LHWCA. Thanks to Daniel J. Fitzgerald with Freehill Hogan & Mahar in New York for bringing this case to our attention.
And on the maritime front . . .
From the federal appellate courts
Fifth Circuit agreed with district court that breach of the captain/crew warranty voided coverage in yacht policy because, under applicable New York law, the yacht was an oceangoing vessel; Parr v. Yachtinsure, Ltd., No. 25-30134, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30862 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025) (per curiam).
Allan T. Parr, Jr., is the sole member of Parr T, LLC, which owns the 77-foot Marquis Open Bridge motor yacht AFTER PARR T. The vessel was insured by Yachtinsure with a policy providing for application of New York law when general maritime law is unavailable. During a voyage from Key West, Florida, in which Parr was operating the vessel, the vessel began taking on water, and a salvor identified the source of the leak as an unseated hose clamp that allowed water to enter via the propeller shaft. A salvor packed the opening of the leak and the vessel was taken to a shipyard for repair. The insurer denied the loss based on breach of express warranties in the policy, and Parr brought this suit against Yachtinsure in federal court in Louisiana. Yachtinsure moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Parr failed to have an approved mate aboard the vessel, in breach of the captain and crew warranty, and that the failure was also a breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness. The policy required a minimum of one underwriter-approved operator and one underwriter-approved mate during navigation. Parr was listed as an approved operator, but the question was whether the failure to have the approved mate voided coverage. Chief Judge Brown began by holding that state law applied to the issue pursuant to Wilburn Boat as there is no entrenched federal precedent requiring that the breach be the cause of the loss. Therefore, she looked to state law, pursuant to the choice-of-law provision in the policy. Parr argued that New York law prohibits named operator endorsements except for oceangoing vessels; however, Chief Judge Brown answered that the geographical limits of the policy extended from Maine to Texas and The Bahamas, not exceeding 250 miles offshore. Accordingly, she held that the vessel was oceangoing and that the express warranty was enforceable under New York law. As New York law requires literal compliance with express warranties, regardless of causal connection, Chief Judge Brown held that the breach of the warranty voided coverage and that the case should be dismissed. See May 2025 Update.
Parr appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that Chief Judge Brown erred in ruling that the AFTER PARR T was oceangoing within the meaning of New York law. He contended that the policy’s geographic limits showed that the vessel was prohibited from oceangoing travel because it was limited to operating near the coast. He also asserted that the vessel is a pleasure craft that is not the type of vessel intended as oceangoing. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, noted that the vessel was allowed to travel up to 250 miles from the Atlantic Coast and answering: “We cannot fathom how that is not permission to go upon the ‘ocean.’” The appellate court reviewed New York cases and noted that the New York courts have consistently deemed vessels to be oceangoing “where their insurance contracts expressly allowed some form of ocean travel, even if limited to a particular coastline.” In contrast, the New York courts have deemed vessels not to be oceangoing “where policies cabined their range to inland waters.” Although Parr asked the Fifth Circuit to craft its own definition of oceangoing from the general maritime law, the court declined to do so, pointing to the New York choice-of-law clause and noting that New York “has a well-developed jurisprudence on this question that points squarely in favor of Yachtinsure.” Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that Chief Judge Brown correctly dismissed the claim as barred under the terms of the policy.
Fifth Circuit affirmed award of salvage for catching and grounding barges that broke away from their fleets on the Mississippi River during Hurricane Ida at 20% of the fair market value of the barges; Currault v. American River Transportation Co., No. 24-30471, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 32014 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025) (per curiam).
This litigation arises from the breakaway of barges from American River Transportation Co.’s fleets on the Mississippi River after Hurricane Ida made landfall in Louisiana in August 2021. Capt. Nicholas Currault, Andre Currault, Troy Currault, and Capt. Sidney Freeman used Lower River Ship Service’s tug SHELL FUELER to catch the breakaway barges and run them aground to create holding places that acted as anchors to hold the barges in place on the bank of the river. The individual salvors and Lower River filed a salvage complaint against American River Transportation and the barges in federal court in Louisiana, seeking an award of salvage under the general maritime law and the International Convention on Salvage, 1989. The claims were tried to Judge Vitter, who found that the salvors were entitled to an award because they had acted voluntarily and had successfully saved 23 barges from marine peril. She then considered the factors under the Convention and general maritime law (THE BLACKWALL case) for the amount of the award. She found that the barges had a fair market value of $18,807,500, and that the salvage efforts were successful with respect to both the barges and other property, but she believed that the evidence of environmental damage that was prevented was too speculative. Considering the danger, the skill exhibited, and the value of the saved property, Judge Vitter believed that a substantial salvage award was merited. However, she reasoned that an award of 50% ($9.4 million) as requested by the salvors [the old moiety rule] would be a windfall. Instead, she awarded 20% of the fair market value of the barges, $3,761,500, together with prejudgment interest. See July 2024 Update.
ARTCO appealed to the Fifth Circuit, challenging whether the salvors had a “specific intent” to save ARTCO’s property and the amount of the award. ARTCO cited Judge Vitter’s finding that the salvors acted to save Lower River’s property and to protect other property downriver. However, ARTCO argued that they had no intent to rescue the specific ARTCO barges. The Fifth Circuit answered that the assertion that the salvors must have a specific intent “fails at the outset,” noting that ARTCO failed to identify any caselaw requiring “would-be-salvors” to show that they acted with the specific intent to rescue a defendant’s property (the court did not express an opinion on whether a party’s lack of intent might bar a salvage award under materially different circumstances). As the requirements for a salvage award were satisfied (marine peril, voluntary service, and success), the Fifth Circuit upheld Judge Vitter’s ruling that an award was merited. The Fifth Circuit then addressed whether the amount of the award was incorrectly determined and excessive. The appellate court cited the six factors from THE BLACKWALL and the ten factors from the International Convention on Salvage and advised that the court is bound to apply all of the factors. The Fifth Circuit noted that Judge Vitter had considered the ten factors from the Convention and applied them in consultation with the six BLACKWALL factors and general maritime principles. She concluded that seven of the Convention factors and four of the BLACKWALL factors weighed in favor of a substantial award. Independently reviewing her reasoning, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Judge Vitter acted within her permissible discretion (the Fifth Circuit did not have to decide whether the Convention or the general maritime law applied because Judge Vitter held that the Convention essentially adopted the BLACKWALL factors and her analysis would be the same under either framework). The Fifth Circuit explained: “The ‘only hard numerical limitation’ we have imposed on an award is that the amount of salvage award cannot exceed the ‘full value of the salved property.’” As Judge Vitter “faithfully applied” the factors from the Convention and THE BLACKWALL, the Fifth Circuit performed the “limited review” of a “general comparison to similar decisions” that is conducted in “the most deferential and general way.” Finding the range in nine of the highest-value awards after THE BLACKWALL to fall between 4% to 25% (and noting that the original code from Rhodes limited salvage awards to one-fifth of the vessel’s value), the Fifth Circuit held that the award of 20% fit within the range and was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the salvage award.
Fifth Circuit upheld release/waiver of consequential damages in offshore drilling contract, regardless of gross negligence or willful misconduct; ENSCO Offshore, L.L.C. v. Cantium, L.L.C., No. 24-30508, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 32480 (5th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (per curiam).
This case involves a dispute between the owner of offshore drilling rigs (Ensco) and the operator of offshore oil and gas platforms (Cantium). Ensco filed the suit in federal court in Louisiana seeking to recover for unpaid invoices. The complaint alleged subject matter jurisdiction in two paragraphs. One paragraph stated: “This Court has original jurisdiction over this action as it arises out of a maritime contract governed by federal maritime law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) [sic].” The second allegation stated: “Additionally, or alternatively, this Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 [sic], as the action arises out of the laws of the United States. Specifically, this action arises out of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . .” The complaint did not contain a specific designation with respect to Rule 9(h) and did not demand a jury. Cantium filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging that Ensco was liable for failing to provide adequate equipment and personnel and failing to perform operations in a workmanlike manner. Cantium included a jury demand in its answer and counterclaim. Ensco then filed an amended complaint with a Rule 9(h) designation and a motion to strike Cantium’s jury demand. In assessing whether to strike the jury demand, Judge Ashe only considered the original complaint because the amended complaint was filed after Cantium had answered and demanded a jury. Judge Ashe noted that when the complaint does not expressly cite Rule 9(h), the courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if the plaintiff made the required statement to invoke the court’s admiralty jurisdiction under Rule 9(h). Cantium relied on the decision of the district court in LeBlanc v. Panther Helicopters in which Judge Barbier held that the complaint’s allegation that the court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to admiralty jurisdiction and pursuant to LHWCA Section 5(b) and that the claimant brought suit pursuant to the OCSLA was not a sufficient identification of the claims under Rule 9(h). Judge Ashe was persuaded, however, by the Fifth Circuit’s T.N.T. decision in which the court held that the allegation that the suit was “for breach of contract, civil and maritime, and for maritime tort” was a sufficient “simple statement asserting admiralty or maritime claims under the first sentence of Rule 9(h).” As in T.N.T., the allegation that the action “arises out of a maritime contract governed by federal general maritime law” constituted a Rule 9(h) designation. Therefore, Judge Ashe struck Cantium’s jury demand. See May 2024 Update.
Ensco then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Cantium’s counterclaim in which Cantium sought more than $22.8 million for loss of the Kings Hill Well and more than $4.5 million in other damages as a result of Ensco’s failing to provide competent people, failing to provide adequate equipment, and failing to perform in a workmanlike manner. Ensco argued that the Master Service Contract between the parties contained a release for all consequential damages and that the sole remedy for a lost well is for Ensco to redrill the well to its prior depth at a negotiated redrill rate (but only if the loss was due to Ensco’s gross negligence or willful misconduct). With respect to the claim for consequential damages, Cantium argued that the limitation in the indemnity section (that it did not apply to gross negligence) should be applied to the provision in the contract that neither party would be liable to the other for consequential damages. Judge Ashe disagreed, stating: “No reasonable interpretation of the MSC results in applying the gross negligence exception from section 15.16 to limit the parties’ waiver of consequential damages in section 15.21.” As the waiver of consequential damages was unambiguous, Judge Ashe agreed that Ensco was entitled to summary judgment on the claims for consequential damages. Judge Ashe then addressed the provision in the contract that Cantium’s sole remedy when a well is lost or damaged is to have Ensco redrill the well at the redrill rate—if the well was lost because of Ensco’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. As Ensco had already redrilled the well, it fulfilled its sole responsibility to Cantium and was not liable for any other damages for the loss of the well. See September 2024 Update.
Ensco then moved for summary judgment for breach of contract that Cantium’s nonpayment of invoices was a breach of contract (resulting in damages of approximately $9 million) and, alternatively, that it was entitled judgement on its quantum meruit claim because it provided valuable services and materials that were accepted by Cantium. Cantium responded that Ensco was not entitled to summary judgment because there were genuine issues of fact whether Ensco’s performance fell below industry standard and violated the terms of the Master Service Contract. Judge Ashe agreed that there were fact issues that prevented summary judgment with respect to the contractual performance. And Ensco was not entitled to summary judgment on the claims for quantum meruit and promissory estoppel as there is a valid contract between the parties. Ensco also asserted a claim against Cantium for attorney fees and defense costs to defend Cantium’s counterclaim based on the indemnity provision in the Master Service Contract. Judge Ashe noted that the counterclaim sought damages that are the types of consequential damages for which the parties mutually waived the right to recover. The indemnity provision in the contract imposed an indemnity obligation that was not limited to claims brought by third parties. Thus, the contract “is reasonably construed as imposing a contractual penalty on a party who brings one or more of those waived claims, as Cantium did here.” Accordingly, Judge Ashe held that Ensco was entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs to defend the counterclaim. See November 2024 Update.
Cantium appealed the decision of Judge Ashe that the parties mutually waived recovery for consequential damages, including for gross negligence/willful misconduct. Cantium argued that the waiver of damages in Sections 15.6 and 15.21 was subject to the exception in Section 15.16 for gross negligence/willful misconduct. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, citing the rule of interpretation in maritime contracts that the contract must be read as a whole, with all provisions given full effect so that none are superfluous. In Section 15.21, the parties mutually waived and released categories of damages that explicitly include consequential loss (including spread costs). In Section 15.6, Cantium released ENSCO from claims for a damaged or lost well, but ENSCO was obligated to redrill the well at the redrill rate as Cantium’s “sole and exclusive remedy.” The Fifth Circuit held that the language of Section 15.6 foreclosed additional damages, even if the loss resulted from gross negligence or willful misconduct (noting that “sole and exclusive” means it is the party’s only remedy). The court explained that the terms gross negligence and willful misconduct appear elsewhere in the drilling contract, but they do not appear in Section 15.6 or 15.21. As Section 15.21 prohibits recovery of the damages sought by Cantium, regardless of whether they are the result of ENSCO’s gross negligence/willful misconduct, the Fifth Circuit held that Judge Ashe correctly denied recovery to Cantium (the court also rejected the argument that the provisions are ambiguous, answering that “a contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning.” Chief Judge Elrod agreed with the result, but she concurred to note the uncertainty in the maritime law on the issue whether one party to a maritime contract may contractually agree to indemnify another party for claims of gross negligence (citing Kenneth G. Engerrand, Indemnity for Gross Negligence in Maritime Oilfield Contracts, 10 Loy. Mar. L.J. 319 (2012)). She noted the collection of cases in the article that have reached “different conclusions on the question whether maritime contracts that limit the parties’ liability are valid.” She recognized the difference between releases of liability (as in this case) and indemnity agreements, stating: “It also may be that while releases between contracting parties is permissible, indemnifying parties for torts committed against third parties is void for public policy.” She concluded by stating: “We owe it to both those entering maritime contracts and district courts to provide greater clarity regarding the validity of these indemnifications and limitations of liability for gross negligence.”
Fifth Circuit reversed the vacatur of attachment of settlement funds in the bank account of an affiliated company, reasoning that the court must decide which entity has control of the funds; the appellate court also reversed the denial of leave to amend to assert a state alter ego theory to support the attachment; CH Offshore, Ltd. v. Mexiship Ocean CCC S.A. de C.V., No. 24-20525, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33495 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (Higginson).
CH Offshore, a Singapore company that supplies offshore vessels for the marine oil and gas industry, chartered a supply ship to Mexiship Ocean CCC S.A. de C.V., an energy company based in Mexico, for a term of 18 months. There was a dispute whether Mexiship Ocean violated the charter and wrongfully retained the vessel after the expiration of the charter, and an arbitration in Singapore awarded damages to CH Offshore against Mexiship Ocean. CH Offshore then filed this suit in federal court in Texas, seeking to garnish specified funds in a bank account that an affiliate of Mexiship Ocean (Mexiship Texas) maintains in Vantage Bank Texas (claiming that Mexiship Ocean owned the specified funds in the account). Non-party Mexiship Texas moved to vacate the writ of garnishment on the ground that the bank account belonged to Mexiship Texas and not Mexiship Ocean. CH Offshore then asked for leave to amend its complaint to add Mexiship Texas as a defendant and to plead Texas garnishment law as an alternative for the garnishment of funds, but Judge Hittner did not believe that CH Offshore demonstrated good cause for an amendment. Turning to the motion to vacate the garnishment, Judge Hittner found no evidence that Mexiship Texas maintained any of Mexiship Ocean’s property in Texas (including in the Vantage Bank account). Consequently, he vacated the garnishment. See January 2025 Update.
CH Offshore appealed, and Mexiship Texas (which is the entity that moved for vacatur) responded as appellee. Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Higginson addressed CH Offshore’ s arguments with respect to attachment under both maritime and state law. The dispute with respect to maritime attachment was whether Mexiship Ocean has property within the Texas district. Judge Hittner found that there was no evidence that Mexiship Texas maintained any of Mexiship Ocean’s property within the State of Texas (“let alone in an account at Vantage Bank Texas”). CH Offshore argued that Judge Hittner failed to consider the settlement agreement, accidentally forwarded to CH Offshore, that included a settlement agreement between Mexiship Ocean and Seahorse, by which Seahorse agreed to return a deposit from Mexiship Ocean in the amount of $808,238.72 to the Vantage Bank account with the beneficiary listed as Mexiship Ocean CCC LLC (“Mexiship Texas). CH Offshore argued that Mexiship Ocean owned the funds that CH Offshore sought to attach. Judge Higginson reviewed Texas law to determine who has ownership of the funds at issue and on the distinction between ownership and beneficiary status, noting the paucity of admiralty law on the issue. He explained that control, rather than beneficiary status, is the primary factor in determining ownership of bank accounts: “If the debtor determines the disposition of funds from the third party and designates the creditor to be paid, the funds are available for payment to creditors in general and the funds are assets of the estate. In this event, because the debtor controlled the funds and could have paid them to anyone, the money is treated as having belonged to her for purposes of preference law whether or not she actually owns it.” Judge Higginson recognized that evidence outside of the four corners of the settlement agreement was relevant, and he characterized the evidence as “complex.” “For example, Mexiship Ocean, as the named party to the Setttlement Agreement, chose to send the Seahorse funds to the Vantage Bank account, but without any codification of an investment relationship between Mexiship Ocean and Mexiship Texas, Mexiship Ocean did not apparently have to send the Settlement Refund to Mexiship Texas.” Concluding that there was sufficient evidence to require further explication, the Fifth Circuit held that Judge Hittner abused his discretion by failing to engage with the relevant evidence and caselaw regarding the Rule B attachment.” The court considered that Judge Hittner was “well-positioned to draw out where control, and therefore, ownership of the Settlement Refund lies on remand.” Judge Higginson then addressed whether Judge Hittner erred in denying CH Offshore leave to amend its complaint to add, in the alternative to its Rule B claim, a state-law basis for attachment using an alter ego theory of liability. Judge Higginson noted that Judge Hittner gave no explanation for his finding that there was no good cause for the amendment. Judge Higginson explained that alter ego determinations involve highly fact-based considerations that are within the prerogative of the district court. However, without an explanation for the denial, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision as an abuse of discretion.
From the federal district courts
There was a fact question of negligence of the owner of the barge and an assist tug despite the testimony of the seaman that the assist tug was not involved in the operation in which he was injured, but the barge owner did not owe the warranty of seaworthiness to the crewmember of the lead tug as the seaman was not a crewmember of the barge; In re American Commercial Barge Line LLC, No. 3:23-cv-364 c/w No. 3:23-cv-407, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223979 (M.D. La. Nov. 13, 2025) (Dick).
George Bates was employed by American Commercial Barge Line as a deckhand on the M/V SAFETY GOAL (ACBL is owner pro hac vice) in a barge fleeting operation on the Lower Mississippi River. Bates claims that he was injured while aboard the barge MTC 640 (owned by Marquette Transportation), and he brought suit against ACBL and Marquette (which also owned the tug M/V CRISTO SANTO that was involved in the operation) in state court in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. ACBL then brought this limitation action in federal court in Louisiana (Marquette also brought a limitation action that was consolidated with the ACBL limitation action). Bates filed a claim in the ACBL limitation action seeking to recover for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and failure to pay maintenance and cure, and ACBL filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting a McCorpen willful concealment defense that Bates is not entitled to recover maintenance and cure for his alleged neck injury. Before his application to work for ACBL, Bates had a work-related injury in which he was reported to have neck tightness and cervical myofascial pain syndrome. A subsequent report stated that he had neck pain. Several months later he visited the emergency room after fainting and falling onto concrete, reporting neck pain and a history of neck pain. He underwent a CT scan of his cervical spine, which reflected moderately severe disc space narrowing and mild osteophytic change at C5-C6 and C6-C7. In his employment application, Bates answered “no” to neck pain and whether he had ever had a CT scan or MRI. Chief Judge Dick considered the three elements for a McCorpen defense, beginning with intentional concealment or misrepresentation. Bates argued that he filled out the application to the best of his knowledge, but Chief Judge Dick answered that subjective intent is not necessary, citing the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the employer is only required to show that the seaman failed to disclose medical information in an interview or questionnaire that is obviously designed to elicit the information. As Bates failed to disclose his neck pain and the CT scan he underwent six months before his application, the first element was established. For the materiality element, Bates argued that he passed his physical and that he received an offer of employment prior to completing the questionnaire. Chief Judge Dick answered that the Fifth Circuit had rejected similar arguments and that ACBL had proven the materiality element with evidence that had Bates disclosed his prior treatment and condition, it would have inquired further to determine if he was employable. Finally, with respect to the connection between the injury and prior condition, ACBL only sought dismissal of the claim for maintenance and cure with respect to his alleged neck injury. As the withheld information involved his prior neck pain and CT scan, Chief Judge Dick held that the connection element was satisfied, and she dismissed Bates’ claim for maintenance and cure with respect to his alleged neck injury. See December 2025 Update.
ACBL and Marquette filed claims in each other’s limitation action, and Marquette sought summary judgment on ACBL’s claims, arguing that it did not breach any duty of care owed to Bates, that its tug was an assist tug working under the direction of ACBL and was entitled to exoneration, and that it did not owe the warranty of seaworthiness to Bates. Chief Judge Dick noted Bates’ testimony that Marquette did not direct his work and that the CRISTO SANTO was not involved in maneuvering the barges; however, she cited the contrary testimony from the captain of the SAFETY GOAL that the CRISTO SANTO was supposed to continue to hold the barge in place, but it released the outside barge, which contributed to Bates’ injury. Accordingly, Chief Judge Dick found a fact dispute that precluded summary judgment on the negligence claims against Marquette. Chief Judge Dick did grant summary judgment on Bates’ unseaworthiness claim against Marquette, reasoning that Bates could not assert the claim because he was not a member of the crew of the barge.
Judge declined to strike affirmative defense asserted by vessel owner to the survival action brought by the widow of a seaman who died on the high seas as the vessel owner was not the Jones Act employer of the seaman; Seals v. GulfMark Americas Inc., No. 2:25-cv-1447, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224131 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2025) (Milazzo).
Glenn Seals was employed by Tidewater Marine as a seaman and was assigned to work as a chief engineer on the M/V POLARIS, a platform supply vessel that was working in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of New York. He was electrocuted while performing his chores in the engine room of the vessel while it was on the high seas, and his widow, Mysti Seals, brought this action in federal court in Louisiana against Tidewater and GulfMark Americas (owner of the POLARIS) under the Jones Act and general maritime law. The defendants pleaded an affirmative defense that Seals’ recovery was limited to pecuniary losses pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act, and Seals moved for judgment on the pleadings that the defense was not available to Tidewater because her husband was a Jones Act seaman as to Tidewater. Thus, she asserted that she was entitled to bring a survival action for her husband’s pain and suffering against Tidewater under the Jones Act, but she agreed that DOHSA would bar the survival action against vessel owner GulfMark for her unseaworthiness claim. As the defense was properly available to one of the defendants, and its inclusion would not prejudice the parties, Judge Milazzo declined to strike the defense.
Diver who developed bends during a commercial dive in the Ohio River from a barge (spudded a gangplank’s distance from shore) was not subject to a “diver’s exception” to the test for seaman status and failed the nature element of the seaman status test; Stringer v. Specialty Offshore, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-165, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224150 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2025) (Ashe).
Nicholas Stringer worked for Specialty Offshore as a dive tender, apprentice diver, and laborer/general construction worker beginning on June 27, 2023. In December 2024, he worked for Specialty as a commercial diver on a project for Alcoa Chemical on the Ohio River in Newburgh, Indiana. The project was supported by a barge that Specialty rented for use as a platform to hold equipment for the project. Stringer helped load equipment on the barge and rode the barge as it was pushed to the location of the work (acting as a lookout). On location in Newburgh, the barge was spudded in place and remained stationary for the duration of the project except for one movement of five feet. The workers lodged ashore and drove to the location. Occasionally Stringer ate breakfast or lunch on the barge. Stringer made 8 dives in 14 days until he suffered from the bends, allegedly caused by the failure to provide him with in-water decompression and necessary medical treatment. Stringer brought this suit against Specialty in federal court in Louisiana under the Jones Act and general maritime law, and he moved for partial summary judgment that he was a seaman, arguing that there is a “diver’s exception” that divers are automatically considered Jones Act seaman without having to satisfy the test for seaman status. Alternatively, Stringer argued that he satisfied the test for seaman status. Judge Ashe rejected the “diver’s exception” argument with respect to Stringer and severed the issue whether Stringer satisfied the test for seaman status under Chandris/Sanchez for expedited determination. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and Judge Ashe decided the case based on the issue of whether Stringer had a connection to a vessel that was substantial in nature, pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Sanchez. Judge Ashe acknowledged that Stringer’s work as a diver “arguably constituted seagoing activity when he was diving.” However, considering the factors enunciated in Sanchez, Judge Ashe reasoned that Stringer owed his allegiance to a shoreside employer, not a vessel. He was assigned to multiple different vessels when he worked for Specialty, many of which were not owned by Specialty and to which he did not owe allegiance. The fact that he rode on a vessel on one occasion did not satisfy the requirement that he travel with the vessel from port to port. There was no evidence that he would work on the barge again after the Alcoa job ended. For 8 of the 9 jobs Stringer performed for Specialty, he was never more than a gangplank’s distance from shore. Failing the nature test under Sanchez, Judge Ashe dismissed Stringer’s seaman’s claims with prejudice.
Seaman who brought his complaint in federal court based on the Jones Act and general maritime law with a request for trial by jury was allowed to amend his complaint 2 1/2 years later to withdraw his jury demand; Smith v. Oceaneering Mobile Workforce LLC, No. 2:23-cv-469, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224875 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2025) (Dossier).
James Earl Smith allegedly contracted COVID-19 while working for Oceaneering Mobile Workforce on the drill ship OCEAN BLACKLION in the Gulf of America off the coast of Louisiana. He brought this suit in federal court in Louisiana on February 7, 2023 against Oceaneering and the owner of the drill ship, asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law, checking the federal question box as the basis for jurisdiction. Three days later, before issuance of a summons, he filed an amended complaint, repeating his causes of action under the Jones Act and general maritime law and requesting a trial by jury. Smith later filed a Second Amended Complaint (adding an additional defendant). The Second Amended Complaint continued to assert the Jones Act and general maritime law as the basis for jurisdiction and continued to request a jury trial. All of the scheduling orders reflected that the case would be tried by a jury. In October 2025, Smith moved to amend his complaint to withdraw his jury demand and to designate the case for a bench trial in admiralty. The defendants objected, and Magistrate Judge Dossier stated that Smith could withdraw his jury demand under Rule 39 if there was no right to a jury trial on some or all of the issues. The answer depended on whether the complaints contained an election to proceed under the admiralty jurisdiction when they stated that jurisdiction was based on the Jones Act and general maritime law. Magistrate Judge Dossier noted that the “preferred technique is to expressly invoke Rule 9(h).” However, she added that when the pleading is unclear, the courts examine the totality of the circumstances from the party’s pleadings and actions to determine if a Rule 9(h) designation was made. She explained that Smith repeatedly identified the diverse citizenship of the parties, but there was no express reference to diversity jurisdiction. She added that Smith’s repeated requests for a jury trial were “incongruous with his reliance on admiralty jurisdiction.” Although Smith checked the box for federal question as the basis for jurisdiction on the civil coversheet, that document is not a pleading. Magistrate Judge Dossier noted the Fifth Circuit’s Romero case, which held that the invocation of both admiralty and diversity is treated as a Rule 9(h) designation, even though there is a request for a jury trial. Although the defendants argued that judicial estoppel should preclude Smith from withdrawing his jury demand, Magistrate Judge Dossier cited the Fifth Circuit’s Bodden decision in which the court stated that the district court should simply deny the jury request when the plaintiff invokes admiralty jurisdiction and requests a jury. Therefore, she allowed Smith to withdraw his jury demand and to proceed with a bench trial.
Passenger who fell on wet stairs because of the combination of a slippery substance and disrepair of the stairs failed to sufficiently allege notice for the counts involving failure to warn, failure to maintain, and negligent supervision; but she adequately alleged counts for negligent design, construction, and selection of materials and negligent failure to train; Hernandez v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:25-cv-22122, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225392 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2025) (Bloom).
Denise Hernandez, a passenger on the CARNIVAL MAGIC, slipped and fell on a wet substance while walking down an exterior staircase from deck 12 to deck 11 on the ship. She brought this suit in federal court in Florida against the cruise line, asserting claims for negligent failure to warn, negligent design, construction, and selection of materials, negligent failure to maintain, negligent training of personnel, and negligent supervision of personnel. The cruise line moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the first three counts failed to sufficiently allege notice; that the first count did not allege that the danger was not open and obvious; and the training/supervision counts were improperly pleaded. Judge Bloom rejected the argument with respect to pleading the condition was not open and obvious, noting that Hernandez had alleged that the dangerous condition of the wet stairs was not open and obvious because water blends in with the steps, and passengers may not know how slippery the stairs become when wet. With respect to notice, Hernandez argued that she had pleaded a specific dangerous condition for which notice was not necessary—that the nosing of the step was not parallel with the deck (and was angled down), which robbed Hernandez of the opportunity to catch her fall. Judge Bloom answered that the Eleventh Circuit has “rejected the position that notice can be imputed to a shipowner merely because the shipowner created the dangerous condition.” Before considering whether Hernandez established notice of the dangerous condition, Judge Bloom addressed the nature of the dangerous condition—a combination of the wet stairs and the disrepair of the slip-resistant strip. Although the cruise line complained that the combination of multiple conditions was improperly pleaded, Judge Bloom disagreed, noting that the plaintiff is entitled to define the dangerous condition. As Hernandez did not have evidence of similar incidents, she had to rely on caution signs in other areas of the ship and the claim that the problem of wet stairs is an ongoing and repetitive issue that imputes notice to the cruise line. Judge Bloom held that Hernandez’s assertions were insufficient, and she dismissed the counts for negligent failure to warn and negligent failure to maintain for lack of sufficient pleading of notice. With respect to the count based on negligent design, construction, and selection of materials, Hernandez pleaded that the cruise line selected material for the exterior steps that it knew or should have known becomes dangerously slippery when wet when not properly maintained and repaired. Judge Bloom held that the pleading was sufficient to establish notice of the dangerous condition. Judge Bloom reached different results for the pleading of the claims for negligent training and negligent supervision. Hernandez adequately alleged that the cruise line was negligent by failing to reasonably train its crew to inspect, clean, dry, and warn passengers of the dangerous conditions on the vessel and failed to ensure implementation or operation of its training programs that were alleged in the complaint and that included the open and deck and stairs included in the incident. However, negligent supervision requires that the employer should have become aware of problems involving a particular employee, and there was no allegation of notice of an unfit crewmember. Therefore, Judge Bloom dismissed three of the counts with leave to amend them.
Judge granted summary judgment on claims of disabled passenger who was run over by departing passengers while disembarking the cruise ship for failure to establish a dangerous condition with respect to the gangway and disembarking; Gourley v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:23-cv-24300, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226534 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2025) (Bloom).
Tammy Gourley, who is disabled, was injured on the gangway to the CARNIVAL VISTA while disembarking the vessel when two passengers hit her with suitcases and ran over her left ankle while running down the gangway. Gourley had been separated from her husband, who is disabled, during the disembarking of disabled and elderly passengers because the crew did not believe he was disabled. The cruise line had three crewmembers working at the checkpoint, who were trained to stop passengers from running, but there were no crewmembers stationed at specific points on the gangway. Gourley brought this suit against the cruise line in federal court in Florida, asserting counts of direct and vicarious liability for negligence and negligent failure to warn. The cruise line moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence of any negligence, of a dangerous condition, or of notice of a dangerous condition. Gourley responded that the cruise line has a non-delegable duty to provide safe ingress/egress (a safe gangway), that it was negligent for failing to properly monitor the gangway and allowing passengers to run down the gangway while disabled passengers were disembarking, and that there was constructive notice because of the cruise line’s corrective measures. For the vicarious liability count, Gourley identified the three crewmembers who took no action to prevent two non-disabled passengers from running down the gangway, in breach of the non-delegable duty. Additionally, she argued that the crew contributed to the hazard because they disputed the disabled status of her husband and others, which caused her to be separated from her husband. Judge Bloom noted that Gourley did not plead that the employees allowed the passengers to run down the gangway, only that they were negligent in allowing the passengers access to the gangway. However, Gourley could not establish that the passengers were not permitted to be on the gangway or that the crewmembers violated any guidelines or policies. Similarly, Gourley failed to establish that the commotion caused her injury because it required an impermissible inferential leap to conclude that her husband would have stopped the passengers from running over Gourley. With respect to vessel direct liability, Gourley alleged that the cruise line was negligent for failing to implement a sufficient system to allow disabled passengers to disembark the vessel safely, but Judge Bloom answered that the lack of a sufficient system by itself, is not a dangerous condition. Similarly, the claim that there were insufficient crewmembers at the checkpoint and on the gangway was not a dangerous condition and was relevant to the issue whether there was a dangerous condition from allowing both disabled and non-disabled/elderly passengers to disembark using the same ramp. As Gourley failed to establish that non-disabled and non-elderly passengers were allowed on the gangway (or that the individuals who caused her injury were not disabled or elderly), Judge Bloom held that there was insufficient evidence of a dangerous condition or that a dangerous condition caused her injury and granted summary judgment
Passenger who fell on a tender boat had to plead notice for her claims against the cruise line asserting “use of unsafe tender” and “failure to maintain tender in safe condition;” Griffin v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:25-21878, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228502 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2025) (Altman).
Trinnell Griffin was a passenger on the CARNIVAL LIBERTY on a cruise from New Orleans, Louisiana to the Western Caribbean. Griffin disembarked the LIBERTY to a tender boat to take her to Grand Cayman and fell on wet stairs on the tender. She brought this suit against the cruise line and the operator of the tender (Caribbean Marine Services) in federal court in Florida, alleging claims of “Use of Unsafe Tender” and “Failure to Maintain Tender in Safe Condition.” The cruise line moved to dismiss her Second Amended Complaint for failing to allege notice of a hazardous condition on the tender. Griffin responded that she was asserting a claim for vicarious liability that did not require a pleading of notice; that the cruise line had a non-delegable duty to provide safe ingress and egress by tender; and that no notice is required when the defendant created the dangerous condition. Judge Altman rejected the argument that the complaint asserted a claim for vicarious liability because Griffin alleged that the cruise line breached its non-delegable duty. However, as the complaint did not mention direct or vicarious liability, Judge Altman gave Griffin an opportunity to clarify the theory of negligence (noting that the current pleading was insufficient). Judge Altman also rejected the argument that notice was not necessary for a claim of breach of a high degree of care, answering that the case cited does not “suggest that plaintiffs can circumvent the notice requirement by artfully pleading the breach of a non-delegable duty.” Finally, Judge Altman rejected the argument that the claim of slipping and falling on wet stairs was the same as alleging that the defendant created the unsafe condition. Accordingly, Judge Altman dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Griffin did file a Third Amended Complaint, bringing a count for “Vicrious [sic] Liability” against the cruise line; direct liability against the cruise line for breach of a non-delegable duty; and negligent failure to warn. Griffin, who had not served the tender boat operator, deleted the tender boat operator from the Third Amended Complaint.
Federal judge held that state pleading that marine insurer converted property by disposing of property in a warehouse (that did not include an amount sought) was insufficient to support removal based on diversity, and the court also lacked admiralty jurisdiction for the removal; Brand Guy LLC v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., No. 7:25-cv-9567, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230608 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2025) (Halpern).
The Brand Guy LLC brought this suit in state court in Rockland County, New York against Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. to recover for conversion of property stored at the insured premises in Monsey, New York that was allegedly disposed of in connection with an insurance claim under a marine insurance policy. Brand Guy previously filed suit in the same state court against Liberty Mutual based on breach of its insurance policy and for a declaratory judgment, seeking in excess of $805,000. Liberty Mutual removed that case based on diversity and admiralty and eventually requested a conference with the court to schedule a motion to dismiss. Brand Guy dismissed the first suit and then filed the second suit, this time alleging a conversion but not containing an ad damnum. Liberty Mutual removed the second state suit on the ground that, based on the prior allegations, Brand Guy was seeking in excess of $805,000 and the parties are diverse. Liberty Mutual also alleged that the federal court had admiralty jurisdiction over the dispute arising from a marine insurance policy. Brand Guy did not have an opportunity to file a motion to remand. Two days after the removal, Judge Halpern sua sponte remanded the case, concluding that the jurisdictional amount for diversity was satisfied. Although Brand Guy had previously indicated damages exceeded the jurisdictional amount, Judge Halpern held that statement was not relevant to the amount in controversy for the conversion claim that is the subject of the second suit. Holding that the pleading was insufficient to show diversity jurisdiction and that the court “also lacks admiralty/maritime jurisdiction over the suit,” Judge Halpern remanded the second suit to state court.
Most claims of passenger who burned his feet while performing barefoot on the hot deck of a cruise ship trying to win the World’s Sexiest Man competition were dismissed because of the open and obvious condition of the deck, but the passenger sufficiently established notice from prior incidents to pursue a claim of negligent failure to maintain; the passenger failed to establish an intentional act to support his claim for punitive damages; Foster v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 1:24-cv-21736, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228501 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2025) (Altman).
Edward Foster, a passenger on the GRANDEUR OF THE SEAS, sustained burns on his feet while partaking in the World’s Sexiest Man competition on the pool deck of the ship. He brought this suit against the cruise line in federal court in Florida, asserting three counts of negligence and demanding punitive damages. The cruise line moved for summary judgment that the hot pool deck was an open and obvious hazard and that Foster did not introduce evidence to support his vicarious liability claim or his claim for punitive damages. Foster moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice. The competition required that the male passengers perform for three female judges, one at a time. The contestant before Foster poured beer on himself and the deck, and Foster removed his sandals because he was concerned that he would slip on the beer while wearing sandals. He recognized that the deck was hot and uncomfortable, but he did not believe he would suffer burns during the three performances (which were each lasting between 30 and 60 seconds). During the last performance, he had to leave after 24 seconds because the deck was so hot. The skin was peeling from the bottom of his right foot, and he had suffered second degree burns on both feet. The cruise line argued that all of the negligence counts should be dismissed because the danger was open and obvious, citing generalizations about pool decks from another case. Judge Altman did not have to rely on generalizations because Foster was in physical contact with the deck, knew that it was hot, and continued to perform for three separate judges for over a minute because he wanted to win the competition. Judge Altman rejected Foster’s responses as “bordering on frivolity”—that he was justified in continuing because he was on a Royal Caribbean ship and believed that it was a safe environment and his subjective observation about the warmth of the deck was not relevant in determining whether a duty existed. Judge Altman granted summary judgment on the counts except for the claim for negligent failure to maintain. He also granted summary judgment on the claim for vicarious liability as there was no evidence that crewmembers were trained with respect to the danger of hot decks. Turning to the claim for punitive damages, Judge Altman noted the difference in opinions in the Southern District of Florida with respect to the availability of punitive damages, but he did not have to address the difference because Foster failed to demonstrate that the cruise line had actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the high probability that injury would result, yet proceeded despite that knowledge. He summarized: “Foster bases his claim only on Royal Caribbean’s ‘intentional choice year after year to do absolutely nothing[.]’ That’s just plan-old negligence. It may even be gross negligence. But it isn’t intentional.” Judge Altman then considered Foster’s motion that the cruise line was on notice of the dangerous condition from reports of at least 25 passengers that had burned their feet on the cruise line’s Bolidt Future Teak decks. Judge Altman noted that there were superficial differences between the incidents, but he answered that all of the incidents involved barefoot passengers burning their feet from contact with hot Bolidt Future Teak decks. Accordingly, he granted summary judgment that the cruise line had constructive notice.
Neither marina/repair facility nor towing tug were liable for damage to a yacht during its towage from one side of the marina to the other; In re Port Everglades Launch Service, Inc., No. 0:23-cv-62315, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228596 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2025) (Dimitrouleas).
The SELAH, a 116-foot Azimut motor-yacht owned by DWB Asset Management and insured by Accelerant Specialty, was brought to Bradford Marine’s facility in Fort Lauderdale for repair. Bradford Marine engaged Cape Ann Towing to tow the SELAH from its berth on one side of the marina to a travel lift on the other side. While en route, the vessel began to take on water and suffered damage. Cape Ann Towing brought this limitation action in federal court in Florida, seeking to limit liability for the two vessels that were involved in the towing. DWB Asset Management and Accelerant Specialty, subrogee of DWB Asset Management, brought claims in the limitation action based on negligence and breach of the warranty of workmanlike service. The claimants also brought a third-party claim against Bradford Marine for negligence, breach of the warranty of workmanlike service, and vicarious liability. Bradford Marine moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that its liability was capped at $500,000 pursuant to the exculpatory clause in the Dockage and Repair Contract with DWB Asset Management. The claimants argued that the exculpatory clause was ambiguous because it conflicted with the provision that Bradford Marine was not liable for any economic losses or consequential damages: “if Bradford disclaims all consequential and economic damages, they argue, there is little or nothing left to apply toward the purported $500,000 limit, rendering the cap illusory.” Bradford answered that the contract differentiated between direct damages and consequential damages, excluding consequential damages and capping liability for direct damages, such as the cost of repair. Judge Dimitrouleas agreed with Bradford Marine, reasoning that to find an ambiguity, “there must be a genuine inconsistency or uncertainty in meaning.” Applying ordinary rules of construction, the clauses could be given meaning with no ambiguity. The claimants also argued that the exculpatory cap did not apply to the towage as the limitation only applied to “liability under this agreement.” Judge Dimitrouleas disagreed, reasoning that the liability was capped “under any theory” of recovery, which encompassed all three causes of liability asserted, including the claim for vicarious liability. Therefore, he held that the liability of Bradford Marine was capped at $500,000. See August 2025 Update.
Judge Dimitrouleas held a bench trial in which several theories were presented as to the cause of the accident (water entered through the garage door or the engine room door that had not been properly sealed before the tow, or water came in through the exhaust pipes). Judge Dimitrouleas found that there was insufficient evidence to determine the exact cause of the entry of water. He then considered whether Cape Ann Towing was negligent. He explained that, with respect to towage, the owner of the tow is responsible for the seaworthiness of the vessel, and the tug is responsible for the safe navigation (“A contract merely for towage does not require or contemplate such a delivery as is ordinarily deemed essential to bailment.”). The yacht claimants argued that the tug captains were negligent for failure to establish sufficient communication with the yacht crew before the tow, failed to establish a pre-tow plan, failed to conduct a sufficient visible inspection before the tow, and towed the yacht too quickly. Judge Dimitrouleas rejected the arguments, finding that the tug captains properly interpreted the actions of the yacht crew as an indication that the yacht was ready for tow, that a pre-tow plan is not customary for this type of tow, that a visual inspection was not likely to reveal any conditions of unseaworthiness, and that the rate of speed not unusual or the cause of the damage. Judge Dimitrouleas noted the different lines of authority on the issue of whether a warranty of workmanlike performance is owed in a towage situation (doubting that it would apply when there was no contract between Cape Ann Towing and DWB Asset Management); however, he found that the yacht claimants failed to show that the tug captains failed to perform the towing services properly and safely. Consequently, Judge Dimitrouleas did not have to decide if there was privity or knowledge for limitation of liability. As to Bradford Marine, the yacht claimants argued that it failed to alert the tug captains of ongoing repairs, failed to transition the yacht into the slings of the travel lift as it took on water, and prematurely released the dock lines before the yacht was attached to the tug lines. Judge Dimitrouleas answered that it was the obligation of the captain of the yacht, not Bradford (which had not begun any work on the vessel), to provide information about the yacht’s condition. He added that Bradford would have had no reason to believe the vessel was unseaworthy for the short tow to the travel lift as the vessel had recently been towed a much farther distance. As the other allegations were not the cause of the damage, Judge Dimitrouleas concluded that Bradford was not negligent and did not breach any contractual duty that would give rise to a breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance. Accordingly, Judge Dimitrouleas entered judgment in favor of Cape Ann Towing and Bradford Marine.
Offshore platform owner and operator were not liable under state law for claim of welder/employee of independent contractor who was injured by the condition he was trying to repair; Allemond v. Talos QN Exploration LLC, No. 4:24-cv-2560, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229701 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2025) (Lake).
Talos QN Exploration and QuarterNorth Energy own and operate a platform located in the Vermillion area of the outer Continental Shelf of the Gulf of America off the coast of Louisiana. The owner/operator contracted with Facilities Consulting Group and Acadian Contractors as independent contractors to assist in decommissioning the platform. Anthony Daw was employed by Facilities Consulting to be in charge of the platform. During the work, Daw noticed that a conductor pipe on one of the wells on the platform was moving. Daw advised Banning Ohlin, the person in charge of the Acadian crew, to secure the conductor. Once the conductor was secured with a come-along, Acadian was going to weld support braces onto the cellular deck to further secure the conductor from moving. During the welding, Cody Allemond, an employee of Acadian, placed his finger between the angle iron and conductor pipe, and his finger became caught when the conductor pipe moved. Allemond brought this suit in federal court in Texas against the platform owner/operator under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, asserting claims for negligence/gross negligence and premises liability under Louisiana law (applicable under the OCSLA). Allemond asserted claims under two statutes. Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code (vicarious liability) provides that a principal owes a duty to its independent contractor when the principal retains some control over the methods or details of the contractor’s work. The defendants told Facilities Consulting and Acadian to secure the moving conductor, but they did not tell them how to secure it. As there was no evidence that the defendants controlled the methods used by Acadian, Judge Lake granted summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim. With respect to premises liability under articles 2317, 2317.1, and 2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code, Judge Lake held that there were fact questions whether the defendants had custody over the platform at the time of the injury, and he then considered whether the moving conductor was an unreasonably dangerous condition vis-à-vis Allemond. The defendants argued that Allemond was injured by the condition he was asked to repair, which was a routine job for an experienced welder like Allemond. Allemond responded that he was not warned that the conductor was moving after being secured by the come-along, that he could not see the movement of the conductor because he was wearing his welding hood, and the heavy seas made it more likely that the conductor would move. Citing Allemond’s experience and the multiple warnings to avoid pinch points between his hand and finger placement, Judge Lake held that there was no material issue of fact whether the moving conductor was an unreasonably dangerous condition vis-à-vis Allemond, and he dismissed the suit with prejudice.
Lack of maritime attorneys in Oklahoma and lack of personal jurisdiction over Oklahoma claimants in Washington in rem action over the wreck (and artifacts) of a vessel that sank 150 years ago were not excuses to set aside the default entered two years before in the in rem action; Rockfish, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, No. 2:22-cv-1659, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230832 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2025) (Robart).
This litigation arises from the efforts of Rockfish, Inc. to locate, recover, and preserve the S.S. PACIFIC, a side-wheel steamer that sank as a result of a collision with the sailing vessel ORPHEUS on November 4, 1875, off the coast of Washington. Rockfish brought this in rem action against the vessel and artifacts recovered from the vessel and, after the time to file claims expired, the court entered a default judgment against those who did not file a claim. The Update subsequently reported that Judge Robart declined to set aside a settlement entered into between insurers of gold and specie cargo on the PACIFIC, and Rockfish, giving the insurers 1.598% of the net proceeds from gold cargo from the wreckage and Rockfish 98.402% of the proceeds. On June 13, 2025, Judge Robart granted Rockfish the exclusive right to salvage the vessel and enjoined all other salvors from engaging in salvage operations within certain coordinates. Two years after the court entered the default on claims, Nancy Spencer and Robert Manley filed a letter with the court, asserting a claim for artifacts, assets, and bodily remains from the PACIFIC. They followed the letter with a motion to set aside the default order. The claimants presented arguments based on personal jurisdiction, lack of actual notice of the claim to the vessel, the advanced age and health issues of the claimants, and their status as pro se litigants living in a state without an abundance of maritime attorneys (Oklahoma). Judge Robart rejected the arguments, noting that this is an in rem action for which the court “need not have personal jurisdiction over Claimants to adjudicate ownership of the vessel at issue.” He added that actual notice was not necessary for the court to exercise in rem jurisdiction and that Rockfish had provided constructive notice as required. Finally, Judge Robart was sympathetic to the claimants’ circumstances, but he answered: “The law requires that pro se litigants follow the same rules of procedure as parties represented by counsel.” Judge Robart explained: “Because the court does not consider the Claimants’ advanced age, Claimants’ medical status, or the limited availability of maritime attorneys in Oklahoma to be extraordinary circumstances, the court denies Claimants’ motion to set aside judgment on these grounds.” Accordingly, Judge Robart dismissed the claims.
Prior incidents in which passengers were injured by falling ceiling tiles did not afford notice to the cruise line of the specific dangerous condition of the ceiling panel that fell on the passenger in this case; judge rejected argument that a falling ceiling panel must have been caused by structural defects that persisted for an extended period; Bennett v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:25-cv-24215, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231640 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025) (Moore).
Karen Bennett, a passenger on the CARNIVAL FREEDOM, was injured when a ceiling panel fell on her while she was walking in a corridor on Deck 7 of the ship. Bennett brought this suit against the cruise line in federal court in Florida, alleging counts for negligent maintenance and negligent failure to warn. The cruise line moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to sufficiently plead notice. Bennett cited seven prior incidents of passengers injured by falling ceiling tiles or panels on vessels operated by the cruise line, but Judge Moore answered that Bennett had only provided one sentence about each accident that did not explain why the incident was substantially similar. He added that the incidents occurred in different corridors on different ships. Judge Moore rejected the argument that the prior events need only be similar enough to allow the jury to draw a reasonable inference of foreseeability, reasoning that the cruise line must have notice of the specific dangerous condition, “not that ceiling tiles or panels can fall generally.” Alternatively, Bennett argued that “by its very nature, falling ceiling panel must be caused by structural defects that have ‘persisted for an extended period before detaching.’” Judge Moore disagreed, answering that the complaint was “devoid of allegations that help the Court infer the ceiling panels must have collapsed because of a condition that persisted for an extended period.” Therefore, Judge Moore dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
38-foot commercial workboat that assisted in dredging on the Alabama River is a “covered small passenger vessel” that is excluded from the Limitation of Liability Act (employer’s paying day rate for use of the vessel constituted consideration so that the employees were passengers for hire); In re MV/MS ADALYN, No. 4:25-cv-1984, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233590 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2025) (Rosenthal).
Hunter Marine Group and Michael Quain Neward Pittman are owner and bareboat charterer of the ADALYN, a 38-foot commercial workboat weighing less than 100 gross tons. Hunter Maine entered into a contract to provide the ADALYN and the tug JOHN D to Encore Dredging to assist in dredging on the Alabama River. The ADALYN was carrying eight Encore employees from the DREDGE RANGER, which was working near Monroeville, Alabama, toward a landing just north of the Highway 84 Bridge crossing. The ADALYN ran aground and hit a stationary steel pipe, causing injuries to the employees of Encore. The employees brought suit against Hunter Marine and Encore in state court, and Hunter Marine and Pittman filed this action in federal court in Texas, seeking to limit liability. The employees argued that the ADALYN was a “covered small passenger vessel” that is excluded from the Limitation Act by the 2023 Amendment that was enacted after the CONCEPTION fire. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and Judge Rosenthal recited the provisions in the Act: “The Act defines a ‘covered small passenger vessel’ as ‘a small passenger vessel . . . that is’ (1) ‘not a wing-in-ground craft; and’ (ii) ‘carrying’ (1) ‘not more than 49 passengers on an overnight domestic voyage; and (11) not more than 150 passengers on any voyage that is not an overnight domestic voyage.’” The Act defines a “small passenger vessel” as “a wing-in-ground craft, regardless of tonnage, carrying at least one passenger for hire, and a vessel of less than 100 gross tons as measured under section 14502 of this title, or an alternate tonnage measured under section 14302 of this title as prescribed by the Secretary under section 14104 of this title—(A) carrying more than 6 passengers, including at least one passenger for hire . . . .” The owner/operator of the ADALYN argued that a small passenger vessel must be both a wing-in-ground craft and a vessel of less than 100 gross tons and that the employees were neither passengers nor passengers for hire. Judge Rosenthal disagreed. She answered that the definition of small passenger vessel is disjunctive, not conjunctive. She explained: “Although the definition uses ‘and’ in between the wing-in-ground and 100-gross-tons criteria, the statute places the article ‘a’ before each vessel description and uses a comma to separate them. This tells the reader that the operative verb in the definition, ‘means,’ is distributive.” As the ADALYN is a vessel of less than 100 gross tons, she turned to the issue of whether the vessel carried more than 6 passengers, including at least one passenger for hire. She reasoned that the issue was whether the employees, directly or indirectly, paid Hunter Marine to travel on the ADALYN (contributed consideration as a condition for the carriage). Hunter Marine argued that it did not contribute consideration for the carriage because it paid a flat, daily rate for usage of the vessel. Judge Rosenthal rejected that assertion with a comparison to a patron who buys a season pass to Disney World or a basketball fan who buys season tickets for the Houston Rockets. She concluded: “The flat, daily fee—‘an economic benefit’—was a condition for the claimants’ carriage on the ADELYN, making them ‘passengers for hire.’” Therefore, Judge Rosenthal held that the Limitation Act did not apply. Finally, the vessel owner/operator argued that the court should not dismiss the federal action seeking a concursus of claims because Rule F should apply, even though limitation of liability was not available. Reasoning that there was no support for that argument in the Limitation Act, Judge Rosenthal dismissed the federal suit and lifted the stay.
From the state courts
Suit against designer/manufacturer/seller of float plane that crashed in Puget Sound could proceed under THE PENNSYLVANIA Rule based on violation of FAA regulations, but it could not proceed on a state negligence per se theory; state statute of repose was not inconsistent with admiralty law and barred products liability claim under state law; punitive damages were not available for unairworthiness claim; Hilty v. De Havilland Aircraft of Canada, No. 23-2-15840-7 (King Cty. Wash. Super. Nov. 17, 2025) (Whedbee).
This litigation arises from the crash of a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) aircraft, owned by Northwest Seaplanes and operated by West Isle Air into Puget Sound, killing the pilot and all nine passengers. The estates of the passengers brought this suit against Northwest Seaplanes and Viking Air Limited, the current Type Certificate holder (seeking to hold Viking liable as the designer, manufacturer, and seller of the airplane). The plaintiffs settled their claims, leaving the claims of Northwest Seaplanes against Viking based on negligence per se, product liability, breach of warranty, and punitive damages. Judge Whedbee was presented with two motions. Northwest Seaplanes sought a ruling that Viking was negligent per se for certifying the aircraft as airworthy despite an allegedly defective design that rendered the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator assembly not reasonably safe (in violation of the Washington Products Liability Act). Viking sought a finding that the sole cause of the crash was the fault of the chief maintenance officer for Northwest Seaplanes (Jim Lambert), who installed an allegedly unauthorized moisture seal into the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator assembly. For the claim of negligence per se, Judge Whedbee accepted that the state may modify or supplement maritime law by creating liability that the admiralty court will enforce when the state action “is not hostile to the characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation.” However, the state statute cited for the negligence per se claim was a “non-starter” as maritime law (applicable to the crash in navigable waters) applies the doctrine of THE PENNSYLVANIA Rule for a presumption of causation, not a presumption of negligence. Judge Whedbee allowed the negligence claim against Viking to proceed under THE PENNSYLVANIA Rule for violation of FAA regulations, but he dismissed the claim for negligence per se with prejudice. Judge Whedbee found that Viking had rebutted the presumption from THE PENNSYLVANIA Rule, and there were fact questions that precluded summary judgment. Turning to Viking’s product liability claim under Washington law, Judge Whedbee reasoned that the Washington statute of repose (12 years) did not conflict with maritime law, and he dismissed the state product liability claim with prejudice on the ground that Northwest Seaplanes did not offer evidence that the useful safe life of the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator assembly is longer than 12 years. Finally, Northwest Seaplanes sought punitive damages because the manufacturer/seller misrepresented to the Canadian Department of Transportation and the United States Civil Aeronautics Board that the model complied with Civil Air/Federal Aviation Regulations. Viking argued that airworthiness cases were similar to unseaworthiness cases in which the Supreme Court has declined to allow an award of punitive damages. Northwest Seaplanes sought to avoid that reasoning by arguing that the claim was for misrepresentation, not airworthiness. Judge Whidbee disagreed, answering that the claim hinged on the airworthiness of the plane. However, he added that Northwest Seaplanes failed to establish willful, wanton, or outrageous conduct. Accordingly, he dismissed the claim for punitive damages with prejudice.
Kenneth G. Engerrand
President, Brown Sims, P.C.
Houston 1990 Post Oak Blvd Suite 1800 Houston, TX 77056 O 713.629.1580
New Orleans 365 Canal Street Suite 2900 New Orleans, LA 70130 O 504.569.1007
Gulfport 1915 23rd Suite B Gulfport, MS 39501 O 228.867.8711
Miami 2801 SW 149th Ave Suite 120 Miramar, FL 33027 O 305.274.5507
Quote
Offshore drilling has long stood at the uneasy intersection of national energy demand, ecological vulnerability, and environmental justice. Extracting oil and gas from beneath the ocean floor offers astounding returns but carries equally extraordinary risks. Spills, seismic disruption, and cumulative pollution imperil delicate ecosystems, while frontline communities along the coast continue to shoulder a disproportionate share of the harms. Notwithstanding the risks, the energy industry presses forward, drawn by the promise of tapping into the vast reserves buried offshore. That pursuit depends on the federal government’s decision to lease access to the seafloor for oil and gas production.
Healthy Gulf v. United States Department of the Interior, 152 F.4th 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2025) (Childs).
The Longshore/Maritime Update is for anyone interested in current longshore and maritime cases and news. Please invite others to join the group that receives the Update. They may do so by sending an email message to LongshoreUpdate+subscribe@groups.io. The content will be in the form of summaries of recent developments, court decisions, commentary, and (where possible) links to the decisions. Generally, updates will be limited to once a month. Anyone working in the longshore/maritime environment should find this useful. To unsubscribe at any time, just send an email message to LongshoreUpdate+unsubscribe@groups.io.
© Kenneth G. Engerrand, December 30, 2025; redistribution permitted with proper attribution.
